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Preface 
Agricultural research has played an important role in increasing world food production over the 
past decades to levels exceeding total food demand. The sad reality, however, of currently one 
billion food-insecure people, urges us to identify the major causes of the discrepancy between 
worldwide plentiful availability and insufficient access to food, and to reconsider our research 
approach and methodologies to help meet the most basic food requirement for all people. 
Food security is more strongly related to food entitlement than to food availability, pointing to 
the importance of poverty alleviation through shared economic development. This has different 
implications at the scales of the entire globe, nation, region, or household. Continued 
availability of food depends on natural resources and trade, where issues like sustainability of 
production and self-reliance under changing global conditions are crucial. Access to food should 
be assured by sustained income in a secure and stable socio-cultural and political setting. 
Obviously, food security is a complex issue and recommendations to alleviate food insecurity 
should be based on multi-disciplinary, multi-dimensional and participatory approaches. 
It is towards this end that a seminar series was organized on Food Security at different scales: 
issues, challenges and opportunities. It offered an opportunity for scientists from a number of 
relevant disciplines to present their view on food security along with the importance of various 
production factors, economic conditions, and socio-cultural behavior. The series was initiated 
from a political perspective, followed by an inventory of the various disciplines presented in 
these proceedings. We hope that the information reveals the importance of all disciplines 
involved, and provides some new impulses to the food security debate to encourage innovative 
and interdisciplinary research approaches. Clearly this initiative needs to be pursued . . . 
Prem S. Bindraban 
Herman van Keulen 
Arie Kuyvenhoven 
Rudy Rabbinge 
Peter Uithol 
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P.S. Bindraban 
l . Policy on food security 
I. Duijvestijn 
Directorate General International Cooperation (DGIS), Ministry for Development Co-operation, 
P.O. Box 20061, NL-2500 EB The Hague, The Netherlands 
1.1. Why food security? 
Should we really devote a whole seminar series to food security? My first thought was: haven't 
we debated enough the subject, and what do we do with the pile of existing policy papers? Let's 
not talk, let's implement! Setting goals and objectives is easy. The challenge is to reach them! 
Twenty-five years on and two World Food Summits later we are still faced with the fact that 800 
million people go hungry, and a further two billion suffer from severe vitamin and mineral 
deficiencies. 
That is why food security is still one of the main issues of Dutch development policy. It is 
important that the right policy choices are made. Policy choices are strongly influenced by r-
esearch. Research priorities have a strong influence when it comes to determining which 
problems and indeed whose problems are solved first, and how, and thus they indirectly help to 
shape the world of tomorrow. Today I shall examine a few subjects which dominate the inter-
national debate and which I believe wil l play a crucial role in addressing the problem of food 
security in the future. I hope a few of them will be discussed in depth in some of the following 
seminar sessions. 
As an introduction to the subjects, I wil l briefly say something about food security in general 
and its predominant place in Dutch development policy. 
Empty stomachs, an outrage and a threat! 
It was 1985.1 was in Zitenga on the Mossi Plateau in Burkina Faso. It was the first time in eight 
years of working in the Sahel that I saw women and children who were in such a miserable 
state of malnourishment and hunger. I felt helpless and experienced a strong urge to do 
something. Most of you wil l recognize that feeling. Although thirteen years have since past, 
that feeling still inspires me to continue the fight for food security. I know that the situation has 
not fundamentally changed, either in Zitenga or in other rural areas in the developing world. 
Besides ethical, there are socio-economic reasons to put food security high on the political 
agenda. Lack of food security is both the cause and effect of poverty. Poverty alleviation is the 
core objective of Dutch development policy. Improving the food security situation of individuals 
and households wil l make a major contribution to alleviate poverty. Food security also con-
tributes to social and political stability, which form a precondition for macro-economic growth. 
Finally lack of food security can spark off armed conflicts and civil wars. The recent problems in 
Kenya and Tanzania find their roots in food insecurity. People's livelihoods are threatened. 
Farmers and pastoralists literally fight for their access to natural resources to secure their 
livelihood and that of their families. 
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1.2. What is food security? 
"That at all times, each individual has access to food in such quantities and of such quality as to 
enable him or her to lead an active and healthy life". This is the definition used by The 
Netherlands. It is also the most commonly used and internationally accepted one. Over time the 
production-oriented approach of food security has changed to a more integrated approach, re-
flecting the different components of food security. 
Availability, equal access, stability and quality are the four components that have to be 
integrated in a food security policy. Only when all these components are integrated in such a 
policy, is food security likely to be achieved. I wil l use these four components as a guideline in 
the analysis of current development policies. I wil l demonstrate that most policies focus on only 
one or two components. This is one of the main reasons why attempts to provide food security 
and eradicate poverty are failing. I wi l l distinguish three levels of food security: global, national 
and household level. Only when the four components are adequately addressed at these three 
levels, can one expect real progress to be made. 
1.3. Global level 
"Will the earth be able to feed its population given current trends in population and economic 
growth and changes in production technologies?" At the global level availability of food seems 
the main concern of scientists and policy makers. Numerous research papers deal with the 
world food situation and the prospects of global food security. In my opinion the focus on 
availability is too large. I am personally confident that we will be able to find technological 
solutions to raise productivity in an ecological sustainable way, so as to produce enough food 
to feed the future world population. I am less convinced that in the future all the people in the 
world wil l be adequately fed. At the global level, insufficient account is taken of conditions for 
equal access, stability and quality. I would like to share with you a few of my concerns. 
In the past, strong state interference and donor intervention did not lead to food security for all. 
The current wind of liberalization that blows through our world economy wil l certainly lead to 
accelerated growth. The inclusion of agriculture in the GATT/WTO round in 1994 struck an 
important blow against the heavily distorted world markets in agricultural products, and is 
likely to have a positive impact on the food situation at world level. However, whether the 
benefits of this growth wil l ultimately have the effect of alleviating poverty and improving food 
security remains to be seen. Even if one assumes complete trade liberalization in the long term, 
this would by no means ensure perfect competition and as you know, perfect competition is a 
precondition for liberalization. Trade liberalization without perfect competition is not a 
preferable alternative to national protectionism, because of the level of profits made by the 
holders of monopolies. 
In a situation where the conditions for perfect competition have not been fulfilled, market 
deregulation benefits powerful economic actors, both private and political. But while the 
powerful gain, others lose! The losers in this case are developing countries. Experience has 
already shown that low-income countries deficient in food do not share the advantages of a 
freer world market. In fact they can become even more disadvantaged. In a situation like this, 
the notion of equal access to food for all countries is no more than a Utopian dream. 
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The outcome of the Uruguay Round and of the coming WTO Round relates solely to the 
obligations of governments. It is up to national governments to remove trade barriers, but it is 
the business community that actually engages in trade. Multinational corporations may engage 
in strategic alliances to turn terms of trade in their favor and use monopoly margins as a 
substitute for tariffs. This is reinforced by other trends such as concentration, specialization and 
chain management. The emergence of multinational firms makes it more difficult for individual 
countries to fight monopolistic practices. However, at international level there is as yet no 
institution that can deal with monopolies and cartels. The WTO has no clear competition policy. 
Who wi l l guarantee perfect competition in the future? Is a code of competition necessary and is 
there room for an institution at the global level that can ban monopolies and settle disputes? 
One should not only look at the question of settling disputes between governments, but also at 
the possibility of creating civil courts that could hear and deal with complaints from private 
parties about monopolistic pricing. I think that this issue needs a lot of attention in the near 
future and in the coming WTO Round. 
Price volatility is another problem affecting food security. Liberalization is expected to lead to 
an increase in the price volatility of agricultural commodities, especially grains. This wil l lead to 
an increase in macro-economic instability and affect macro-economic growth. Increased price 
volatility wi l l particularly hit food-importing developing countries and major exporting coun-
tries of agricultural commodities. Appropriate price risk management instruments should 
receive more attention in food security policies. The Food Aid Convention, which aims to assist 
food-deficient developing countries with balance of payment problems does not contribute 
structurally to problems related to price instability, nor did Stabex, Sysmin or other Agricultural 
Commodity Arrangements. There is a need for better stabilizing instruments. Much has been 
written on this subject, but up to now, ideas have not been translated into practical options. 
At global level the quality aspect of food is addressed under the heading of consumer concerns, 
that is to say concerns expressed by consumers regarding the safety of food and in the way food 
items are produced. Consumer concerns are becoming more and more important in trade relati-
ons. However, I would like to issue a warning in this respect. Consumer concerns can lead to 
unfair competition and trade restrictions, especially when very high quality and safety standards 
are set, and thus prevent developing countries from entering the market. They can also squeeze 
developing countries out of existing markets. A good example is the EU's decision to limit the 
import of fish products to countries that fulfi l l certain EU criteria, concerning hygiene and 
sanitation, becoming effective the first of January 1999- Countries who want to export to the EU 
must prove that they fulfi l l the conditions. Countries like Ghana and Mozambique wil l not be 
able to export to the EU any more. A similar measure on beef imports, led to a sharp reduction 
in the number of developing countries that export beef to the EU. Although concern for food 
quality and sustainable or ecologically produced food products is legitimate, it can help to 
prevent developing countries from participating fully in world food trade and, ultimately affect 
food security. Consumer concerns should not be redressed by restricting imports from deve-
loping countries, but by assisting them to overcome obstacles. Thus a positive and constructive 
approach is necessary. 
To summarize: At global level there are three important issues which, in my view, need further 
debate and research. Firstly, the problem of perfect competition; how and by whom can perfect 
competition be guaranteed? Is a special code of competition a solution? Secondly, the problem 
of price volatility and the search for better price risk instruments and, lastly, consumer concerns: 
how can they be addressed impeding developing countries integrating in the world market? 
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Solving these problems wil l help to bring food security within the reach of most developing 
countries. 
1.4. National level 
Food security is the prime responsibility of national governments. In the past, food availability 
was the prime objective of food security policies. This led to food self sufficiency strategies with 
measures such as import restrictions, subsidies on inputs, price subsidies and food aid. Active 
state intervention was an accepted instrument. Research on high yielding crop varieties was 
seen as a logical policy. However, food security for all has not been achieved. Even where 
progress has been made, a large part of the population still lives in extreme poverty and in a 
food insecure situation. India is an example of a developing country that has gone from being a 
net food importing country to a net exporter. Despite this, India is home to many of the world's 
malnourished. 
Nowadays food insecurity is more a poverty issue. Food self sufficiency is no longer seen as the 
key issue. The focus is more on good governance and sound macro-economic policy. The neo-
liberals have taken the lead. Far-reaching state intervention made way for market orientation. 
The private sector and the market are supposed to do a better job. Liberalization and privatiza-
tion are part of all macro-economic policies in developed as well as in developing countries. 
For some time now, developing countries, especially the vast majority of African countries, have 
accepted the need for fundamental policy reform. Most countries are working with the World 
Bank and IMF to implement tough, politically risky adjustment programs. It is undeniable that 
some progress has been made, the question is whether the gain justified the pain. 
In general the food security situation did not improve indeed; the situation often worsened. In 
adding social dimensions to adjustment programs, the most negative effects of adjustment have 
been cushioned, but no measures have been taken to tackle fundamental shortcomings. Why 
did the adjustments not have the expected results? 
In the first place: liberalization took place in a situation governed by imperfect markets and 
without accompanying public investments in agricultural infrastructure. 
The liquidation of the state-controlled marketing boards in Africa did not bring about the 
expected gains in efficiency, nor did it boost exports. Sometimes private monopolies or 
oligopolies took the place of government monopoly, sometimes the private sector did not react 
adequately. Ivory Coast and Cameroon lost their export market for cocoa because the private 
sector was not able to maintain quality standards after the liquidation of the cocoa marketing 
Boards. 
The withdrawal of subsidies often failed to produce the desired effect. Effective demand for 
food and non-food products decreased as food prices rose. Higher producer prices did not, 
generally speaking, lead to an increase in food supply, because of the lack of private investment 
in productive technologies. Private investments wil l only be remunerative if basic agricultural 
infrastructure, which cannot be financed by the individual farmer, such as feeder roads, a credit 
system for small farmers and market information systems, is present. 
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Structural Adjustment Programs were most probably too much tailored to the western situation, 
where strong institutions and a dense infrastructure permit the private sector to take over from 
government. 
Secondly, if developing countries are told to liberalize and open up their markets for foreign 
competition, it would be nice if developed countries did the same. Unfortunately this is not 
always the case. The best example is the EU, with its highly protected agriculture. It is only 
under strong pressure and very gradually, that the EU has been prepared to change its Common 
Agricultural Policy. In spite of promises to grant least developed countries (LDC) better access to 
the markets of developed countries, the first EU proposals in Agenda 2000 do not contain any 
offer to developing countries in this respect. Moreover, this cannot give the developing 
countries much confidence in the recipes they get prescribed. 
What have been the consequences of these policy reforms for food security? Availability of 
food, especially the capacity to produce food, has decreased. In this respect I would like to draw 
special attention to the soil fertility problem in Africa. Soil fertility is becoming a serious limiting 
factor in efforts to increase food production, even more than the lack of precipitation. Availabi-
lity of food, especially the capacity to produce food, could be increased if Agricultural Structural 
Adjustment programs and Agricultural Investment Programs gave more priority to food crops, 
public investments in soil fertility and the agricultural institutional infrastructure. Attempts to 
solve balance of payments problems, focus predominantly on commercial crops. Public invest-
ments in credit systems, marketing and research, just as in the past, concentrate on boosting 
commercial crops. Food crops are neglected and, together with price liberalization, often lead 
to rising food prices, stagnating food supply and rising import bills for food. In Africa the 
increase in the yield and productivity of the basic food crops for domestic consumption in the 
last 20 years was on the average 5 kg per hectare compared with over 30 kg per hectare yield 
for export crops. 
Access to food can easily diminish in a situation of liberalization. In the short term, price 
liberalization and the withdrawal of food subsidies push up food prices. Privatization and the 
liquidation of state enterprises increase unemployment, leading to falling incomes and 
decreasing purchasing power. Low-income groups in cities are particularly hit by food 
insecurity. Strong economic growth in the mid term does not guarantee increased access to 
food, because of rising income inequality. Social safety nets may form temporary solutions, but 
there should be a much greater focus on income distribution and employment policy. 
Access to food can also be increased by raising the production capacity of the rural poor, 
especially small farmers both male and female. Higher prices for food crops are not enough. 
Access to land, security of tenure, agricultural and institutional infrastructure such as credit, 
market access and input supply are more important. Research should focus on improving 
agricultural productivity, with particular emphasis on small farmers in low-income countries. A 
focus on labor-intensive technologies could help them to make better use of their comparative 
advantages. 
The stability of supply is influenced by weather conditions and increased price volatility as a 
consequence of liberalization. Bad harvests require coping mechanisms at national and local 
level. Experiences with cereal banks in the Sahel show that they can form a successful coping 
mechanism at local level, but require a lot of institutional capacity building. 
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The grain marketing boards were supposed to stabilize food supply and prices. They failed to do 
so at national level, and most of them were liquidated. Additional food imports often caused 
balance of payment problems and had a negative impact on overall economic growth. Food aid 
can be used as import support, but it's negative effects on local food production is difficult to 
assess. At this moment there is no coping mechanism that can effectively counter the negative 
effects of price volatility on economic performance. Price risk management instruments are 
needed, and require further discussion and elaboration. 
In short, food security policies should form an integral part of macro-economic policy and be 
reflected in agricultural policy. Although in recent years more attention has been paid to the 
social dimension of structural adjustment, most adjustment programs fail to pay explicit atten-
tion to or develop a policy on food security. More priority for food crops, price coping mecha-
nisms for stability and supply, imperfect markets and public investment in soil fertility and 
agricultural institutional infrastructure are, in my opinion, the issues on which researchers and 
policy makers should concentrate. 
1.5. Household level 
The food security situation can be measured with a simple yardstick: the nutritional status of 
individual family members. 
For years Malawi was cited as the example of an African country that had made tremendous 
progress in development after independence. Impressive growth rates, progress in education 
and health services, and food self sufficiency at national level. It took quite some years, and 
hard statistical evidence, before donors and the government were willing to acknowledge that a 
malnutrition rate of 40 to 45% among children was not cause of euphoria. 
Malnutrition is not easy to tackle. It demands more than just secure food and income. In fact it 
requires a varied range of activities for different target groups. In 1994 a Conference on 
Nutrition took place, in 1995, the Social Summit, which resulted in the 20/20 initiative and in 
1996 we had The World Food Summit. Objectives are no problem, the political wil l is there, 
relevant theories and knowledge are available, there is no lack of policies. We are simply failing 
to put what we know into practice. Admittedly, developing countries lack the means and 
capacity to take the required action, but donor countries face similar problems. We have no 
nutrition specialist on our embassies. The World Bank reduced the number of nutritionists in 
their staff to three, so their programs no longer address nutrition. 
I have said that there are enough nutrition policies and that all we need to do is implement 
them, I wi l l nevertheless elaborate shortly on a few elements. Empowering the rural and urban 
poor to strengthen their socioeconomic security is a first step towards bringing food security 
within the reach of individual families. Equal access of women and men to production assets is 
probably the most important policy measure a government can take to achieve food security at 
household level. Food security within households has much to do with equity. Gender relations 
often determine the way different members within a family have access to food. It is also at 
household level where the quality aspect of food should receive most attention. A well-
balanced diet and good nutrition can only be secured at the household level. Women play a 
crucial role here. 
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At the household level food security policies largely focus on equal access to food and 
production assets, but also to health, education and social policies. 
Ladies and gentlemen, there is one issue I have not addressed, but which I think is of the utmost 
importance for our future food security: the sustainable use of natural resources. In a liberal 
economic environment, sustainable use of natural resources may become threatened. Especially 
in developing countries, where institutional capacity is limited and market relations are imper-
fect, increased agricultural production and growth are often achieved at the expense of the 
natural environment and hence at the expense of future food security. As stated earlier, in an 
increasing number of countries reduced soil fertility is threatening sustainable agricultural 
development and food security. But attention also needs to be paid to the abundant use of 
fertilizers, insecticides, pesticides and bioengineering, because this can threaten human health. 
At the beginning of my paper I remarked that researchers can help to provide more insight, to 
find solutions to existing problems, and to clarify policy options. I have elaborated on a few of 
the issues, that relate to food security and which need our full attention. I hope that they wil l 
stimulate the debate and contribute in setting research priorities. 
2. Integration of biophysical and economic 
analyses for food security studies 
P.S. Bindraban 
Research Institute for Agrobiology and Soil Fertility (AB-DLO), P.O. Box 14, 
NL-6700 AA Wageningen, The Netherlands 
Abstract 
This paper deals with analyses on future food demand and supply, considering biophysical and 
socio-economic possibilities. Analysts have recognized that the global demand for food wil l 
climb dramatically as population increases and income rises. There are however, substantial 
different views on the possibilities to supply the world population and obtain food security for 
all on earth. These differences are based on differences in vision or interpretation, resulting in 
different methodological approaches. It is important to recognize that conclusions of the 
various approaches serve different purposes. Most analyses are extrapolations, presuming past 
trends to continue. These analyses are meaningful to identify problematic developments that 
need to be addressed. Predictive analyses give a fairly accurate image of the near future, on the 
basis of integration of a substantial amount of information on past developments, but the 
accuracy rapidly deteriorates when the time horizon is extended. These two approaches do not 
permit sudden changes, while breaks in trends are more decisive for development. Moreover, 
options to change past trends towards desired situations are not explored. Explorative analyses 
do indicate feasible options, explicitly addressing sustainability issues. However, such options, 
mainly based on biophysical production potentials are considered too remote from reality. 
Therefore, an integrative approach is needed to identify ways to realize future increase in food 
production in a socially acceptable and economically feasible manner and in a way which also 
warrants the environmental quality to be sustained or even improved. Holistic modeling 
approaches do potentially permit interactive analysis of biophysical and socio-economic 
possibilities. Such analyses would allow more realistic development of scenarios on sets of 
attainable crop production and economic policies that could be used to achieve food security. 
2.1. Introduction 
Since Malthus, food shortages in our world have been forecast by many, but none have become 
reality. Instead, food production per capita has been rising for decades. Still however, over a 
billion people are not food secure and suffer from under-nourishment, which results from poor 
distribution due to major differences in wealth and social instability rather than supply of food. 
Food security refers to a condition in which all people at all times have both the physical and 
economic access to safe and nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life (Alexandratos, 
1996). Considering the fact that agricultural efforts to increase food production have been so 
successful, what than is the role of agriculture and biophysical and socio-economic analyses on 
the issue of food security? 
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Firstly, dramatic increase in demand for food due to population increase and income rise 
affecting consumption habit is widely recognized. World agricultural production wil l have to 
triple over the coming three to four decades to meet growing food demand (WRR, 1995). These 
assessments have a fairly common basis, and projected demands for food reveal comparable 
rates of increase [e.g. World Bank, 1997). 
Secondly, future increase in production wil l have to come primarily from increasing 
productivity, as area expansion is not desirable, because it would require the cultivation of 
natural and fragile lands (Alexandratos, 1996; IFPRI, 1994,1995)- A major concern, therefore, is 
the increasing pressure on land resources, which can lead to various forms of degradation, 
negatively affect the production capacity of land (Bindraban et al., 1998). 
Thirdly, the drastic increase in global economic activity wi l l severely affect the natural resource 
base. There are many uncertainties whether economic growth can be continued at the long 
term as environmental degradation starts to manifest itself in some situations (WRR, 1995)-
Fourthly, the global system is becoming increasingly complex and so many factors affect food 
security, that we loose sight of possibilities and limitations of our globe. Policy makers have to 
take (strategic) decisions on the basis of ambiguous views of global, regional and local 
potentials and limitations. 
Finally, despite the successes in the past to increase food production, still many expect the 
increasing trend to finish on short notice and to result in vast food shortages (Brown & Kane, 
1994). 
Due to such threats on declining agricultural productivity and uncertainties on future 
developments, producers, researchers and policy makers are interested in options for 
sustainable development. The future increase in food production should not only be obtained in 
a socially acceptable and economically feasible manner, but should also warrant the 
environmental quality to be sustained or even improved. Given the various components of food 
security, availability, access, stability of supply, and quality, determination of options to realize 
food security requires an integrative approach, considering both biophysical potentials and 
socio-economic attainable solutions. 
This paper describes various procedures that assess future food production potential in relation 
to food security. Major differences among the analyses are based on strongly differing 
principles and assumptions, resulting in different methodologies (Rabbinge, 1997; Van Ittersum 
et al., 1998). Methodological approaches to integrate biophysical and socio-economic analyses 
are considered to inherit powerful possibilities to investigate the impact of policy measures on 
food security. 
2.2. Approaches for future analyses 
Scientific analyses of complex systems are achieved by simplified description of those systems, 
by setting bounds and considering major processes only. The effect is that links between 
endogenous and exogenous variables are ignored. Little may be lost when these links and 
feedbacks are weak, while much is gained in terms of transparency and focus. For instance, 
short-term analyses ignore feedbacks that occur with a lag greater that those allowed for the 
description of the system, while long-term analyses may not comprehend factors important at 
the short-term (Perrigs, 1997). 
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Food security comprehends all aspects of life, which makes it unfeasible to account for all 
relevant factors and processes. Comprehensive, holistic descriptions of systems cannot escape 
from describing parts of the global systems only. The impact of exogenous factors needs to be 
considered in ex-post evaluations. The relevance of the results of the various attempts and 
approaches to address food security and sustainable developments can be great, depending on 
the objective of the study. Therefore, the purpose of the analyses should be clearly determined 
with clear relevance for the stakeholders. 
2.2.1. Extrapolations 
Brown and Kane (1994) assessed future developments for three distinguished food sectors by 
extrapolation of their recent past trends. The fishery and rangeland sectors are already 
overexploited and future increase is not possible. Therefore, the only system left to realize 
increase in food production is cropping. Contrasting to the past when food production kept 
pace with demand, various reasons were mentioned that would constrain future production. 
While the world could rely on new technologies in the past, these have been exhausted, leaving 
us without a technological backlog. Water supply wil l be limiting and fertilization has little 
impact on production increase. The loss of cropland wil l be faster than rise in productivity. With 
demand reaching limits of supply of seafood and rangeland, social disintegration wi l l further 
deteriorate the situation. 
Even stronger deteriorating developments were projected for China's future (Brown, 1995). The 
rapidly industrializing economy of China was compared to those of Japan, Taiwan and South 
Korea in the past, as they were also densely populated in agronomic terms, i.e. all having a high 
number of people per hectare of cropland. Cropland area shrunk in the latter countries by 1.2 to 
1.4% per year. Similar rates occurred in China from 1990 to 1994, because of demand for land by 
other sectors. Starting from low levels of productivity, the other countries could still increase 
their yields. Additionally, mainly Japan could escape to seafood to meet its increasing demand 
for food. These options are not feasible for China, placing it in an even worse situation. 
Production and consumption in China are extrapolated to respectively decline and increase 
causing a vast deficit. 
Extrapolations enforce a continued trend to the future of past developments without 
consideration of underlying causal mechanisms. 
2.2.2. Predictions 
FAO's global study on world agriculture towards 2010 emphasizes food security, nutrition, 
sustainable agriculture and rural development (Alexandratos, 1996). Predictions are based on 
detailed information on a large number of commodities, countries and land use for the 
historical period of 1961 to 1990, considering specialists' opinions on feasible developments. 
Demand for food is based on exogenous assumptions of population and GDP growth. 
Projections of production start with provisional targets of production for commodities and 
countries, separately, followed by several rounds of iterations and adjustments in consultation 
with specialists, with particular reference to what are considered to be "feasible" levels of land 
use, yields and trade. Accounting controls, e.g. on land area, were applied to avoid erratic 
calculations. The results of the analysis reveal that progress wil l be slow and uneven, also 
beyond the end of this century. Some enhancement of food security and nutrition is expected 
by the year 2010, mainly resulting from domestic production and food imports. However, a 
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number of developing countries are likely to face serious constraints, in particular in sub-
Saharan Africa. With regard to sustainable agricultural development, it is concluded that the 
pressure on resources wil l continue to build up, with the vicious circle of poverty and resource 
degradation to accelerate the process. 
The large information base used in predictions results in more emphasis on causality in 
projecting near future developments. 
2.2.3. Explorations 
The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR, 1995) analyzed the limits to 
food supply and the consequences for natural resources in a quantitative way for the 
population of 15 major regions, comprising the world, in 2040. The consequences of two 
alternative agricultural production systems and three diets for three population scenarios were 
analyzed to address different perceptions on socio-economic developments and environment. 
Food production was assumed to take place under best technological means and depended on 
biophysical conditions. Production potentials were calculated on the bases of model analyses 
considering eco-physiological processes. The results indicate that sufficient food can be 
produced for 10 to 40 billion people at world level, depending on production system and 
consumption pattern. However, in the most populous regions, South- and Southeast Asia, food 
supply does not exceed demand twofold, indicating potential hazardous situations. 
In the early nineties the WRR (1992) performed an analyses to explore long term consequences 
of policy objectives, combining agro-technical, socio-economic and environmental aspects for 
rural areas of the EU-12. Four major objectives that were considered concerned minimal costs 
for agricultural production, regional employment, greatest possible area for natural 
environment and strict environmental requirements. Interactive Multiple Goal Linear 
Programming (IMGLP) was used to optimize objectives under production constraints and 
possibilities as set by the agricultural production systems under best technological means. 
Significant differences in input requirements, production and environmental load among 
various objectives indicated substantial scope for policy. The results have strongly enhanced 
discussion on European agriculture in relation to the role of the EU in the world market and the 
GATT negotiations, the attention on aspects other than agricultural production of the rural 
areas and the budgetary consequences of production. 
Explorative analyses, in essence, differ from the previous two methods described, as it is based 
on process knowledge of the system that is described, i.e. agricultural production system, with 
explicit assumptions regarding exogenous factors. 
2.3. Regional approaches 
Analyses of extrapolative and predictive nature are useful to indicate how developments are 
likely to evolve under current behavior and to identify developments that may turn out to 
become problematic. Alternative developments should therefore be explored to address these 
expected problems and to give guidance to realize breaks with trends. While the extrapolative 
and predictive approaches do not permit sudden changes, explorative analyses do indicate 
alternative feasible solutions (Van Ittersum et ai, 1998). Explorative analyses are, however, 
argued not to offer options for an audience which expects to hear about solutions to the world 
food problem (Tims, 1995), as they are too remote from reality. Therefore, the approaches have 
to be combined to more realistically identify ways in which future increase in food production 
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can be realized. The methodology should integrate analyses of biophysical and socio-economic 
models to reveal options to achieve food security through sustainable production practices. 
Planning is a concept based on the notion that the process of development can be influenced. In 
other words, it is possible to indicate feasible paths from the present situation towards desired 
situations in the future. Agricultural land use planning should bridge the gap between macro 
policy and specific project planning. The former deals with sectoral growth at the national level, 
but does not pay attention to the spatial distribution of investments. The latter is usually so 
detailed that the broader socio-economic framework in which it has to operate remains out of 
sight. Both approaches operate for a great deal independently from each other. Regional 
agricultural planning can be considered as the intermediate planning level, which is on one 
hand sufficiently specific for guiding action and on the other hand general enough to be placed 
in national context (Hengsdijk & Kruseman, 1993). 
A region can be identified by its natural, administrative and socio-economic boundaries, within 
which land use and changes results from important relations between agro-ecological and 
socio-economic factors. Such an eco-regional approach emphasizes (clarifies) the specific 
characteristics of a region, which may help to identify possibilities and constraints of the region. 
These constraints may be of biophysical or socio-economic nature (Rabbinge, 1995). 
2.3.1. Integrated approach to regional planning 
Land use potentials can be identified, based on the assessment of available natural resources, 
soil, climate and crops (WRR, 1995). Land use options can be explored by MGLP techniques 
through optimization of specific objectives, say maximum income, minimum environmental 
load etc., within the boundaries set by bio-physical and market constraints (WRR, 1992). Major 
limitations of MGLP within this resource-based approach refer to the static character of the 
analysis, the discontinuous nature of the optimization technique, and the absence of an 
economic analysis of motives and costs associated with land use adjustments. Moreover, the 
lack of economies of scale, absence of multiplier effects, and price exogeneity pose serious 
questions for the application in economic analysis (Kuyvenhoven et ai, 1995). 
Econometric supply-response models are based on continuous homogeneous production 
functions. Optimization is performed on a household utility function. The procedure permits 
analysis of adjustments in the farming system as a result of changes in the economic 
environment. A major constraint from agronomic point of view is the use of production 
functions to account for the effects of agronomic input to outputs. Interactions among inputs, 
say nutrients, which are crucial, are not considered (De Wit, 1992). , 
There is an additional fundamental difference between the two approaches. While the supply 
response models start their analysis at the current production system and indicate the pace and 
direction of adjustment as result of policy change, the resource based IMGLP analyses, are 
focused on potential land use independently of actual production systems. 
Decisions on land use depend on resource endowment, (multiple) objectives and expected 
prices faced by individual actors (Kuyvenhoven et al., 1995)- Comprehensive analyses of these 
factors require integrative resource based supply-response approaches. 
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2.3.2. Integration of agro-ecological and socio-economic 
information 
Within a research project to explore options for sustainable land use and food security at 
regional level in developing countries a methodology was developed which integrates agro-
ecological and socio-economic information, with the aim to formulate recommendations to aid 
policy makers (Hengsdijk & Kruseman, 1993). 
Individual farms in two distinct regions, the fifth region of Mali and the Atlantic zone of Costa 
Rica, were studied and categorized. Economic relations were determined for the farm-types like 
the impact of the price of nitrogen on nitrogen input in the production system. On the basis of 
input-output relations, production levels of various crops were determined. Given a set of input 
conditions, like inputs of fertilizers, biocides, labor, etc. related crop yields/outputs were derived 
from biophysical modeling. Inputs and outputs are prices. Depending on the objective that is 
aimed at, for instance maximization of income, or minimization of risk, optimal production 
systems for the farm-types would be determined using linear programming techniques. 
The production of all farmers and farm-types is aggregated to obtain regional production. In 
order to maximize their income farmers will produce in this analysis, the most profitable crops, 
given the initial prices considered. As a result, regional production of a certain commodity/crop 
might become too large, reducing prices. The MGLP optimization routine wil l be performed 
with the adjusted prices of inputs and outputs, giving another optimal solution. This iterative 
process is continued towards an equilibrium condition. 
In this methodology, the actual situation is described in much detail in both biophysical and 
socio-economic terms. The analyses allow to "realistically" analyze the impact of policy 
measures on agricultural production for the region that is being studied. It was found that in 
the low-income region, like South Mali, with not well-developed markets for land and capital, 
classical price policy measures are less effective than exogenous measure, like infrastructure. 
For Costa Rica, with a relatively well-developed infrastructure, price policy appears stronger in 
affecting the production system (Van Keulen & Kuyvenhoven, 1997). 
2.4. Discussion 
There is an obvious need to investigate the impact of policy measures on food security and vice 
versa to formulate recommendations to policy makers, producers and scientist on options to 
address food security. Though food security comprehends all aspects of life and no analysis can 
account for all relevant factors and processes, it is recognized that integrative analyses of 
biophysical and socio-economic models inherit powerful possibilities to meet these aspirations. 
While extrapolations are not reliable for the long-term and do not allow sudden changes, they 
do have an alarming nature. The world watch institute (Brown & Kane, 1994; Brown, 1995) for 
instance, has a major impact on setting the agenda on issues related to food security, by 
alarming the society on problems to be expected. This is an extremely important component of 
a complete package to address future problems. 
Predictions may be fairly accurate on the short term, but are less suitable for the long-term, and 
neither allow sudden changes in developments. FAO in 1996 (Alexandratos, 1996) concludes 
that progress on food security has been slow and uneven, as their study from 1987 had warned. 
The current analysis reveals that the slow and uneven progress is, unfortunately, likely to prevail 
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also beyond the end of this century. These results indicate that drastic changes are needed to 
alter the situation in the future, but though their analysis is claimed not to be extrapolative, it 
does heavily rely on current developments, not allowing drastic changes in development. But 
then, these results showing that progress on food security in the world is likely to remain slow 
in the future actually are a plea for drastic changes to turn that tide. 
Explorative analyses do indicate alternative opportunities, but do not indicate what measures 
are needed to realize these options. The studies of the Netherlands Scientific Council for 
Government Policy (WRR, 1992,1995) have opened up discussions on the usefulness on 
explorative studies. It emphasizes that the eminent question now is on how a technically 
feasible and politically desired situation might be attained, given the present situation and 
information on behavioral constraints of all parties involved (Van Latesteijn, 1995). 
As a response to these methodological limitations, an integrative biophysical and socio-
economic modeling approach was developed to explore options for development and indicate 
required measures to attain these options (Hengsdijk & Kruseman, 1993). This methodology 
(DLV) is ready to be implemented in other regions, where the exercise can be used to further 
improvement (Van Ittersum, 1998). The methodology is suitable for relatively detailed studies at 
relatively small regions. The agricultural system is described at the level of a farm household, 
which requires a large amount of data before such an exercise can be performed. Transaction 
costs in the current procedure are expressed in one value that describes the bulk of all other 
factors that are exogenous to the system as it is described. Bulking exogenous factors in one 
pricing mechanism does not allow analyses of the exogenous factors that are really limiting. Is it 
the dirt road that has to be paved, or is it the lack of trucks to transport the inputs and outputs, 
or is the market too small? These aspects make the procedure to be strongly related to "reality" 
or the current situation, and limit options to explore the impact of drastic changes. 
The DLV methodology is suitable for detailed studies at relatively small regions. It may prove 
difficult, if not impossible to aggregate such analyses to larger scale in order to formulate policy 
recommendations at national level or higher. 
Integration of the various biophysical and socio-economic aspects of agricultural production 
should therefore take place at a higher aggregation level. Prices are not affected by changes in 
the production at the farm level. The success or failure in production of an individual farmer wil l 
not affect the price, but prices will be affected if the bulk of farmers in a region are successful, 
or fail. Therefore aggregated analyses at the regional level, with generic descriptions of farm 
household types should suffice for analyses at higher levels of policy making. From a 
biophysical point of view, analyzing agricultural production at the level of eco-regions is most 
appropriate. These regions are relatively homogenous in terms of biophysical/ecological 
characteristics. Analyses at this meso level offer the advantage that processes at lower, micro, 
levels can govern the procedure of the analysis, while they can be aggregated to the higher 
levels. This would be a more appropriate starting point to analyze issues on food security at 
larger scale and a longer time horizon. 
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3. Socio-economic aspects of food security 
A. Kuyvenhoven 
Wageningen Agricultural University, Department of Economics and Management, Development 
Economics, Hollandseweg l , NL-6706 KN Wageningen, The Netherlands, and 
Director, Netherlands Economic Institute, Rotterdam 
3.1. Introduction 
Nearly one billion people are undernourished in a world plentiful of food. That is not a matter 
of insufficient availability. Expanding world food production by a few percent would in theory 
be sufficient to provide the poor and needy with a basic diet for a healthy life. Moreover, real 
food prices have decreased for more than a century now, thanks to continuous advances in 
technology and farming practices. Never before was good food so cheap but went so many 
people hungry. Have we come to tolerate hunger as part of our modern world, much like drugs 
or crime? 
Nobel Price Laureate Amartya Sen has convincingly argued that the problem of securing 
sufficient food for a productive life is basically solvable. To achieve such a solution, however, 
food security needs to be properly understood. In addition, societies need to be prepared to 
pursue the proper institutional responses to the challenge of hunger. Food security is multi-
dimensional as it is embedded in three concepts: access (the entitlement to establish command 
over an adequate diet and related necessities), availability (sufficient supply through production 
or trade) and sustainability (the ability to maintain or reproduce the resource base and 
assimilate wastes). While availability is a necessary condition to achieve food security, it is by no 
means sufficient to establish someone's access to daily food requirements. Failing to 
understand the significance of access to food and the role of economic policies to maintain 
entitlements, has for instance led to incorrectly equate food security with food production or, at 
the national level, with self-sufficiency. Sustainability, certainly in more fragile areas, is an all-
important long-term context factor. 
Food security, or absence of hunger and malnourishment, is one of the oldest and most 
persistent issues in economics. It is put in a historical perspective in 3.2. Current trends in food 
security by major regions and medium-term prospects are described in 3-3. Projections cover the 
next decade and are taken from a recent USDA study. Concerns like the recent leveling-off in 
grain yield growth and a possible end to food price decreases are discussed in 34, and 
elaborated in terms of agreed findings and policy dilemmas in 3.5. In the final part, conclusions 
are drawn with regard to policy support and reform to achieve better food security. 
3.2. Two centuries of debate 
In a world with slowly changing technology (like the introduction of enclosures, crop rotation, 
mixed farming) and regularly visited by famines, discussions on food security in the sense of 
absence of hunger have a tendency to focus on availability, i.e. the ability to produce enough 
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food. That is exactly how the debate on hunger was characterized two centuries ago when 
Thomas Malthus expressed his pessimism on resolving poverty and hunger in his famous Essay 
on the Principle of Population of 1798. As Rosegrant and Ringler (1997) recently argued, that is 
not to say that Malthus was a dogmatic population pessimist who did not understand the 
implications of advances in technology. Rather, in the absence of it, population growth and 
decreasing marginal returns go a long way to explain the perpetuation of poverty and hunger. 
In much the same way, poverty and risk averseness explain today why so many African farmers 
continue to mine their soils, the very resource on which their future depends, and in doing so 
are caught in a poverty trap. 
In one of his contributions to the problem of hunger, Amartya Sen (1993) argues another, more 
philosophical'point. Well before Malthus, the French enlightenment thinker Condorcet had 
already identified the possibility of population growth being too fast. Where Malthus disagreed, 
however, "was in Condorcet's belief, and that of many other rationalist thinkers of that period 
such as Adam Smith, that by reasoning about the nature of solvable problems and by 
understanding the appropriate actions to be undertaken to avert these problems, we can 
prevent their occurrence, whereas Malthus saw no such hope and spoke instead of the need for 
compelled suffering on the part of much of humanity" (Sen, 1993, p. 86). To Malthus' credit 
should be added that he later openly amended his view. In 1817 he wrote in the fifth edition of 
his Essay that people did in fact control the number of their offspring and thereby avoided 
famine and misery (Rosegrant & Ringler, 1997). 
History, as we know now, has not given much support to Malthus. Birth rates have greatly 
decreased with education and economic development, and many technological changes have 
occurred because population pressure became an incentive for innovation through e.g. 
intensification (Boserup). In fact, agricultural economics is one of the few disciplines, which can 
pride itself to have developed an endogenous theory of technological change, with changes in 
factor proportions and market configurations as explanatory variables. 
In terms of food security, all this has important implications. If supply factors determining food 
production can be considered largely endogenous, hunger and undernourishment cannot be 
explained by a failure to supply food (availability), but rather by a failure to have access to 
whatever is available. Access in this sense means a source of command over food (an 
entitlement in Sen's words) such as income, social security or simply a job. Only for the farmer 
who grows his own food, availability and access overlap, and bad weather hits both. With off-
farm income, however, access can be maintained when alternative sources of food supply are 
available. 
Sen (1993) draws three important lessons for successful prevention of a food insecure world. 
First, with availability being only a necessary condition to prevent hunger, a focus on per capita 
food supply (a most popular statistic) may create a false sense of security at all levels of scale, 
be it a household or a country at large. Second, where long-term food security requires broad-
based and shared economic development, more immediate concerns can only be resolved via 
redistribution mechanisms that restore access to food. Cash transfers, direct food distribution 
and public works (generating employment) are well-established interventions to overcome 
periods of food insecurity. The redistributional effort, though often hard to organize and to 
target effectively, is not excessive, and usually not exceeding a few percent of total output. 
Finally, there remains the political dimension: governments do not always act in the face of 
even widespread hunger. Here Sen (1993, p. 80) argues for democracy and a free press ("good 
governance" and "accountability" in the development jargon). It is a subtle argument that 
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addresses information failures (to act is to know) and political survival (re-election in the face of 
famines is a foregone conclusion). 
Summarizing, to understand food security for the social scientist is primarily to understand 
access. To achieve the latter, a society needs sustained development and public action to ensure 
entitlements. In this process, public debate, participation and effective co-operation are among 
the indispensable ingredients. They define the enlightenment of our time. 
3.3- Current situation and prospects 
Most recent studies exploring the prospects for food security at an aggregate level agree that 
the number of people suffering from hunger and undernourishment are likely to increase to 
well over one billion, though in relative terms the share of those who are food insecure 
continues to decrease. (The current economic upheaval in East and Southeast Asia is likely to 
interrupt this trend). Poverty and hunger in the years to come wil l be increasingly concentrated 
in sub-Saharan Africa. While absolute numbers are still increasing, the regional share of food 
insecure in Asia steadily declines. Persistent income inequality in Latin America remains a major 
factor threatening food security in low-income households. 
The latest USDA report (1997) on this subject confirms much of the current findings, and its 
approach clearly illustrates the three dimensions of food security (3.1 and 3.2). Food gap 
calculations up to 2007 indicate that the most vulnerable regions (large parts of Sub-Sahara 
Africa, low-income Asia and low-income households in Latin America) would need a 4-4% 
higher availability of food on aggregate to meet minimum nutritional standards (NS), up from 
3-5% in 1997. If only current levels (1994-1996) of food consumption (CL) are to be maintained, 
3-4% more food is needed than projected, against 2% in 1997- The gap between what is needed 
and what is locally available is most dramatic for Sub-Sahara Africa where the NS gap is 
expected to increase from 10 to 13-5% during the decade 1997-2007, and the CL gap from 4 to 
7-5%- By contrast, the aggregate NS food gap in Asia remains less than 2% in 2007; only the 
projected CL gap would go up, from less than 1% to almost 2%. 
Figures like these underline the access dimension of food security. Increased production and/or 
imports would suffice to close the gap in most areas, but distributional problems and foreign 
exchange shortages remain formidable hurdles to better access at the household level. This 
applies in particular to sub-Saharan Africa where a deteriorating nutritional situation lasting 
already three decades is likely to continue. It is in Asia that natural resource constraints to 
further production growth are becoming manifest. Although population growth is substantially 
on the decrease, industrialization and urbanization compete on a large scale for land, water and 
research resources. 
North Africa is an interesting example of how food availability adjusts to higher effective 
demand via increased commercial imports of grain. Local production in the area is erratic and 
has a limited potential to expand. Nevertheless, food security is easily achieved through imports 
(which now equal domestic production) because foreign exchange is sufficiently available. The 
growing grain import dependency of North Africa points to a general trend in securing 
sufficient supply of food: where land and water resources become binding and levels of living 
increase, food security wil l increasingly depend on the role of international trade to supplement 
domestic supply. Table 3.1 shows the importance of this trend in the USDA projections. 
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Table 3.1. Commercial import dependency of aggregate food availability (%). 
Year 
1988 
1997 
2007 
Asia 
4.0 
6.1 
6.5 
SS Africa 
7-3 
9-3 
8.5 
North Africa 
71.3 
77-2 
73-7 
Latin America 
28.9 
65.1 
68.3 
World 
9-5 
14.2 
14.2 
Source: Calculated from USDA (1997)- Country coverage by region is not complete. 
In terms of future food availability at large, the USDA projections confirm current concerns 
about the expected growth rate of production. For the first time since the 1970s, food prices 
have increased substantially in the course of 1994, then stabilized by the end of 1996 and 
continued to decrease - in real terms - since then. Although real prices are projected to 
decrease well after 2000, the rate of decrease is expected to be substantially lower than in the 
past (Fig. 3.1). 
1990 (dollars per ton) 
800 
1970 75 80 85 90 
Figure 3.1. The pattern of declining real prices is slowing. 
Source: USDA (1997). 
A more serious concern is the decline in the rate of growth of research and development 
expenditures in agriculture in both developed and developing countries. This decline has been 
particularly manifest in the public sector, and has already caused a flattening out of total factor 
productivity growth in agriculture in the USA and major EU countries. If this trend continues, 
the long-term decline in real food prices might well come to an end. 
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In the developing world, in particular the rice economies of Asia, yield increases have been 
leveling-off lately. To the extent that less yield growth is a response to shifts in demand away 
from basic food staples, this need not be a cause for concern. However, in a world with annual 
population increments of around 100 million people and, hopefully, better future access to food 
for those presently malnourished, declines in rate of growth of crop yields and agricultural 
research and development cannot be dismissed too lightly. 
34- Why do people worry? 
The leveling-off in the growth of grain yields world-wide in the 1990s, the interruption of the 
long-term decrease in real food prices since 1994, and the recent decline in stocks have raised 
old Malthusian fears. Could the stagnation in grain production be structural, while demand for 
food continues to grow? Are we finally approaching the limits to further yield growth? In a 
recent analysis of price movements in the world food market, Stolwijk (1997) points to a 
number of factors that lend little support for these neo-Malthusian concerns, at least in the 
short run. Against the background of numerous studies showing that agro-ecological and bio-
physical limits to higher grain yields are far from binding in most parts of the world, it does not 
come as a surprise that the explanatory factors for yield stagnation and price hikes are largely 
policy-induced and demand-related. 
First, food production in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has dramatically declined in recent 
years, but so has consumption and intermediate use. On balance, the process of restructuring in 
arable farming in CEE appears to be accompanied by less rather than more imports, and its 
effect on the world market has been negligible. Second, lower internal prices and set-aside 
arrangements have curtailed grain output in the USA and the EU. These changes are policy-
induced in an effort to gradually liberalize domestic agricultural markets. Third, exporting 
countries in the rest of the world have cut back their exports as a response to low world market 
prices. Fourth, China has emerged as a new importer of grains, but partly because domestic 
production is presently constrained by low internal prices and a relative decline in public 
investment in agriculture. Finally, bad weather has affected harvests all over the world in 1995-
96. 
Convincing as these short-term arguments may be, they are not likely to appeal to those who 
argue that over longer periods lack of arable land, limits to irrigation, overgrazing, erosion, 
water logging, and especially the lack of technological break-throughs on the shelf wi l l cause 
serious problems in food availability. Lester Brown's Worldwatch Institute and many in the 
green movement share this pessimist view on future food security. A recurrent dilemma in 
discussions of this type is the question of how to perceive the various constraints to further 
output growth. Are they factually correct, are they so universal in time and space as often 
suggested, and if so, why can they not be modified or why do they not induce further 
innovation? Some analysts like Rosegrant and Ringler (1997) take direct issue with the facts, 
methods of analysis and suggested solutions (e.g. short-term trends are incorrectly viewed as 
portents of disaster; long-term trends actually contradict Malthusian threats; induced innovation 
and feedback mechanisms are denied; restricting consumption patterns of the rich or changing 
life styles wil l not improve the food security of the poor). Production ecologists can probably 
answer most of the other questions convincingly and point to a reservoir of unused options to 
attain much higher production levels. Economists, political scientists and others are then faced 
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with the question of why food security problems perceived as basically "being solvable by 
rational deliberation and co-operative action" (Sen, 1993, P- 85) are not effectively addressed. 
More balanced approaches tend to dominate the view on future food security of institutions 
like FAO, IFPRI and many donor organizations. On the demand side, many agree, world 
population growth is projected to decrease from its current 1.6 percent to 1 percent in a few 
decades from now. With continuing increases in levels of living the income elasticity of the 
demand for food wil l fall, and the growth in total consumption demand for food is therefore 
expected to slow down considerably. With careful resource management and improved farming 
practices, further yield increases are potentially attainable, certainly if supportive policy 
interventions are put in place. In this scenario, real food prices need therefore not increase. This 
is not to deny that serious problems are likely to continue locally or even regionally. In 
particular for Sub-Saharan Africa, prospects to achieve food security in the next decades remain 
bleak. A range of complementary measures, both private and public, is required to increase 
food production. Such an effort means for many countries a major change in the system of 
incentives towards a more pro-agriculture and pro-rural policy. The political-economy 
implications of such a policy adjustment are not undividedly attractive in the short run. 
3.5. Where do we stand? What are the implications? 
When discussing how to feed the world, by and large, we appear to agree on the following 
factors at stake: 
1. There is no immediate need for urgent breakthroughs in farm technology to satisfy future 
demand. 
2. Poverty is now widely recognized as the main cause of hunger; and poverty can only be 
addressed by appropriate long-term development policies. 
3. Governments tend to neglect the significance of agricultural science and technology, hence 
the continued relevance of the yield gap (the difference between actual and potential 
production). As the Director General of ISNAR, Stein W. Bie, told in his inaugural address: 
"Many of the food insecure countries never invested significantly in agricultural science, 
many of their politicians failed to recognize that agriculture can benefit from advances in 
human thought, and that science has a place in the life of smallholders. The lack of 
investment in efficient creative science for the rural industries in many parts of the 
developing world has been a serious political mistake from many rulers of the South, 
frequently aided and abetted by their Northern advisers, and the lack of Northern interest in 
creating viable rural primary industries in the South". 
4. Finally, governments have often intervened in the market place against the interests of 
agricultural and rural activities, both at the macro and the micro level. At the same time, 
many environmental consequences have simply been neglected. 
Most studies exploring Walter P. Falcon's (1996) question "Can the world produce enough food 
at reasonable prices, provide access to the poor, and not destroy the environment in the 
process?" during the next few decades, would also agree on the following conclusions: 
• Growth in food production wil l globally be enough to keep up with population growth and 
demand. 
• Real prices wil l continue their long-term trend to decrease, but at a lesser pace. 
• Greater world trade can resolve growing disparities between the geographical distribution 
of production and consumption. 
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• Yield improvements through further intensification need continued investment in 
agricultural research. 
• A second or double green revolution is needed which enhances the productivity of low-
income groups and promotes sustainable intensification and better management of natural 
resources, with more emphasis on less favorable areas. 
• Action to curb fast population growth is desirable. 
• Although trade liberalization can contribute to the stabilization of world agricultural 
markets, there remains the absence of a paradigm for coping with food price instability. 
• Transfers and targeted programs can be an effective means to improve access to food and 
reduce poverty, but are no long-term substitutes for shared economic growth and structural 
adjustment and reforms. 
• The analytical ability to capture large-country effects remains limited; coincidence of bad 
harvests, consecutive bad years or sudden changes in food policy cannot be properly 
assessed. 
These outcomes pose a number of policy dilemmas in achieving food security, which can be 
briefly summarized as follows: 
1. Low relative prices and a general aid fatigue may slow down technical advances in research 
and development, and discourage investment in agriculture, knowledge, infrastructure and 
environmentally related activities. 
2. Much of the future increase in food production requires substantial research efforts and a 
redirection of activities towards eco-regional approaches for sustainable land use and food 
security, in particular for marginal areas. 
3. Food security is a field where market imperfections abound and public action is required as: 
• agricultural research is largely a public good with strong externalities; 
• future shortages and surpluses of a long-term nature hardly affect present prices; 
• environmentally damaging or favorable practices go almost unnoticed in the market place; 
• access failure implies a strong distributional concern. 
4. Curbing population growth and liberalizing trade to facilitate access to food are not 
universally shared instruments. 
3.6. Policy support and reform 
Keeping in mind the policy dilemmas to achieve better food security, what can we conclude 
about policy support and possibly reform to fight hunger and malnourishment? On the access 
side, the answer is simple and classical. Long-term food security depends on broad-based and 
shared economic development. Short-run concerns usually require redistribution mechanisms 
(national and international) to restore access to food. Policies to achieve this are well 
documented in the development literature and are not confined to the agricultural sector. 
Entitlements to food can be created in any part of the economy. 
To ensure availability, certainly via domestic production, has proven more controversial. Past 
policies in many developing countries have hardly supported agriculture in an era where pro-
urban and pro-industry policies were the rule. Policy reform to restore support for - or at least 
non-discrimination of - agriculture has come slowly under structural adjustment programs, and 
has not been helped by the often-inconclusive discussions on market and government failures. 
Interventions in support of agriculture are believed to be most effective if they create an 
enabling environment (improving access and correcting for classical market failures) for 
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basically private decision-making, and focus more on structural and competition policy rather 
than direct price and market interventions. The latter can be confined to policies to stabilize 
prices, be restricted to a few strategic crops or inputs, and make better use of international (or 
large national) markets. 
The high cost in terms of efficiency and distribution of past price distortions in agriculture, 
insufficient targeting, and under-investment in overhead provisions are by nowwell known. 
Allowing for regional differentiation, three conclusions stand out: 
• rather than sectoral policies, exchange rate, trade and tariff policies have been the major 
determinants of agricultural prices; 
• agricultural price support, if any, has been insufficient to compensate for the strong price-
depressing effect of macro-policies; and 
• other compensating interventions (input subsidies) have often been regressive and 
discriminating against the poor. 
To conclude, agriculture's contribution to welfare and food security goals depends on three 
major areas of policy concern: efficient pricing, improved yields, and gradual shifts to higher-
value crops. An integrated approach to agricultural policy wi l l therefore emphasize good macro-
economic and trade policies to ensure correct incentive pricing, proper management of the 
natural resource base of agriculture, and an enabling structural and institutional policy to 
overcome access constraints to markets, input supply and technology. In general terms this 
means: 
• less direct price and market interventions; 
• more emphasis on public expenditure on infrastructure, support services and institutions; 
• a shift from commodity to factor taxation; and 
• appropriate and targeted interventions in the case of genuine market failures such as food 
insecurity and natural resource exhaustion. 
It is the last argument that justifies fiscal subsidies to alleviate malnutrition, establish credit 
programs (not subsidized interest rates), encourage positive environmental activities, or 
promote the transition to new technologies and input packages. 
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4. World population trends: 
how do they affect global food security? 
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4.1. Introduction 
This paper investigates how current trends of world population growth might affect global food 
security. It is organized into three parts: First, we give an outline of those demographic trends 
that are relevant for food security. Then, we analyze frequently discussed links between people 
and food and show that conceptual confusion and fallacies have obstructed scientific progress 
towards a better understanding of this relationship. Finally, we briefly discuss what would be 
necessary to increase worldwide food security in the future. 
4.2. Major demographic trends worldwide * 
World population will grow significantly - despite falling fertility 
There is a most striking paradox in global population trends: on one hand we have had a rapid 
decline in fertility for over two decades in many developing countries - not to mention the 
already very low fertility in most of the highly developed nations. On the other hand, we wil l 
almost certainly experience a further massive increase of the world population. The United 
Nations Population Division projects a global population of 8.04 billion for the year 2025 and 
9-37 billion for 2050 (Fig. 4.1, Table 4.1). According to this medium variant, an increase of some 
2.35 billion people can be expected worldwide between 1995 and 2025; and an additional 1.3 
billion between 2025 and 2050. 
These numbers are a little smaller than previous UN estimates, leading some mass media to 
jump to the conclusion that world population growth wi l l be over soon. This rash judgment is 
premature. The UN medium variant projection is based on the assumption that almost all 
countries worldwide wil l have a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of only 2.1 in 2050 at the latest (only 
for 10, mostly European countries, the UN assumes a TFR in 2050 that is a little less - between 
1.84 and 2.1). This assumption would require a further steep fertility decline in many developing 
nations - especially in Pakistan, Nigeria, Iran or India, where the Total Fertility Rates are still far 
above the reproductive level of 2.1 children per woman. According to the most recent UN 
estimates, Pakistan for instance, currently has a TFR of about 5 children per woman - the 
medium variant projection assumes that it wil l drop to 2.1 during the next 25 years. In other 
words, we wil l only have a world population of about 9-4 billion by 2050, if the Total Fertility 
1
 Parts of this paragraph (Major Demographic Trends Worldwide) have been published previously in: Heilig, CK. / 
Fischer, C. (1997) 
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Rate, measured as a global average, declines from about 3-0 in 1990-95 to the reproductive level 
of 2.1 children per woman in 2035-40. 
Table 4.1. Total Population by Region in 1950,1995, 2025 and 2050 (in 1000). Low, Medium and High 
Variant UN Projection, 1996. 
Historical Estimates 
1950 1995 
Low Variant 
2025 2050 
UN Projections, 1996 
Medium Variant 
2025 2050 
High Variant 
2025 2050 
World total 2,523,878 5,687,113 7,474,059 7,662,248 8,039,130 9,366,724 8,580,509 11,156,318 
More devel. regions 812,687 1,171,384 1,149,984 959,159 1,220,250 1,161,741 1,286,133 1,351,681 
Less devel. regions 1,711,191 4,515,729 6,324,075 6,703,089 6,818,880 8,204,983 7,294,375 9,804,637 
Africa 
Eastern Africa 
Middle Africa 
Northern Africa 
Southern Africa 
Western Africa 
Latin Am. & Carib. 
Caribbean 
Central America 
South America 
Northern America 
223,974 
65,624 
26,316 
53,302 
15,581 
63,151 
166,337 
17,039 
36,925 
112,372 
171,617 
719,495 
221,315 
83,271 
158,077 
47,335 
209,498 
476,637 
35,686 
123,474 
317,477 
296,645 
Asia 1,402,0213,437,787 
Eastern Asia 
South-eastern Asia 
South-central Asia 
Western Asia 
Europe 
Eastern Europe 
Northern Europe 
Southern Europe 
Western Europe 
Oceania 
Australia/New Zeal. 
Melanesia 
Micronesia 
Polynesia 
Least dev. Countr. 
671,156 1,421,314 
182,035 481,920 
498,583 1,366,866 
50,247 
547,318 
219,296 
78,094 
109,012 
140,916 
12,612 
10,127 
2,095 
153 
237 
197,572 
167,686 
728,244 
310,506 
93,372 
143,377 
180,988 
28,305 
21,427 
5,814 
481 
583 
579,035 
1,370,579 1,731,421 
453,249 
181,841 
236,621 
78,449 
420,419 
631,598 
44,778 
175,438 
411,382 
336,398 
593,984 
252,289 
258,834 
90,256 
536,058 
649,866 
45,478 
189,415 
414,973 
301,140 
4,428,3764,405,219 
1,572,978 1,374,217 
634,064 651,846 
1,944,779 2,057,954 
276,556 
669,468 
271,948 
89,039 
131,939 
176,542 
37,640 
26,380 
9,636 
811 
813 
321,202 
537,521 
215,673 
75,785 
102,990 
143,072 
37,081 
24,235 
11,040 
928 
879 
1,092,685 1,384,413 
1,453,899 2,046,401 
480,182 
187,525 
256,716 
82,901 
446,574 
689,618 
48,211 
189,143 
452,265 
369,016 
698,596 
284,821 
317,267 
106,824 
638,892 
810,433 
56,229 
230,425 
523,778 
384,054 
4,784,833 5,442,567 
1,695,469 1,722,380 
691,911 811,891 
2,100,034 2,521,304 
297,420 
701,077 
284,170 
95,593 
137,196 
184,118 
40,687 
28,809 
10,150 
857 
871 
386,992 
637,585 
255,955 
94,194 
119,887 
167,550 
45,684 
30,557 
12,972 
1,097 
1,059 
1,159,2551,631,820 
1,546,302 
506,719 
200,438 
276,175 
87,335 
475,634 
752,670 
51,224 
206,032 
495,414 
393,598 
5,108,307 
1,785.553 
749,613 
2,256,712 
316,429 
736,585 
303,706 
98,776 
142,603 
191,500 
43,047 
30,561 
10,655 
905 
926 
1,231,329 
2,408,106 
812,974 
336,396 
381,781 
124,900 
752,055 
1,000,555 
65,827 
282,729 
651,999 
451,503 
6,500,750 
1,999,209 
994,046 
3,053,930 
453,566 
742,331 
311,048 
105,667 
135,502 
190,115 
53,073 
35,495 
15,036 
1,285 
1,257 
1,916,482 
Source: United Nations Population Division (1997): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. The 1996 
Revision. Annexes I and II. New York. 
Obviously, there is no guarantee that this wi l l happen. There could be a much higher increase in 
world population, as indicated by the "high" variant UN projection: If worldwide fertility would 
drop to only about 2.6 children per woman we would have a global population of some 8.6 
billion by 2025 and 11.2 billion by 2050. This would be equivalent to a 2.89 billion increase 
between 1995 and 2025 and a 2.58 billion increase between 2025 and 2050. Hence, we cannot 
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exclude another doubling of the world population between now and the middle of the next 
century. 
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Figure 4-1. Total world population, 1950-2050 (in billions) and average number of children per woman 
(Total Fertility Rate). High, medium and low variant UN Projections, 1996. 
Source: United Nations Population Division (1997): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. The 
1996 Revision. Annexes I and II. New York. 
Is it possible to completely stop world population growth during the next few decades? Yes, it is 
- if fertility, worldwide, would decline to 1.57 children per woman -, the global population could 
stabilize at about 7-5 billion by 2025. This is the result of the 1996 UN low variant projections. 
Please note that this variant assumes a drastic drop of average fertility to a level of some 24% 
below replacement - in all countries worldwide. While such a steep decline, in fact, already 
happened in many European countries, it is rather unlikely that populous developing nations 
such as Pakistan, India, Indonesia or Nigeria -which greatly determine world population growth 
- would follow this trend. 
The current annual population increase of about 80 million will remain constant until 2015 
Currently world population is growing by about 80 million people per year (Fig. 4.2). This is a 
little less than in the early 1990s when the growth was more than 85 million per year. According 
to the 1996 UN medium variant projection this wil l change very little during the next decades. 
Only after 2015 will we observe a gradual decline of the annual population increase - reaching 
about 50 million by 2050. Thus, by the middle of the next century, world population growth (in 
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absolute numbers) wil l have declined to the level of the early 1950s. However, this is only 
possible, if fertility - in all developing countries - falls to the "reproductive level" of 2.1 children 
per woman by 2050. 
CM <M OM 
Figure 4.2. Average annual world population increase (in millions) and average number of children per 
woman (Total Fertility Rate). High, medium and low variant UN Projections, 1996. 
Source: United Nations Population Division (1997): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. The 
1996 Revision. Annexes I and II. New York. 
This absolute population growth of about 80 million people is an important factor of global 
food security. Despite declining population growth rates and falling fertility, the global food 
demand wil l increase by an amount, which is roughly equivalent to the total food demand of 
Germany (not taking into account diet-related increase of food demand) (Crosson & Anderson, 
1992) 
Between now and 2050 world population growth will be generated exclusively in developing 
countries 
Between now and the middle of the next century world population wil l most likely increase by 
some 3.68 billion people - all of this increase wil l be contributed by the developing countries 
(Table 4.2). In fact, the population of the developed nations as a group wil l most likely decline 
by almost 10 million people between now and the year 2050 - according to the UN medium 
variant projections. Most of this population growth in the developing world wil l occur during 
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the next 30 years: between 1995 and 2025 the populat ion in developing countries w i l l increase 
by 2.3 bi l l ion; between 2025 and 2050 i t w i l l "on ly" g row by 1.39 bi l l ion. 
Table 4.2. Population Increase (in 1000) and in Exp. Annual Growth Rate (in %) by Region between 1950-
1995,1995-2025,2025-2050 and 1950-2050. UN Medium Variant Projection, 1996. 
Wor ld Total 
More Dev. Regions 
Less Dev. Regions 
Africa 
Eastern Africa 
Middle Africa 
Northern Africa 
Southern Africa 
Western Africa 
Latin Am. & Carib. 
Caribbean 
Central America 
South America 
Northern America 
Asia 
Eastern Asia 
South Eastern Asia 
South Central Asia 
Western Asia 
Europe 
Eastern Europe 
Northern Europe 
Southern Europe 
Western Europe 
Oceania 
Australia-N. Zealand 
Melanesia 
Micronesia 
Polynesia 
Least Dev. Count. 
1950-199E 
(103) 
3,163,235 
358,697 
2,804,538 
495,521 
155,691 
56,955 
104,775 
31,754 
146,347 
310,300 
18,647 
86,549 
205,105 
125,028 
2,035,766 
750,158 
299,885 
868,283 
117,439 
180,926 
91,210 
15,278 
34,365 
40,072 
15,693 
11,300 
3,719 
328 
346 
381,463 
Population Change 
(%) 
0.34 
0.15 
0.41 
0.49 
O.51 
O.48 
0.46 
0.47 
0.50 
0.44 
0.31 
0.51 
0.44 
0.23 
0.38 
0.31 
0.41 
0.42 
0.51 
0.12 
0.15 
0.07 
0.11 
0.10 
0.34 
0.31 
0.43 
0.48 
O.38 
0.45 
& Annua l Exponential Growth 1 
1995-2025 
(103) 
2,352,017 
48,866 
2,303,151 
734,404 
258,867 
104,254 
98,639 
35,566 
237,076 
212,981 
12,525 
65,669 
134,788 
72,371 
1,347,046 
274,155 
209,991 
733,168 
129,734 
-27,167 
-26,336 
2,221 
-6,181 
3,130 
12,382 
7,382 
4,336 
376 
288 
580,220 
(%) 
0.22 
0.03 
0.26 
0.44 
0.49 
O.51 
O.30 
0.35 
0.48 
O.23 
0.19 
0.27 
0.22 
O.I4 
0.21 
0.11 
O.23 
0.27 
O.36 
-0.02 
-0.06 
0.01 
-O.O3 
0.01 
0.23 
O.I9 
0.35 
0.36 
0.25 
0.44 
2025-205O 
(lO3) 
1,327,594 
-58,509 
1,386,103 
592,502 
218,414 
97,296 
60,551 
23,923 
192,318 
120,815 
8,018 
41,282 
71,513 
15,038 
657,734 
26,911 
119,980 
421,270 
89,572 
-63,492 
-28,215 
-1,399 
-17,309 
-16,568 
4,997 
1,748 
2,822 
240 
188 
472,565 
(%) 
0.12 
-O.O4 
O.I4 
0.26 
0.28 
O.32 
0.16 
0.19 
0.27 
0.12 
0.12 
0.15 
0.11 
O.O3 
0.10 
0.01 
0.12 
O.I4 
0.20 
-0.07 
-0.08 
-0.01 
-0.10 
-0.07 
O.09 
O.O4 
O.I9 
O.I9 
0.15 
0.26 
Rates 
1950-205C 
(103) 
6,842,846 
349,054 
6,493,792 
1,822,427 
632,972 
258,505 
263,965 
91,243 
575,741 
644,096 
39,190 
193,500 
411,406 
212,437 
4,040,546 
1,051,224 
629,856 
2,022,721 
336,745 
90,267 
36,659 
16,100 
10,875 
26,634 
33,072 
20,430 
10,877 
944 
822 
1,434,248 
) 
(%) 
0.25 
0.07 
0.30 
O.42 
0.45 
0.45 
0.34 
O.36 
0.44 
O.30 
0.23 
0.35 
O.29 
O.15 
0.26 
O.18 
0.28 
0.31 
O.39 
O.03 
0.03 
O.04 
0.02 
0.03 
0.24 
0.21 
O.34 
0.37 
0.28 
O.4O 
Note: The exponential growth rate was calculated with the formula: r = (log(Pn / Po)) / n log e. 
Source: United Nations Population Division (1997): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. The 1996 
Revision. Annexes I and II. New York 
Comparing the centennial growth of developed and developing countries reveals a dramatic 
divergence. The populat ion of the developed countries as a group w i l l have increased by less 
than 350 mil l ion between 1950 and 2050. The developing countries, on the other hand, w i l l 
have an estimated 6.49 bil l ion people more - thus almost quintupl ing their 1950 populat ion. 
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This modern "population explosion" in the Third World is not comparable to the demographic 
transition of Europe in the 18th and 19th century. It is a historically unique phenomenon. Both 
the absolute numbers of population increase and the growth rates are without historical 
precedence. No country in Europe has experienced annual population growth of more than 0.5 
to 1% during its "high growth" period. 
World population increase is concentrated in Asia 
From the 3.68 billion people that wil l be added to the world population between 1995 and 2050, 
Asia wil l contribute some 2 billion (Table 4.2). This enormous increase is due to the already 
massive size of the population. Most of this growth will occur in the next three decades. 
Between 1995 and 2025 Asia's population wil l grow by 1.35 billion - between 2025 and 2050 the 
increase is projected to be just 658 million (Table 4.2). 
Despite a projected increase in mortality due to AIDS, we cannot expect a significant slowing 
down of population growth in Africa. This continent wi l l contribute nearly 1.33 billion people to 
the world population between 1995 and the middle of the next century - almost twice as much 
as its current total population. Fertility is still so high in Sub-Saharan Africa that it can offset the 
effect of rising mortality. With an increase of 734 million over the next 30 years Africa's 
population wi l l more than double. 
Latin America and the Caribbean, on the other hand, wil l have only a very moderate population 
increase of some 334 million between 1995 and 2050 - almost two-thirds (213 million) during 
the next three decades. This is due to both the smaller initial size of the population and the 
already relatively low level of fertility. 
Europe's population will almost certainly decline - by 27 million over the next 30 years and by 
another 64 million between 2025 and 2050. Hence, the UN medium variant projection assumes a 
shrinking of Europe's population by some 91 million between 1995 and the middle of the next 
century. 
Largest growers 
According to the 1996 (medium variant) UN population projection India's population wil l 
increase by an additional 401 million between 1995 and 2025 - China wil l grow by "only" 260 
million (Table 4-3). The next largest contributor to world population growth - surprisingly - is 
not Indonesia, which has the third largest population among developing countries, but 
Pakistan. This country's population wil l grow by about 133 million between 1995 and 2025. An 
almost equal contribution to world population growth wil l probably come from Nigeria -127 
million. Perhaps unexpected, the next largest contributor to world population growth will be 
Ethiopia, which wi l l have an additional 80 million people over the next three decades. Indonesia 
wil l grow by "only" 78 million people. The United States of America wil l probably grow by 65 
and Bangladesh by 62 million. Few development experts would have put Zaire on a watch list 
for population growth. But this Central African country is projected to have an increase in 
population of more than 60 million between 1995 and 2025. The tenth largest contributor to 
world population growth wil l be Iran -wi th a population increase of almost 60 million during 
the next three decades (Table 4-3). 
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Table 4-3- The 10 countries with the highest population increase between 1950-1995,1995-2025,2025-
2050 and 1950-2050. UN Medium Variant Projection, 1996. 
Past Population Increase, 
1950-1995 
(103) 
China 
India 
Indonesia 
United States of America 
Brazil 
Pakistan 
Nigeria 
Bangladesh 
Mexico 
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 
665,464 
571,444 
117,922 
109,302 
105,040 
96,744 
78,786 
76,446 
63,408 
51,452 
Projected Population Increase, 
1995-2025 
(103) 
India 
China 
Pakistan 
Nigeria 
Ethiopia 
Indonesia 
United States of America 
Bangladesh 
Zaire 
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 
401,196 
260,206 
132,647 
126,676 
79,884 
77,785 
65,366 
61,751 
60,472 
59,886 
Projected Population Increase, 
2025-2050 
Centennial Population Increase, 
1950-2050 
(103) 
India 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Ethiopia 
Zaire 
China 
Indonesia 
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 
Bangladesh 
Brazil 
173,982 
80,945 
72,642 
62,534 
47,987 
40,372 
36,802 
34,993 
32,585 
23,143 
(lO3) 
India 
China 
Pakistan 
Nigeria 
Indonesia 
Ethiopia 
United States of America 
Brazil 
Bangladesh 
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 
1,175,113 
961,904 
317,840 
305,575 
238,726 
194,298 
189,730 
189,284 
176,405 
153,356 
Source: United Nations Population Division (1997): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. 
The 1996 Revision. Annexes I and II. New York. 
Which countries, wor ldwide, w i l l have the highest increase in populat ion during the 100-year 
period between 1950 and 2050? If the 1996 UN medium variant populat ion assessments and 
projections are accurate (and there is no reason to believe otherwise) India w i l l lead the group 
w i th an increase of 1.18 bi l l ion people - significantly larger than that of China, which w i l l have a 
population increase of "on ly " 962 mi l l ion (Table 4-3). The th i rd largest contr ibutor to wor ld 
populat ion g rowth between 1950 and 2050 w i l l be Pakistan w i th an increase of 318 mi l l ion 
people. The ranking of the other 7 countries is as given in Table 4.3-
Please note again that these data are a l l based on the most recent medium variant UN 
population projection, which assumes that al l countries, wor ldwide, w i l l reduce their average 
TFR to 2.1 children per woman by 2050. It is certainly possible, if not likely, that some of these 
countries, such as Pakistan or Iran, w i l l not be able (or wi l l ing) to reduce average fert i l i ty t o that 
level. In that case these countries wou ld have an even higher increase in populat ion than 
reported above. 
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By far the highest rates of population growth can be found in Western Asia and Africa South of 
the Sahara 
On a country-by-country basis it was mainly the oil exporting nations of Western Asia that had 
the highest population growth rates over the past 45 years. According to the 1996 revision of 
the UN population assessments and projections, the United Arab Emirates, for instance, had a 
mean annual growth rate of 7-7% between 1950 and 1995- This exceptionally rapid population 
growth was fueled by both very high rates of fertility and immigration. Extremely high growth 
rates were also estimated for Qatar, Western Sahara, Kuwait, Djibouti, Brunei and Saudi Arabia 
(Table 4.4). 
Between 1995 and 2025 more and more countries in Sub-Saharan Africa will be among those 
with the most rapidly growing population. Between 1995 and 2025 the fastest growing 
populations wil l be those of the Gaza Strip, Liberia, Oman and Yemen. However, there wil l be 
also extremely high rates of population growth in Rwanda, Somalia, Niger, Ethiopia, Libya, and 
Angola. 
Which country will have the highest rate of population growth considering the whole century 
from 1950 to 2050? According to the UN medium variant population projection, it wil l be the 
United Arab Emirates, with a spectacular mean annual population growth of 4%. Most of the 
other "top ten" countries with high rates of centennial population growth are also oil-exporting 
nations of Western Asia (Table 4.4)- This extremely fast population growth over a whole century 
shows that population density is unrelated to the regional agricultural resources, as long as 
they can be compensated by other sources of sustenance (such as Oil exports). 
India will out-grow China 
India has one of the oldest family planning programs. It started way back in the 1950s. The 
country's average fertility, however, declined only slowly. In the early 1950s both China and 
India had a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of about 6 children per woman. But while China's TFR 
sharply fell to about 2.4 in 1990, it declined only slowly in India and was still above 4 children 
per woman in 1990. This relatively slow decline of fertility has built up a huge population 
momentum in India. The country's population structure is much "younger" than that of China. 
A "broad base" of children and young adults - born during the high growth period in the 1960s, 
1970s and early 1980s - wi l l enter reproductive age in the near future. Even if fertility continues 
to decline to reproductive level by 2020 (as being assumed by the UN projections) the Indian 
population wil l probably increase to almost 1.6 billion by 2050 - slightly more than that of China 
(UN medium variant). 
However, India's population might become even much larger. If the average TFR would only 
decline to 2.6 (instead of 2.1) children per woman in 2020, the population would increase to 
about 1.9 billion by 2050. 
According to the UN low variant projection, India's population would increase to 1.2 billion by 
2050. This would require an average TFR decline to 1.6 children per woman by 2010-15. This, 
however, does not seem to be a very likely scenario. 
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Table 44- The 10 countries with the highest growth rates: average annual population growth rates, 
1950-1995,1995-2050, 2025-2050, and 1950-2050. UN Medium Variant Projection, 1996. 
Past Population Growth, 
1950-1995 
(%yr1) 
United Arab Emirates 
Qatar 
Western Sahara 
Kuwait 
Djibouti 
Brunei Darussalam 
Saudi Arabia 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Oman 
7-7 
6.9 
6.4 
54 
5.0 
4.0 
3-9 
3-7 
3-5 
3-5 
Projected Population Growth, 
1995-2025 
(%yr1) 
Gaza Strip 
Liberia 
Oman 
Yemen 
Rwanda 
Somalia 
Niger 
Ethiopia 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
Angola 
3-8 
3-8 
3.6 
3-2 
3.1 
3.0 
3.0 
2.9 
2.9 
2.9 
Projected Population Growth, Centennial Population Growth, 
2025-2050 
(%yr1) 
Gaza Strip 
Oman 
Ethiopia 
Zaire 
Yemen 
Niger 
Somalia 
Angola 
Congo 
Liberia 
2.3 
2.1 
1.8 
1.8 
1.7 
1.7 
1.7 
1.7 
1.7 
1.7 
1950-2050 
(%yr1) 
United Arab Emirates 
Western Sahara 
Qatar 
Djibouti 
Oman 
Kuwait 
Saudi Arabia 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
Gaza Strip 
Niger 
4.0 
3-7 
3-5 
3.2 
32 
3.1 
2.9 
2.9 
2.9 
2.7 
Source: United Nations Population Division (1997): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. The 1996 
Revision. Annexes I and II. New York. 
Nigeria and Pakistan: emerging population giants 
There are not many countries in the wor ld where populat ion projections are more diff icult to 
believe than in Nigeria. It w i l l become an African populat ion giant, we l l comparable to the most 
populous Asian nations. In 1950 the West-African country had a populat ion of about 33 mi l l ion ; 
since then the populat ion has more than t r ip led. The UN Population Division estimates that 
Nigeria's populat ion in 1995 was about 112 mi l l ion (please note that the UN does not revise 
their estimate according to the most recent Nigerian census, which was significantly lower. 
Obviously, the UN Population and Statistical Divisions do not consider this census accurate 
enough). Between 1995 and the year 2050 the country's population w i l l probably t r ip le again 
and reach almost 339 mil l ion (Fig. 4.3). If this does occur, we w i l l have a tenfold increase of a 33 
mil l ion populat ion w i th in one century. This wou ld have no historical precedence. And this is just 
the medium variant UN projection. 
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Figure 4.3. Nigeria, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Thailand: Total population 1950-2050 (in millions) and total 
fertility rate. High, Medium and Low Variant UN Projections, 1996. 
Source: United Nations Population Division (1997): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. The 
1996 Revision. Annexes I and II. New York. 
There are several overwhelmingly Muslim populations with very high population growth rates, 
such as those of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or the United Arab Emirates. But none of them is 
projected to have such a massive absolute increase of the population as Pakistan. In 1950 
Pakistan had a population of about 40 million people. Since then it has more than tripled and 
stood at 136 million in 1995. But the real population explosion in Pakistan wil l only come over 
the next few decades, because the country not only has a very young population, but also still 
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an extremely high fertility - much higher, for instance, than in Bangladesh or Thailand. These 
large numbers of children and young adults wil l soon come into reproductive age and will 
produce a large number of offspring even if we assume, as in the UN medium variant, a rapid 
decline in average fertility to reproductive level (of 2.1 children per woman) by 2020. Pakistan's 
population will be about 357 million by 2050 (according to the UN medium variant projection) 
(Fig. 4-3). 
High fertility in the early 1950s was not the only reason for the exceptional population growth 
in Nigeria and Pakistan. There were other countries, which initially had a similar or even higher 
level of fertility. Consider the case of Bangladesh and Thailand. The Total Fertility Rate of 
Bangladesh during the early 1970s was as high as in Nigeria or Pakistan and the initial 
population size was quite comparable. Yet Bangladesh is projected to have a population of 
"only" 220 million by 2050 (as compared to 339 in Nigeria). Even more impressive are the 
demographic trends in Thailand, which reflect one of Asia's success stories in population 
control. The country's average TFR was comparable to that in Nigeria, but declined sharply in 
the early 1970s. This "saved" Thailand from building up this massive population momentum, 
which characterizes the situation in Nigeria or Pakistan. Consequently Thailand wil l have only a 
very moderate population increase of 14.7 million between 1995 and 2050 (Fig. 4-3). 
The global balance of population is shifting 
Europe's share of the world population sharply declined between 1950 and 1995 from 21.7 to 
12.8% - Africa's share, on the other hand, has increased from 8.9 to 12.7%. Today, both Europe 
and Africa are each home of about one eighth of the world population. This wil l change 
significantly in the future. Europe's share of the global population wil l shrink to about 6.8% in 
2050. Africa's share will grow to 21.8%. Hence, one century of population growth wil l 
completely reverse Europe's and Africa's position. Following the UN medium variant projections 
we have to expect a dramatic change in the global balance of population: A much bigger share 
of the world population wil l live in sub-Saharan Africa. In only some 50 years Western Africa, for 
instance, wil l have the same population as all of Europe. Eastern Africa wi l l have many more 
people than all the countries of South America, the Caribbean and Oceania combined. 
4.3. The link between people and food 
There are few subjects in demography, which have received more attention than the relation 
between population and food. Since the times of Rev. Thomas R. Malthus - or even before -
numerous scholars have dealt with the question, whether the number of people might 
eventually outgrow the potential of the arable land to provide food for the people (amongst 
others Malthus, 1798; Vogt, 1948; Osborn, 1948; Fremlin, 1964; Ehrlich, 1968; Daily & Ehrlich, 
1992; Waggoner, 1994; Islam, 1995; Cohen, 1995; Ehrlich et al., 1995; Heilig, 1996). 
The most striking feature of this discussion is that it seems to repeat itself with each generation 
- apparently with little chance to lead to a definite conclusion. A few years ago Joel Cohen 
published a book in which he systematically discussed a large number of theories and models 
on how many people the Earth can support. He could show that the range of estimates actually 
increased. "More and more extreme (both high and low) estimates are proposed, challenged 
and defended" (Cohen, 1995, P- 214). 
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One reason for this unsatisfactory trend is the conceptual confusion, which plagued the 
discussion over many centuries and sidetracked scholars to focus on dimensions of the problem, 
which later turned out to be less important or even irrelevant. There was, for instance, much 
debate on the so-called "population carrying capacity" which primarily deals with the geo-
biophysical characteristics of land, while technological, economic and social questions were 
ignored. The following discussion is an attempt to outline some of these fallacies. It is 
organized around seven arguments. 
4.3.1. The local ratio between people and (cultivated) land is 
unrelated to food problems 
The most basic idea, which links people and food, deals with the ratio between people and 
(arable) land. The argument goes like this: A given area of land can sustain only a certain 
number of people. If the population grows above this threshold famine wil l break out and cut 
down population to a "sustainable" size. This classical Malthusian argument was repeated by 
numerous authors - sometimes in its crude original version, sometimes modified. For instance 
some authors (and the later Malthus) assumed that people might anticipate to food shortages 
by restricting their reproduction and thus achieve a balance between people and land without 
having to wait for famine. 
There are two fundamental problems with this concept. 
First, people often do not (only) feed from the land, in which they live, but are supplied through 
trade from agricultural areas or fishing grounds far away. This is obvious for people living in 
urban agglomerates, who depend on agricultural "hinterlands", which can be located as far as 
on other continents. Even traditional self-supply farmers do not exclusively live from the land 
they cultivate. They usually have access to local markets on which they can supplement food 
deficits. Thus, the idea of local food self-sufficiency is inappropriate at heart. It ignores that 
human economies - even at primitive levels - use trade and at least a simple division of labor to 
compensate location disadvantages. Populous ancient trading centers could thus exist in the 
Sahara and other remote areas. 
Second, the food production potential of a certain land area is not a constant - it can be 
increased by agricultural technology - sometimes by orders of magnitude (for instance, when 
Libya is growing wheat in the desert). The limitation often is not land or water as such, but the 
access to technology and investment capital. There are many examples where people suffer 
from chronic food shortages and famine while living in the middle of extensive areas of arable 
land, such as in Sudan. 
The concept of a local balance between people and arable land or water resources is misleading 
for the analysis of food problems - even in today's least developed countries. Today, no rural 
area is completely isolated from the impact of the world grain market. Agribusiness, food-aid 
programs, or international agricultural research centers are heavily changing local conditions 
for farmers everywhere. Trade regulations, exchange rates, commercial energy prices, and 
transport technologies have become essential factors of agriculture. Some time ago, during 
Russia's economic transition, farmers from Georgia used to board airplanes with baskets of 
vegetables and fruits. They flew to Moscow to sell their products. Subsidized flight tickets and 
the disrupted communist food distribution system opened-up a new profit opportunity. Few 
countries have a more dramatic imbalance between people and land than Egypt - more than 
50% of all the food has to be imported. Yet, food shortages are rare. For Egypt the geopolitics of 
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food aid and the income from crude oil exports are the critical factors of its food supply - not 
land or water. 
43-2. The global population carrying capacity is more than 
sufficient 
While it has become rather obvious that the idea of local food sustainability is an inappropriate 
concept for studying today's food problems, there are still many debates about the global 
carrying capacity (Bailey, 1993). Especially some biologists have repeatedly tried to convince the 
public that the world is on the brink of disaster, because global population growth is 
supposedly outrunning the earth's capacity to produce food (Ehrlich, 1968). However, there is 
substantial empirical evidence that the global rain-fed crop cultivation potential could easily 
feed a world population twice or three times the current size. 
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) together with FAO has 
undertaken several detailed assessments of the global arable land. They were based on the 
Agro-Ecological-Zones (AEZ) approach, which uses spatial databases on climate, soil and terrain 
information to build - in a first step - a detailed inventory of agro-ecological conditions for 
several hundred thousand land-units worldwide. In a second step, each unit is tested against the 
growth requirements of 21 major crops that are defined with a Length-of-Growing-Period (LGP) 
concept. If the physiological requirements of a certain crop can be matched with the soil, 
climate, and landform conditions of a specific land unit, this unit is marked as suitable. (For a 
detailed description see: Fischer & Heilig, 1998.) 
IIASA and FAO researchers have undertaken several rounds of assessments based on this 
approach, some of them for specific countries or sub-regions. The first round in the early 1980s 
included 118 less developed countries (excluding China) (FAO, IIASA, UNFPA, 1982). It showed 
that these countries as a group had enough arable land to feed 5.7 billion people with a low 
level of agricultural technology, 14.4 billion with an intermediate level of technology and 32.3 
billion with a high level. The 1996 UN population projections predict that this group of countries 
(LDCs minus China) wil l have a total population of 6.7 billion in 2050. In other words, if these 
countries apply some basic agricultural technology they should be able to support twice their 
projected population. With currently available high agricultural technology, they could feed 
almost five times their projected population. The results of this first inventory and evaluation of 
cultivated land were confirmed by several subsequent studies (e.g. Eswaran et ai, 1998; Penning 
de Vries, et al., 1995). 
Ironically, this did not end the debate. Several authors actually used the IIASA/FAO data to prove 
their argument, that the population was approaching the global carrying capacity. Joel Cohen, 
for instance, pointed out that at "low levels of farming technology, there would be 64 critical 
countries, with a projected 503 million people more than they could feed" (Cohen, 1995, P-118). 
T.N. Srinivasan criticized the IIASA/FAO study for omitting economic factors. Some authors 
believe that the global carrying capacity is (much) lower than the present world population -
without really explaining how this paradox should be understood. Lester Brown, David 
Pimentel, and Paul Ehrlich are still publishing "warning cries" that the world population (or 
some specific country) is approaching the maximum food production capacity of the land. 
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Here we cannot comment on this debate; but one misunderstanding should be clarified: Several 
authors have used the IIASA/FAO potential land study to prove that a number of countries 
would have problems at a low level of agricultural technology. This conclusion, however, is 
misleading. The definition of "low inputs" in the IIASA/FAO study was based on a traditional 
almost zero-input agriculture. "Low input" meant that the farmers use hand tools, have no 
chemical fertilizers or pesticides, no irrigation, no tractor, no high yield seeds. The "low techno-
logy" category in the IIASA/FAO studies is equivalent to a primitive slash-and-burn agriculture, 
which needs long fallow periods to revitalize the soil. It is a baseline category. Most developing 
countries have long passed this stage in agriculture - their farmers are now operating on a 
medium level of agricultural technology. Almost everywhere in Asia, farmers are using chemical 
fertilizers and pesticides, have high yield crops and irrigation. Those, who predict food deficits 
for developing countries by assuming a "low level technology", essentially assume that the 
development in the Third World would be turned back. The opposite is more likely: current 
trends clearly indicate that within the next few decades most developing countries wil l be able 
to use even "high" levels of agricultural technology (in the definition of the NASA study). 
Recently, IIASA researchers have replicated the potential arable land study from the early 1980s, 
using much improved global data sets on soil and terrain characteristics, as well as much more 
detailed climate information (precipitation, temperature profile, etc.). It was found that Latin 
America is currently using about 185 million hectares for rain-fed cultivation. The net-area 
suitable for crop cultivation, however, is 952 million hectares. Thus, Latin America has a total 
land reserve of 767 million hectares, which is more than 4 times the currently used cultivated 
area. Of course, much of this land is covered by valuable forests and wetlands. But even if 
farmers would not tough the estimated 533 million hectares of forest and wetland some 234 
million hectares of "other" land suitable for cultivation would be available. Latin America has at 
least twice as much arable land, as it is currently using (Table 4.5). 
Africa has even more land reserves suitable for rain-fed cultivation. Currently, African farmers 
are cultivating some 248 million hectares out of 978 available for cultivation. Excluding the 447 
million hectares of forest and wetland, still more than 283 million hectares would be available 
for rain-fed cultivation (Table 4.5). However, Africa has not only more than enough arable land 
- it also has a huge potential for intensification. Currently, its agriculture is mostly operating on 
low or medium levels of agricultural input. With a huge potential for agricultural modernization 
and massive reserves or arable land Africa should easily be able to feed its projected population. 
If the continent nevertheless has serious food problems and grim prospects, they are certainly 
not caused by resource constraints. Africa is a good example that food security can be only 
analyzed in a framework, which includes economic, social, cultural, and political conditions. 
Asia, on the other hand is certainly more critical - especially Western Asia. At the moment we have 
not assessed the situation in Eastern Asia (mainly China), but in Western, South-Central and South-
East Asia some 430 million hectares of land (out of 565 available in Asia - excluding Eastern Asia) 
are currently available. This leaves a reserve of only 135 million hectares. This is significantly less 
than in Latin America of Africa. Moreover, if we take into account that some 56% of this reserve 
is covered by valuable (tropical rain) forests and wetlands, just 16 million hectares of other land 
is available. (This does not include some land reserves in East Asia, which might be in the range 
of 15 to 30 million hectares). Asia has no alternative to a rapid modernization of agriculture; it is 
also likely that some of its forests and wetlands have to be used for feeding the projected 
massive population increase. In addition, Asia wil l depend, more than any other region, on 
global grain markets - especially the food-deficit countries of Western Asia (4-3-3). 
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40 FOOD SECURITY AT DIFFERENT SCALES: ISSUES, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
In conclusion, our data and models show that - on a global level - there is more than enough 
land and water available to feed the world population in the foreseeable future. Especially, 
South America and Africa have huge land reserves, which are suitable for rain-fed crop 
cultivation (see also: Tiffen & Mortimore, 1993). Even China has more arable land than 
previously known (Crook, 1993). According to a most recent NASA assessment, the worldwide 
land area with rain-fed crop cultivation potential is at least twice as large than the currently 
used crop area. Moreover, these areas are under current levels of agricultural technology, 
implying that the productivity could be further increased. 
4 3 3 . We cannot talk about food without talking about non-
agricultural sectors 
There are countries that do not have enough arable land to feed the population - even when 
the farmers use high levels of agricultural technology. Most of these countries are in Western 
Asia, South Central Asia and Northern Africa, but there are also some serious cases in Asia and 
in Eastern-, Western and Southern Africa. On the other hand, some countries have huge 
reserves. With appropriate technology, the Sudan could easily feed all of Africa; the United 
States and Canada could significantly step up production; many European countries have 
explicit policies to reduce the cropland in order to prevent over-production. 
Countries with deficits in agricultural resource are often considered the most critical for food 
crises. However, this conclusion is misleading as has been discussed already (4.3.1). There are 
many examples of resource-poor countries, which have achieved high levels of food security, 
such as Japan, South Korea or Singapore. Japan, for instance, had a total cereal production of 
13.4 million tons in 1995; in that year, the country had a net-import in cereals of 26.8 million 
tons. South Korea imported 12.4 million tons of cereals, while it produced only 6.9 million tons 
(Table 4.6). 
These countries can feed their population well, because they can trade non-agricultural 
products for grain. By selling industrial products and services on the world market, they are able 
to support a population, which is much larger than the carrying capacity of their land. The real 
disaster in some countries (especially in Africa) is not the lack of agricultural resources, but their 
inability to develop non-agricultural sectors. With a population carrying capacity of the global 
arable land-resources, which far exceeds the projected world population in 2050, food security 
is more an economic and development problem - and to a lesser extent - a resource problem. 
4.3.4. Food insecurity is often a distribution problem 
It has always irritated researchers and the public alike, that there can be hunger in the midst of 
food abundance. For years the European community had a policy of "taking agricultural excess 
production out of the market" - a euphemism for destroying (or submitting to non-human 
consumption) huge amounts of food products. On the other hand, millions suffer from under-
nutrition. 
Between 1961/63 and 1992/94 the average food calorie supply increased almost everywhere: in 
Africa from 2,061 to 2,333 cal. cap."1 d"1; in Asia from 1,865 to 2,577; in Latin America from 2,345 
to 2,722; and in the Least Developed Countries from 2,012 to 2,032 cal. cap."1 d"1 (Table 4-7). 
While the increase in average calorie supply was very significant in Asia, it was only moderate in 
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Latin America and small in Africa. The average calorie supply in the Lest Developed Countries 
stagnated at a low level. 
Table 4.6. Cereal trade and production for selected countries, 1995 (103 tons). 
Australia 
Canada 
France 
USA 
Egypt 
Japan 
South Korea 
North America 
Europe 
Oceania 
Africa 
South America 
Asia 
M DCs 
LDCs 
Import 
288 
1,362 
1,072 
4,947 
7,972 
27,264 
12,440 
18,711 
44,113 
1,247 
34,539 
17,863 
119,226 
92,273 
152,596 
Export 
10,694 
21,864 
28,447 
104,189 
157 
461 
10 
126,907 
62,483 
10,716 
3,111 
15,455 
22,957 
209,072 
40,352 
Net-Trade 
10,407 
20,503 
27,375 
99,242 
-7,815 
-26,803 
-12,429 
108,196 
18,370 
9,469 
-31,429 
-2,408 
-96,269 
116,799 
-112,244 
Production 
26,560 
49,693 
53,606 
276,999 
17,182 
13,437 
6,923 
357,506 
268,411 
27,415 
100,340 
90,113 
929,037 
766,858 
1,129,197 
Net-Trade 
(% of Production) 
39-2 
41.3 
51.1 
35-8 
-45-5 
-199.5 
-179.5 
30.3 
6.8 
34.5 
-31.3 
-2.7 
-10.4 
15.2 
-9-9 
Source: FAO, PC-Agrostat, 1996 
Table 4-7- Average per cap. Supply of Food Calories, Fat and Protein, 1961/63 and 1992/94-
Calories per person per day 
1961/63 1992/94 Change: 
1961/63-1992/94 
World 
Africa 
Asia 
Least Developed 
Latin America 
Calories 
Fat 
Protein 
Calories 
Fat 
Protein 
Calories 
Fat 
Protein 
Calories 
Fat 
Protein 
Calories 
Fat 
Protein 
2,274 
48.7 
62.6 
2,061 
38.7 
53-3 
1,865 
24.6 
47.2 
2,012 
29.O 
5O.6 
2,345 
50.4 
62.2 
2,709 
68.3 
71.6 
2,333 
47.2 
57-9 
2,577 
51.8 
63-9 
2,032 
32.8 
50.0 
2,722 
76.3 
69-7 
435 
19.6 
9-0 
272 
8.5 
4-6 
712 
27.I 
16.7 
21 
3-8 
-0.6 
377 
25-9 
7-5 
Source: FAOSTAT, 1996 
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However, the access to food not only differs between regions, but also between social groups 
within a given country. There are more than enough obese people in India or Africa - regions, 
where millions have chronic food deficits. Alexandratos (1995) from FAO has estimated that 
some 780 million people worldwide still suffer from under-nutrition - not because there is not 
enough food, but because these people are so poor that they cannot get access to it (Table 4.8). 
Researchers have shown that even in the United States of America where some 50% of the 
population have overweight the food supply for the poorest 5% is insufficient (at least in 
quality). Even within families, a gender-gap exists in the access to the available food. It is well 
documented that girls and women are the first who suffer under food shortages. 
Table 4-8. Estimates of undernutrition in 93 developing countries. 
Total Population Undernourished * Undernourished * 
(millions) (millions) (% of Total Pop.) 
Africa (sub-Sahara) 
Near East / North Africa 
East Asia 
South Asia 
Latin America & Carribean 
Total 
1969/71 1979/81 1988/90 
268 
178 
1147 
711 
281 
2585 
358 
233 
1392 
892 
357 
3232 
473 
297 
1598 
1103 
433 
3905 
1969/71 1979/81 1988/90 
94 
42 
506 
245 
54 
941 
129 
23 
366 
278 
47 
843 
175 
24 
258 
265 
59 
781 
1969/71 1979/81 1988/90 
35 
24 
44 
34 
19 
36 
36 37 
10 8 
26 16 
31 24 
13 14 
26 20 
Note: 
* Persons who, on average during the course of a year, are estimated to have food consumption levels 
below those required to maintain body weight and support light activity. This threshold level (ranging 
from an average of 1760 cal person"1 d"1 for Asia to 1985 for Latin America) is set equal to 1.54 times the 
basal metabolic rate. 
Source: Alexandratos, 1995, P-50 
A focus on average food supply ignores the unequal distribution of food within a society, which 
is a central cause of today's chronic food problems. The majority of undernourished people do 
not live in countries with extreme agricultural resource deficits, but in countries with highly 
unequal income distribution, such as in India or Latin America. Especially in Africa, the most 
vulnerable group is often the rural population, which is ignored or even discriminated by 
national development policies (Paarlberg, 1996). The city population usually is supplied by food 
imports or food aid in cases of food emergency, while the remote rural population often suffers 
unobserved. 
4.3-5- Food security has a cultural dimension 
Sometimes it is not the lack of money, which prevents people from getting adequate nutrition, 
but the lack of education and diet traditions. Various types of malnutrition are linked to 
traditional eating habits or taboos in certain social groups. In Africa, one can find people with 
protein deficits who would not eat eggs and fish or drink milk. Some social groups in modern 
developed societies prefer a diet with extremely high consumption of meat, fat and sugar -
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despite the fact that they suffer from a high prevalence of overweight and nutrition-related 
health problems. 
The link between people and food in scientific studies is usually investigated in terms of per 
capita calorie supply, vitamins or other nutritional components such as vitamins or trace 
elements. However, people do not eat calories or vitamins - they eat potatoes or yams, fish or 
pork chops, "hamburgers" or "nasi goreng", fried noodles or milk shakes. Nutrition has an 
important cultural dimension (Heilig, 1993,1996). Even if a sufficient amount of calories would 
be available to all people worldwide, food deficiencies could exist, because some people would 
not get it in a dish they are accustomed to eat. The science fiction fantasy of a world population 
who lives on mass-manufactured food pills ignores the cultural diversity of nutrition. While 
certain American restaurant chains work hard in standardizing food preferences worldwide, it is 
still a long way before we can calculate the food demand of the world population in 
"Hamburger" equivalents (Ingco, 1990). 
43.6. A famine does not indicate that the population has out-
grown its agricultural resources 
A famine certainly is the most dramatic consequence of an imbalance between people and 
food. This has lead many authors to consider the replication of famines among a population as 
an indicator that a population has out-grown the carrying capacity of its cultivated land. 
However, there are many reasons for famines where land shortage is the most unlikely (for a 
detailed discussion of famines in history see: Walter & Schofield, 1989; Watkins & Menken, 1985; 
Boyle & O'Grada, 1986). 
A lot has been published on the ecological collapse of past civilizations (Lowe, 1985; Culbert, 
1973; Diamond, 1994). It is, for instance, quite likely that chronic food shortages - triggered by a 
dry period around AD 800 - have contributed to the decline of the Maya civilization (Hodell et 
ai, 1995; Sabloff, 1990,1995). But that was certainly only one element in a multi-factorial 
process of socio-economic decline - they didn't just perish all of a sudden in a famine. If food 
constrains really have contributed to the collapse of the Maya culture, than it was not an 
absolute limitation of bio-physical resources which caused the decline, but an inability to adapt 
the technology and the economic, social and political organization to the environmental 
constraints. The correlation between paleoclimatic records and the decline of the Classic Maya 
civilization is not necessarily a causal explanation of the collapse. For instance, it does not 
explain why the Mayas moved from the most seriously drought-affected southern lowlands to 
the northern lowlands (to Chichen Itza, Uxmal, Kabah or Sayil) which are not very suitable for 
agriculture. Why did they not move to the highlands where agro-climatic conditions are much 
better (Pohl, 1990; Sharer, 1994)? 
More recent, there is a long list of severe famines, which are related to policy decisions, military 
conflicts or terror. A good example is the "Great Leap Forward" in China, which triggered one 
of the largest famines in recorded history. Between 1959 and 1961 Mao's communist regime 
started a scrupulous economic and social experiment by forcing a crude industrialization onto 
China's agricultural society. Millions of farmers where removed from the agricultural communes 
and ordered to work in primitive village industries. While the farmers tried to produce steel in 
their backyards, not enough labor was available to bring in the harvest. There might have been 
other factors involved in the rapidly developing famine, such as regional harvest losses due to 
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bad weather conditions, or communication problems between the cadres. But there can be no 
doubt that the main cause of the disaster was a political decision for a bad economic program 
(Becker, 1996; Piazza, 1983). 
The famine under Stalin's terror regime is another example of a food crisis, which was unrelated 
to land shortage. Through forced collectivization and deportation of peasants, he triggered a 
large famine in 1930-1933, especially among the rural population of the Ukraine. Most estimates 
range from 3 to 5 million excess deaths due to starvation (Nove, 1990). Some authors, however, 
have estimated that the total famine-related death tol l of Stalin was in the range between 9 and 
12 million (Ellman, 1991; Conquest, 1991)- The Kasakhs, a semi-nomadic people, especially 
suffered from Stalin's destruction of traditional agriculture. When Stalin ordered their sheep 
population, on which they depended, to be wiped out in 1931 to 1933, many Kasakhs fled to 
China and other republics. However, some 1.3 to 1.75 million died due to malnutrition. If the 
high estimated is correct, some 42% of the entire Kazakh population perished within only three 
years. 
In Rwanda, some 800 OOO people were killed during the civil strife that ravaged the country in 
1994; more than 2 million fled into neighboring countries, and another 380 OOO sought refuge in 
camps within Rwanda. The conflict led to widespread famine. 
Of course, not all famines have been triggered by economic mismanagement of authoritative 
regimes or political conflict and terror. We can identify many other obvious reasons for great 
famines - above all, natural catastrophes, such as hurricanes, floods, droughts, crop pests or 
volcano eruptions. In 1984/85 a devastating drought afflicted Ethiopia and several other African 
countries, triggering a famine which killed more than 1 million people. A cyclone that struck 
Bangladesh in May 1991 left the lives of an estimated 140 000 people in ruins. 
These natural disasters can cause great suffering and social disruption; they often have 
demographic consequences, such as emigration waves or increased mortality. However, they do 
not indicate that the population has outgrown the food production capacity of the land. When 
the natural disaster is over the food situation usually normalizes - and very often, the 
population begins to grow again. Consider the case of India, where floods and monsoons 
frequently destroyed the harvests. Historians have documented numerous famines of 
apocalyptic dimensions in India, such as the great famine of 1630-31 which affected all of India 
or the food crises between 1555 and 1596 in the northwestern part of the country (Braudel, 
1990). Yet none of these disasters decimated India's population in the long run. Today it is the 
second largest in the world, and by 2050, India wi l l be the most populous country. The 
sustained post-famine population growth clearly indicates that it was not a tight people-land 
ratio, which caused the disasters. 
4.3-7- It is not clear whether anthropogenic changes of the 
environment wil l affect global food security 
A widely used argument predicts that environmental change, caused by global population 
growth and industrialization, is threatening the global food supply. In recent years, a number of 
studies have been published analyzing environmental impacts on agriculture (Chen & Kates, 
1994; Parikh, 1994; Pimentel, 1991). Mainly four types of impacts are discussed: 
• the possible impact of global climate change on rain-fed agriculture; 
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• the impact of industrial and urban pollutants (ozone, sulfur, heavy metals) on soils and 
water used in agriculture; 
• the loss of arable land due to urban expansion, infrastructure construction and resource 
exploitation; 
• the impact of over-exploitation (nutrient mining) or inadequate technology (salinization) in 
intensive (irrigated) agriculture. 
Before we briefly discuss the various impacts, the reader should be reminded that this paper 
deals with global food security. It is obvious that environmental destruction or degradation 
caused by human activities has in many places already affected agricultural areas - such as 
around Lake Aral or in the neighborhood of urban agglomerations. However, we want to know, 
whether these impacts can affect the global food supply - a system, which has various mecha-
nisms to counterbalance local or regional production problems. 
Of course, potentially the most serious threat to global agriculture is a climate change (Chen & 
Kates, 1994; Council for Agricultural Science and Technology, 1992; Fischer et ai, 1994; Fischer & 
Van Velthuizen, 1996; Rosenzweig, 1994; Rosenzweig & Parry, 1994; Pimentel, 1991). The impact 
could be - at least - twofold: climate zones with favorable growing conditions could shift to 
areas with poor soils or inadequate terrain. If in Russia the area with a precipitation and 
temperature profile optimal for agriculture shifts to the North (as predicted by the GCMs) it wi l l 
move to areas of poor soils or wetlands (such as in large parts of Siberia). The other possible 
impact is the increase in weather variability - especially the increase in extreme weather events, 
such as hailstorms, hurricanes, typhoons, blizzards, or draughts. Several studies have been 
conducted to clarify the issue. The debate is still ongoing, but it seems that the negative 
consequences of climate change for agriculture would be more serious than the positive 
impacts. Does this threaten global food security? This is hard to say. The range of uncertainty in 
the models, which are used to predict climate change and the subsequent consequences for 
agriculture is still very high. Substantial change is expected only in the far future (50 to 150 
years from now). We have no idea what kind of (agricultural) technology wil l be available even 
30 years from now to counter-balance the climate-related food production deficits. 
Industrial and urban pollutants are certainly a local or regional threat to agricultural 
productivity. The sulfur emissions from China's coal-based energy system threaten agricultural 
areas - not only in China but also in Japan (Niu & Harris, 1996). Low-level ozone pollution from 
urban-industrial agglomerates has a measurable impact on agricultural productivity nearby 
(Chameides et al., 1994)- Many agricultural soils are polluted with heavy metals or chemical 
residuals from warfare. In the Ukraine, a significant agricultural area is radioactively 
contaminated. However, it is unlikely that these local or regional impacts could threaten the 
global food supply. There are still huge areas of unused arable land far away from urban-
industrial centers. There is also reason to believe that mitigation technologies wil l be available 
and implemented, which wil l eventually minimize these environmental impacts from industry 
and urbanization. 
The conversion of arable land into cities, infrastructures and resource extraction sites is certainly 
an important problem - especially in countries with rather limited resources of arable land, such 
as China or Japan. But again, this is not a universal problem - arable land in Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, the United States of America, France or Russia is certainly not affected by 
urbanization to the same extent. In quantitative terms the loss of land to urban areas and 
infrastructure it is much less than 1% of the size of agricultural areas worldwide (Heilig, 1994)-
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Some authors, such as Vaclav Smil, have predicted food problems due to agricultural over-
exploitation (Smil, 1987; 1984). This problem can have two "faces": (a) farmers can use methods 
that lead to nutrient-mining, which means that soil nutrients are extracted through harvesting 
at a higher rate than they are recycled (fertilizers) or generated within the soil. There is a 
consensus among experts that this is certainly a problem in some areas, such as in Eastern 
Africa, where farmers do not have access to adequate amounts of fertilizers, (b) The other types 
of over-exploitation are the problems of intense (irrigated) agriculture - especially on difficult 
or marginal soils. There can be numerous problems, from acidification to salinization, from soil 
erosion to the loss of vital microorganisms in the soil. All these problems, however, can be 
handled (or at least minimized) with adequate agricultural technology and soil management. 
They are usually related to a lack of know-how, investment capital, or incentives - factors, which 
can be changed. 
4-4. Six key-factors of future food security and their 
relation to population trends 
Future food security worldwide wil l depend on six key factors (for a recent review of the world 
food security situation see: FAO, 1998): 
• the further development and dissemination of agricultural technology - in particular the 
question, whether the expected advances in bio-technology can be actually used by farmers 
worldwide; 
• the worldwide implementation of those economic structures that promote efficiency in 
agriculture, liberalize trade and provide incentives to food producers; 
• the development of human resources - the training of farmers, but also the imple-
mentation of education programs, which qualify rural populations to participate in non-
agricultural sectors; 
• the further improvement of early warning systems and effective emergency food aid 
programs; 
• and least, but not last, the question, whether violent conflict and the rule of terror 
regimes can be stopped. 
Agricultural technology 
When we discuss global food security, two numbers have to be taken into account before and 
above everything else. First, we must always remember that the farmers are currently feeding 
some 5-5 billion people worldwide - as compared to 2.6 just 50 years ago. Second, we must be 
aware that with very high probability the number of people to feed wil l further massively 
increase - probably to some 9 billion people within the next 30 years. This population increase 
wil l be exclusively in developing countries. 
Taken serious, these numbers lead to three conclusions: First, there is no way back to a 
traditional low-input slash-and-bum agriculture, which was common only 50 years ago in most 
parts of the less developed world. Without modem agricultural technology, it would not be 
possible to feed a 5-5 billion global population - not to speak about the 9 billion people in 2030. 
It was the use of chemical fertilizers, advanced irrigation, crop sanitation products (pesticides, 
herbicides, etc.), high-yield seeds, agricultural machinery, modern transportation systems and 
expanded infrastructure, which ended the age of famine. This is a "bitter pi l l " to swallow for 
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those anthropologists, ecologists and biologists, who are by principle skeptical about modern 
agricultural technology and praise the advantages of traditional small-scale, ecologically 
adapted farming (Bartlett, 1956). Fact is - those traditional agricultural systems could not 
sufficiently feed a world population of half the current size. 
Second, as resource studies have shown, there are a number of countries and regions with 
severe land and/or water constraints (China, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Western Asia). 
Since their food demand wi l l nevertheless increase, a significant improvement of agricultural 
productivity wi l l be necessary, because reclamation possibilities are limited. Only the 
implementation of very advanced agricultural technology can help those countries to supply at 
least part of the massively rising food demand from domestic production. 
Third, the productivity gains in agriculture since the late 1960s (production more than doubled 
while the cultivated land area remained almost unchanged) could be achieved in a very short 
period. The Green Revolution in Asia was implemented in less than two decades. The older 
among us wil l still remember the barrage of criticism, which academic scholars have blasted 
against the Green Revolution in the 1970s. Today, this is history. Even small farmers in remote 
areas of Asia use chemical fertilizers, pesticides, high yield grain and small tractors. 
The prospects for improvements in agricultural and food technology are good. Due to 
spectacular advances in microbiology and plant and animal genetics, a new agricultural 
revolution is around the corner. It is very likely, that we wil l have genetically modified plants 
with much better pest or draught resistance and higher yield. New technologies, such as the 
bioreactor micropropagation for cloning, have the potential to lower the costs of breeding and 
speed-up adaptation and improvement of high-value crops. 
Functioning economic structures 
So much has been written on the economy of hunger that it is certainly impossible to review the 
main arguments in this short paragraph (Norton & Alwang, 1993)- However, in my under-
standing, three "schools" of economists have driven the debate (Meyers & Simon, 1994): 
• Those, who see hunger primarily as a distribution or entitlement problem, which has to be 
solved by state intervention and development aid to eradicate poverty; 
• those, who believe that the "invisible hand" of free markets, combined with private (land) 
property and free international trade will increase everyone's income and thus eliminate 
poverty and hunger (Simon, 1981); and finally 
• those, who have focused their attention on more specific economic factors that can slow 
down agricultural development and trigger hunger, such as lack of small agricultural 
credits, or the impact of food aid which can harm domestic agriculture. 
While the debate wi l l certainly go on among the economists, a few conclusions are meanwhile 
possible from a demographer's point of view: 
• As we said, there is a small number of developing countries, which wil l not be able to feed 
their rapidly growing population from their own land - even if they implement advanced 
agricultural technology. These countries essentially have two options: they can either step-
up appealing to international food aid agencies and development organizations, hoping 
that international donors wil l provide the food they need; or they can develop their non-
agricultural sectors, and use the export earnings for buying food on international markets. 
In both cases, it is clear that the idea of national food self-sufficiency is inappropriate for 
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these countries. In other words: a functioning international grain market with low prices is 
an important condition of future food security for these countries. Trade restrictions or high 
tariffs wi l l especially hurt these food deficit nations. 
• The increase in food demand, driven by massive population growth, wi l l require agricultural 
expansion. Expressed in economic terms: we are not only talking about a distribution 
problem, but also about a growth problem. It is not sufficient to distribute the "cake" more 
evenly to prevent hunger, we must also make sure that it grows significantly. Conventional 
wisdom and recent experience with Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union suggest, 
that economic growth in agriculture is greatly facilitated, if farmers are not tyrannized by a 
command and control system, but can make their own decisions. Economic incentives for 
farmers are crucial for increasing food production. With its economic reforms China has 
demonstrated in the last 15 years, how this can be achieved (Prosterman et al., 1996). Much 
remains to be done to implement these incentives - especially in Africa. 
Human resources 
Sustained economic growth and agricultural modernization - t w o cornerstones of food security 
- wil l only be possible in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, if education and basic health services 
can be brought to the massively increasing number of people. It is true, as some economists 
have pointed out, that not only the number of mouths to feed wil l grow, but also the number of 
arms to work. This argument, however, only holds, when the working "arms" are healthy and 
guided by educated brains. Where education, training and public health deteriorate, because 
high population growth thins-out the resources, the balance of "arms" and "mouths" gets 
disturbed. This is not just metaphorical talk, but bitter reality in countries such as Botswana. 
Recent surveys have found that up to 20% of the population is infected with the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) (US Bureau of the Census, 1996) and wil l die of AIDS. If we take 
into account the elderly and children it is likely, that one third of the productive population in 
Botswana is weakened by a lethal virus. Some 30 million people in the developing countries are 
suffering from HIV infection; hundreds of millions - mainly in rural areas - are weakened by 
malaria and other tropical diseases, which seem to spread considerably (Garrett, 1994). The 
deteriorating public health situation in some (developing) countries especially in Africa 
(Bongaarts, 1988) and Russia (Shkolnikov et al., 1996; Eberstadt, 1993; Ryan, 1995) wil l be a 
major risk of future food security. 
It is also not sufficient that the current level of education and training is just maintained - it 
must increase in developing countries, if these nations should have a chance to modernize their 
agriculture and to develop industrial and service sectors. By 2050 Asia, Africa, Latin America, 
and the Caribbean wil l have a combined projected population of roughly 8.3 billion - as 
compared to 4.6 billion in 1995. Only a massive wave of modernization wi l l allow their 
agriculture to keep up with the corresponding food demand. In resource-poor countries only 
industrialization and the development of a service sector (such as tourism) can generate the 
income necessary for food imports and eradication of poverty. All economic sectors must 
become much more productive and that is only possible through the development of human 
resources. Each Dollar invested in education, training and basic health services - in both rural 
and urban areas - brings Asia, Africa and Latin America one step closer to food security. 
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Early warning and emergency aid systems 
Draughts, floods, typhoons, tsunamis, hail, pest epidemics and other natural catastrophes have 
always threatened agriculture and thus the food supply of regions or nations. With the 
possibility of greater weather variability due to climate change (especially in the tropics), we 
must expect even more frequent disaster-related food crises in the future. Population growth 
wil l amplify these risks, because it wi l l lead to high population concentration in countries and 
regions, which are especially vulnerable to natural catastrophes, such as Bangladesh, India, 
Pakistan, Java, and Southern China. The FAO and other organizations have established very 
effective early warning systems and food emergency programs. The bill for emergency 
operations managed by FAO has climbed from $150 million for the entire decade of the 1980s 
to $170 million for just six years since 1991 (FAO newsletter). 
Early warning systems are essential to cope with disaster-related food crises. Remote sensing 
makes it possible for national and international agencies to generate highly accurate harvest 
forecasts. The US Department of Agriculture is routinely monitoring the status of grain areas in 
various parts of the world, providing information which can be downloaded worldwide by 
everyone through the INTERNET. The Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) of USDA collects, 
analyzes, and disseminates information on crop and livestock production conditions worldwide. 
One most valuable source of information is the analysis of digital satellite imagery, developed 
by the FAS Production Estimates and Crop Assessment Division (PECAD). PECAD also collects 
extensive weather information as it relates to agricultural production. A range of crop models is 
used to assess attributes such as yield, growth stage, soil moisture, and winterkill. Examples of 
crop-analysis products for the United States, China, Korean Peninsula and Former Soviet Union 
are available. From USDA one can also download vegetation condition images based on the so-
called Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI). It measures vegetation vigor caused by 
chlorophyll activity; which is sometimes called "greenness". These data have been used to 
locate and monitor the effects of floods, freezes, or draughts on crop areas (see for instance the 
web site at: http://www.nass.usda.gov/research/). In principle, the technology, the logistics and 
the economic structures are in place to detect and handle future food emergencies worldwide; 
however, these mechanisms have to be maintained and fine-adjusted. 
Paradoxically, the greatest danger of food emergency systems is their effectiveness. Today, large 
amounts of food can be rushed to almost everywhere, if necessary even being dropped from 
airplanes in remote areas. There is also great commercial interest from leading agricultural 
producers (USA, Canada, France) to f i l l the international grain reserves - as long as the price is 
attractive (or subsidized). In fact, the logistics and supply volume of emergency food aid have 
been so massive that it harmed domestic food markets in disaster regions. For instance, 
traditional African agriculture has not only suffered from regular grain imports, but also from 
food emergency aid programs to urban poor, which were extended more than necessary. 
Repeatedly, corrupt regimes (for instance in Russia, former Yugoslavia, or North Korea) have 
channeled emergency food aid away from the suffering. It was misused to supply armed forces 
or generate profit on the "black market" - thus destroying the market for domestic farmers. 
Direct food aid must be strictly targeted to the needy; it must be continuously monitored and 
terminated after the emergency period. This can be best achieved by international humanitarian 
organizations (of volunteers), which have direct operational control of the low-level food 
distribution to suffering people. Government-administered food emergency programs have 
often been slow, ineffective, politically biased, and costly due to administrative overhead. In less 
developed countries an emergency food operation can only be a first step to restore food 
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security. Usually it is necessary to implement a follow-up program of agricultural reconstruction. 
Depending on the type of crisis the agricultural infrastructure may be destroyed by a natural 
disaster, the farmers may be displaced by military operations, and the fields may be unusable 
due to land mines. In all those cases, the farmers do not have the resources for reconstruction. 
A reconstruction aid program is necessary to build up the agricultural infrastructure and provide 
basic inputs to the farmers. 
Violent conflicts 
One dimension of global food security, that must never be forgotten, is the political environ-
ment. No food security can be achieved under a terror regime or in the turmoil of civil war. It is 
a sad reality that violent conflicts are a major factor of Africa's food problems today. From 
Somalia to Rwanda people's stomachs ache, not only from hunger, but from fear. Terror and 
(civil) war are - and probably wil l be - the root problem for many food crises. With increasing 
population density, the potential impact of violent conflict wil l further grow. We still remember 
the humanitarian disaster in densely populated Rwanda/Burundi, where hundred thousands 
where killed, partly due to a tribal conflict over scarce arable land. With rapidly growing 
population at already very high levels of population density Pakistan, parts of India, Bangladesh 
or Java are facing a high risk of conflict over agricultural resources. Countries in West Asia and 
Northern Africa must be careful to avoid conflicts over scarce water resources. 
Conclusion 
It is a symptom of today's academic tunnel-view in agricultural research that global food 
security is often analyzed in a rather biased way. It is either understood as a biophysical 
resource problem, as a problem of lacking economic entitlements, or as a question of 
agricultural technology. This paper argues that food security is a multi-criteria problem - based 
on physical, biological, economic, technical, socio-cultural, demographic and political factors. At 
times, one factor can override all others, but usually all factors play a role. 
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5. Emerging trends in demand for cereal crops 
M. Hossain & M.A. Sombilla 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), P.O. Box 933, Manila, Philippines 
5.1. Introduction 
The world as a whole has made significant progress towards improved food security and 
nutrition over the last three decades. In the 1960s concerns were raised about impending 
famines in many parts of the globe, particularly in Asia, because of the explosion of the 
population growth and the closing of the land frontier. But the subsequent history has proved 
that such concerns were unfounded. The per capita availability of food for direct human 
consumption are today about 16% higher than 30 years ago. The proportion of undernourished 
population in developing countries declined from nearly 36% in late 1960s to 20% by early 
1990s. But the progress has been slow and uneven. Indeed many countries and population 
groups have failed to make significant progress, and some, particularly in Africa, have even 
suffered setbacks in their already fragile food security and nutrition situation. Chronic 
undernutrition still affects some 800 million people, 20% of the population in the developing 
world and over one-third in sub-Saharan Africa (Alexandratos 1995, Bender & Smith 1997). We 
are at the doorsteps of the 2lst century, but with all the remarkable developments in modern 
science and technology, we are yet to eliminate the scourge of hunger and undernutrition. 
Indeed, the world's capacity to sustain a favorable food-population balance has again come 
under spotlight in view of the continued degradation of the natural resource base, and a drastic 
slowdown in the growth of cereal production in 1990s (Brown 1995,1996). At the same time, 
rapid economic growth and urbanization in many developing countries particularly in Asia, 
have also been changing the food consumption patterns with significant impact on demand for 
different types of food. An important issue in this context is whether the deceleration in the 
growth in cereal production is in response to a slackening of demand for these crops. In this 
presentation, we would like to dwell on this issue by examining the forces governing the 
demand for rice, particularly in Asia. We wil l report the results of the projections made by the 
International Food Policy Research Institute for their 2020 vision on food security (IFPRI, 1995), 
and a subsequent revision made in collaboration with the International Rice Research Institute. 
Although these projections were made upto 2020, we shall also present the demand forecasts 
for 2010, because many exogeneous factors that wi l l govern these changes cannot be predicted 
with confidence beyond that time horizon. 
5.2. Determinants of demand 
5.2.1. Level and growth of income 
The most important factor that influences the per capita consumption of staple food is the level 
of income of the consumer. At low levels of income, meeting energy needs is the most basic 
concern for an individual. Staple foods, such as starchy roots, rice, wheat and coarse grain 
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provide the cheapest source of energy. Poor people spend most of their income on such food. 
The choice of the staple depends on culture, local production and availability and relative prices 
of different food items. As the income increases, the consumer shifts from low quality to better 
quality products within the food staple. For example, rice is the most preferred food staple in 
Asia with 90% of the world's rice production. At low levels of income rice is considered a luxury 
commodity. At times of scarcity, and the very low-income consumers are often satisfied with 
coarse grains and sweet potatoes, which are the cheapest source of energy. As incomes grow, 
per capita rice consumption increase with consumers substituting for rice the coarse grains and 
root crops. But as income increases beyond a threshold, people can afford to have a high cost 
balanced diet containing foods that provide more proteins and vitamins, such as vegetables, 
fruits, fish and livestock products. Thus, per capita rice consumption starts to decline. 
The above pattern of changes in food consumption with economic growth is amply 
demonstrated by the experience of Japan and South Korea, which made a transition from a low 
to a high-income level within a very short period of time. The trend in the Japanese per capita 
rice consumption since the Second World War is shown in Fig. 5.1. The consumption increased 
with economic growth and reached the peak by the early 1960s, and then started declining. By 
the late 1980s, the per capita rice consumption in Japan was about 40% lower compared to the 
level in the early 1960s. As income rises, the consumer is willing to pay higher prices for better 
quality production. In Japan, the share of higher quality rice has increased over time at the 
expense of the standard quality. In South Korea, the per capita consumption of rice increased 
from 318 grams per day in mid 1960s when it was a low-income country to 386 gams by 1979 
when it reached the middle income level. Since then the per capita consumption has been 
declining. The changes in the composition of the per capita food intake in South Korea over the 
last two decades can be seen from Table 5.1. There has been a substantial reduction in the 
consumption of cereals and root crops, but a surge in the demand for livestock products, fish, 
fruits and vegetables. We can expect these changes to occur to other countries as they move 
along the path of economic development. 
per capita consumption 
(kg/year) 
100 
glutinous rice 
standard quality 
non-glutinous rice 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 I I I l M M 
1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1986 
year 
Figure 5.1. Changes in rice consumption in Japanese non-farm household (per capita annual data). 
Source: Comprehensive time series report on the family income and expenditure survey 1947-1986. 
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Table 5.1. Changes in food consumption pattern in South Korea, 1974-75 to 1992-94 (g capita"1 d"1). 
Food i tem 
Cereals 
Roots 
Vegetables 
Fruits 
Sugar 
Oils and fats 
Fish 
Meat and eggs 
Mi lk 
Total 
1974-76 
686 
101 
373 
63 
23 
11 
132 
32 
12 
1433 
Source: FAO 1996. 
1992-94 
513 
43 
511 
229 
88 
35 
181 
124 
58 
1782 
Chanae 
-173 
-58 
138 
166 
65 
24 
49 
92 
46 
349 
In many countries in East and Southeast Asia, the income has reached a level (Table 5-2) where 
we expect the per capita cereal consumption to decline in future. The FAO food balance sheet 
show that among Asian countries, per capita cereal consumption has declined substantially in 
Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, all middle and high-income industrialized 
countries that have passed the income threshold mentioned above. China and Indonesia, two 
giant Asian nations which account for over one-third of the global cereal consumption are 
approaching the threshold of peak per capita consumption from where we may expect a 
declining trend to set-in soon. But in South Asia, Philippines and Vietnam in Southeast, 30 to 
50% of the people live in poverty who do not have adequate income to access food required for 
a healthy productive life (Table 5-2). With economic growth and reduction in poverty, the per 
capita cereal consumption is expected to further increase in these countries, since the poor 
could then afford to satisfy their unmet demand for staple food. The rate of change in the per 
capita consumption of food staples in Asia wil l then depend on the relative strength of the 
upward pressure for the low-income countries and the downward pressure for the middle and 
high-income countries. 
5.2.2. Urbanization 
The other force that dampens the demand for staple food with economic growth and 
modernization is the trend of urbanization. As people move from rural to urban areas, the 
energy needs become somewhat lower as the occupational composition changes from physical 
labor-based to mental labor-based jobs. Also, the cost of meeting non-food basic needs, such as 
education and health care and transport and recreation services increase and a smaller share of 
the family budget is available for staple food. The composition of consumption between staple 
and non-staple food also changes because of greater nutritional awareness for having a 
balanced diet, and the practice of eating outdoors with the availability of market for food 
services. Hence, for the same level of income, the per capita consumption of cereals wil l be 
lower in urban areas compared to rural areas. This is demonstrated by the evidence from 
Bangladesh as shown in Fig. 5.2. In Asia, the level of urbanization is still low but wi l l be growing 
over the next two decades (Table 5.3). Thus, urbanization is going to dampen the growth in 
demand for cereals, particularly of rice in the coming decades. 
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Table 5.2. Level of development, economic growth and incidence of poverty in selected Asian countries. 
Country 
(mi 
China 
India 
Indonesia 
Pakistan 
Bangladesh 
Vietnam 
Philippines 
Thailand 
South Korea 
Nepal 
Malaysia 
Sri Lanka 
Population 
lions, mid- iqqç) 
1200 
929 
193 
130 
120 
74 
69 
58 
45 
22 
20 
18 
Per ca 
1995 
(USS1 
620 
340 
980 
460 
240 
240 
1050 
2740 
9700 
200 
389O 
700 
pita income 
PPP 1995 
(USS1 
2920 
1400 
3800 
2230 
1380 
n.a. 
2850 
7540 
11450 
1170 
9020 
3250 
Average annual 
g rowth (%) 
198S-91; 
8.3 
3 2 
6.0 
1.2 
2.1 
n.a. 
1.5 
8.4 
7-7 
2.4 
5-7 
2.6 
Fraction of 
poor people 
(96) 
29 
53 
15 
12 
51 
n.a. 
28 
12 
0 
53 
6 
4 
Source: World Bank, 1997. 
Note: The per capita income in purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars are estimated with reference to 
prices in United Sates. Incidence of poverty is measured in terms of the number of poor people 
living on less than one US dollar per capita per day. Estimates of poverty for Bangladesh and 
Thailand are from national sources. 
per capita consumption 
(g/day) 
600 -
400 -
200 -
300 350 400 500 80 
per capita income (US$) 
Figure 5.2. Rural-urban differences in rice consumption, Bangladesh. 
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Table 5.3(a). Projection of urban population, by region (% of total population). 
Country 1990 2010 2020 
Asia 
Africa 
Latin America 
North America 
Europe 
32 
32 
71 
75 
72 
44 
44 
81 
8o 
78 
51 
51 
83 
83 
82 
Source: United Nations, 1995. 
Table 53(b). Projection of population residing in urban areas, selected Asian countries (% of total 
population). 
Country 
Japan 
South Korea 
Thailand 
Indonesia 
China 
India 
Bangladesh 
i 960 
56 
28 
13 
15 
19 
18 
5 
1990 
77 
74 
19 
31 
26 
26 
16 
2010 
81 
91 
31 
54 
43 
34 
28 
2020 
84 
93 
35 
57 
51 
4 1 
36 
Source: United Nations, 1995. 
The influence of the level and growth of income and of urbanization is captured by economists 
in the income elasticity of demand. It measures the degree of increase of demand for a 
commodity in response to a change in income. For low-income countries, the income elasticity 
of demand for staple food is typically over 0.5, indicating a 5% increase in demand in response 
to a 10% increase in income. But for the middle and high-income countries to income elasticity 
of demand for cereals is often negative, indicating that with further increases in income, the 
people wil l reduce the expenditure on staple food. The estimates of the income elasticity of 
demand for rice and wheat and the expected change over the next two decades assumed by the 
IFPRI model (Rosegrant et al., 1995) can be seen from Table 5.4. The inverse relationship 
between the level of income and the demand response to income growth is amply 
demonstrated by the figures. Since the income elasticities are very low, the rapid growth of 
income in East and Southeast Asia is not going to have much effect on the growth for rice. But 
for wheat the positive income effect wi l l be quite substantial. 
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Table 5.4. Projection of income elasticity of demand for foodgrains. 
Perc 
Country 
Japan 
South Korea 
Malaysia 
Thai land 
Indonesia 
Philippines 
China 
India 
Bangladesh 
Brazil 
Nigeria 
Madagascar 
apita income 
(USS) 
39640 
9700 
3890 
2740 
980 
1050 
620 
340 
240 
8512 
260 
230 
Rice 
1993 
O.05 
-0.20 
0.06 
O.O4 
0.15 
0.21 
0.10 
O.I4 
0.21 
0.21 
O.47 
O.43 
2020 
-0.15 
-O.40 
-0.06 
-0.06 
-0.03 
O.O5 
-O.O5 
0.02 
0.00 
0.13 
0.47 
O.38 
Wheat 
1993 
0.25 
O.32 
O.30 
0.29 
O.36 
0.33 
0.23 
0.22 
0.28 
0.07 
O.48 
0.49 
2020 
0.24 
0.13 
0.25 
0.22 
0.28 
0.27 
0.03 
0.12 
0.23 
0.00 
0.47 
O.48 
1993 
-0.18 
-0.20 
-0.15 
-0.07 
0.05 
0.21 
-0.07 
-O.01 
-
0.06 
0.15 
0.13 
Maize 
2020 
-0.26 
-0.30 
-0.29 
-0.17 
-0.10 
0.05 
-0.22 
-0.10 
-
-0.04 
0.11 
0.09 
Source: IFPRI IMPACT Model; World Bank, World Development Report, 1997. 
5-2.3- Indirect demand in livestock production 
The other important factor that we must take into consideration in projecting the growth in 
demand for cereals is their indirect demand as livestock feed (Alexandratos 1995). Although the 
income elasticities for cereals as human food are small and declining, those for livestock 
products are relatively large and vary within a range of 0.5 to 0.7. This explains the significant 
expansion in the consumption of livestock products worldwide over the last three decades, 
particularly in Asia where economic growth has been the fastest. Between 1965 and 1995, food 
demand for meat increased more than fourfold, from 2.6 million t in 1965 to about 10.7 million 
t in 1995 (FAOSTAT, 1997). Even in South Asia, where people prefer primarily a vegetable-based 
diet, the consumption of meat has increased by over four million t over this period. Asia, as a 
whole, has thus emerged as a major importer of meat, with its share of global meat imports 
reaching about 28% in 1995- It takes 2,4 and 8 kg of grain to produce one kg of poultry, pork 
and beef, respectively. The increase in the demand for livestock product implies a fast growth in 
the demand for cereal grains, mostly corn. 
The present level of per capita meat consumption in Asia is very low compared to the standards 
for the developed countries. It is less than 18 kg per capita per year in South Asia, Indonesia and 
Myanmar; 17 to 26 kg in Vietnam, Philippines, and Thailand, and between 39 to 44 kg in Japan, 
China, and South Korea. Only in Malaysia, the per capita consumption is high (50 kg). So, with 
rapid economic growth, we can expect a surge in the consumption of livestock product and 
hence, the demand for cereals as livestock feed. The IFPRI projections show that during the 
1993-2020 period the world demand for meat wil l grow at a rate of 1.8% per year, and of eggs 
and milk by 1.6% and 1.1% respectively. Most of this growth wil l be accounted for by the 
developing countries. The demand in the developed world will continue to slow down because 
of very low and declining income elasticity of demand for meat (as people become more health 
conscious), the stabilization of population and the slow growth of per capita incomes. In Asia, 
the demand for meat is projected to grow at a rate of 3-2% per year, and wil l account for most 
of the increased in demand for the world as a whole. The upward pressure on feedgrain 
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consumption in response to economic growth can be assessed from Table 5.5, which compares 
the per capita cereal consumption as direct human food and livestock feed in selected Asian 
countries at different levels of income, compared to that in USA. The intake of livestock feed is 
about 12 times higher in USA compared to Indonesia, and four times higher compared to China. 
Table 5.5. Consumption of cereals as human food and livestock feed in selected Asian countries, 
compared to the United States, average 1992-94. 
Country 
As human food 
Indonesia 
China 
South Korea 
Japan 
USA 
561 
614 
513 
400 
315 
Cereals (a capita"1 d"1) 
As livestock feed 
54 
146 
388 
408 
610 
Total 
615 
760 
901 
808 
925 
Cor 
and 
isumption of meat 
eaas (a capita1 d1) 
32 
121 
125 
170 
370 
Source: FAO 1996. 
Given the level of per capita consumption, the most important factor that is going to push the 
demand for cereals is obviously the rate of population growth. In the developed world, the 
demand for cereals has been stagnating because most of them have achieved a stationary 
population. But most developing countries are still having a population growth from 1.5 to over 
3.0% per year. However, with growing economic prosperity the growth of population wil l 
decline substantially. According to UN projections, annual growth of population in developing 
countries wil l decline from the present level of 1.9% per year to 1.1% per year by 2025. But due 
to the expanded base of the population (from 4.5 billion in 1995 to about 6.8 billion in 2025) the 
absolute increase in the number of people over the next three decades wil l remain as large as 
over the last three decades (Fig. 5.3). Ironically, it is in the poverty-stricken regions, where the 
per capita cereal consumption is expected to increase, the population growth will also grow 
faster. In South Asia, for example, the population is projected to increase by 723 million over the 
next three decades, compared to 656 million over the previous three decades. In Africa, the 
projected increase during the next three decades is about 78% higher than the actual increase 
over the last three decades. It is only in the East and Southeast Asia and in Latin America that 
the additional number of mouths to be fed is going to be lower in the future compared to what 
they have experienced in the past. 
5.2.4. The forecast of the growth in demand 
We now present the results of the projections of the demand for cereals considering the above 
factors. The demand projections are made using the International Model for Policy Analysis of 
Agricultural Commodities and Trade (IMPACT) that was developed at the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI; for details of the model, see Rosegrant et al., 1995). It is 
specified as a set of country or regional submodels, each with a particular structure within 
which supply, demand, and prices for the commodities are determined. The 35 countries and 
regional agricultural submodels are linked through trade, a specification that highlights the 
interdependence of countries and commodities in the world agricultural economy. The model 
uses a system of supply and demand elasticities, derived from other studies, incorporated into a 
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series of linear and non-linear equations, to approximate the underlying production and 
demand functions. Sectoral growth multipliers are used to determine the intersectoral effects of 
changes in income in agriculture and non-agricultural sectors. 
Q1995-2025 
• 1965-1995 
Latin America 
Afr ica 
South Asia 
East and S East 
Asia excl. China 
China ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
600 800 
million persons 
Figure 53- Projection of population increase over 1995-2025 compared to increase over 19965-95. 
Domestic demand for commodity is the sum of its demand for food, feed and industrial uses. 
Food demand is a function of the price of the commodity, the prices of competing products, per 
capita income and total population. Feed demand is a derived demand determined by changes 
in the livestock production, feed ratios, and own and cross-price effects of feed crops. The 
function also incorporates a technology parameter that indicates improvements in feed 
efficiencies. The demand-supply imbalance for a crop results in changes in prices, and 
international trade, which feedback into the model through iterations, so that an equilibrium 
demand is equal to supply at the global level. 
The initial results of the model for projections for the supply-demand and food security trends 
for the 1990-2020 period were published in Rosegrant et al. (1995). For demand projections, the 
original model used average income elasticities for the period of projection. A revision of the 
model done at IRRI used a declining income elasticities for different crops, and also 
incorporated the revised population projections by the United Nations (1995) which are based 
on 1991 population census reports. The revised projection gives a more optimistic scenario 
regarding the growth of population (Table 5.6). The revision also shifts the benchmark to 1993-
A major limitation that remains is that the model does not incorporate income and population 
growth and demand elasticities separately for rural and urban areas. 
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Table 5-6- Changes in the projection of population trends by region. 
Region 
Asia 
East Asia 
Southeast Asia 
South Asia 
sub-Saharan Africa 
Latin America & the Caribbea 
West Asia & North Africa 
Benchmark 
populat ion 
In 1990 
1324 
441 
1115 
485 
n 435 
309 
Projection for 2010 
1992 UN 1996 
projection 
1599 
605 
1602 
806 
552 
423 
revision 
1585 
592 
1577 
818 
590 
537 
Increase 
1992 
projection 
20.8 
37.1 
43-7 
66.2 
26.9 
36.8 
(%) 
1996 
revision 
19.7 
34.2 
41.4 
68.7 
35-6 
73-8 
Source: United Nations Population Council. 
The results of the projection for the demand for cereal crops for the developing countries for 
the 1993-2010 period are reported in Table 5.7. The fo l lowing major points can be noted f rom 
the table. Wi th faster growth in income and declining income elasticities (which is projected t o 
turn negative in the middle and high-income countries), the growth in demand for rice in Asia is 
going to slow down substantially. The revision shows a demand of only 1.4% per year, 
compared to 2.0% reported earlier. The demand for feedgrains however is going to increase at a 
rate of nearly 3.0% per year because of the stronger market for livestock products. The to ta l 
demand for wheat and coarse cereals w i l l g row at a higher rate than that for rice. As a result 
the demand for al l cereals w i l l increase at a rate of 1.9% per year because of high growth in the 
demand for livestock feed. 
The results show a substantial deceleration in the growth in demand for cereal crops, over the 
next decade or so when compared to the historical g rowth of 2.4% per year over the next three 
decades. 
Table 5.7. Projected growth in demand for cereals as human food and feed grains, 1993-2010. 
Crop 
Rice (mil led) 
Wheat 
Coarse cereals 
Feed drains 
Benchmark 
1993 
307 
266 
161 
194 
Projection 
IFPRI 2020 
vision 
430 
379 
209 
296 
for 2010 
Revised 
estimate 
389 
371 
212 
313 
Rate of g row th in 
demand (% 
IFPRI 2020 
vision 
2.0 
2.1 
1.6 
2.5 
increase) 
Revised 
est imate 
1.4 
2.0 
1.6 
2.9 
Total 928 1314 1285 2.0 1.9 
Source: IFPRI-IRRI revision of IMPACT model (work in progress). 
Tables 5-8 and 5.9 provide a comparative picture of the projected growth in the demand for rice 
as compared to cereals in the major Asian countries. The tables also report the demand 
forecasts for sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. The growth in demand for both rice and 
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other cereals is going to be the highest in sub-Saharan Africa, because of the high incidence of 
poverty and exceptionally high levels of populat ion g rowth . South Asia w i l l also experience 
strong demand growth both for rice and cereals. So is the case w i th the Philippines in Southeast 
Asia. Japan, South Korea, Thailand and China are going to experience a slow growth in demand 
for rice, but their demand for other cereals w i l l continue t o be high because of the faster 
growth in the demand for wheat and feedgrains. These countries w i th the exception of Thailand 
have extreme pressure of populat ion of land, but have comfortable fore ign exchange reserves 
to import food . Thus, if wheat and corn are available in the wor ld market as prices lower than 
their domestic cost of product ion, these countries may opt for imports in meeting the growing 
deficits in the domestic production of wheat and corn. 
Table 5-8. Projected increase in the demand for rice, 1993 to 2020. 
Asia: 
China 
India 
Indonesia 
Pakistan 
Bangladesh 
Vietnam 
Philippines 
Thailand 
sub-Saharan Africa 
Latin America 
Developing wor ld 
Demand (mil l ions of tons) 
1993 
309 
125 
7 7 4 
32.8 
2.3 
17-9 
12.8 
6.5 
7-7 
9-6 
14.4 
341 
2010 
385 
144 
102.6 
41.7 
3-8 
24-4 
17-0 
9-3 
8.4 
15-2 
18.9 
432 
Source: Revision of IFPRI IMPACT Mode l . 
2020 
410 
146 
112.8 
43-6 
4-7 
27.0 
18.5 
10.7 
8.2 
21.5 
22.2 
469 
Increase over the 
bv 2010 
24.6 
15.2 
32.6 
27.6 
65-2 
36.3 
32.8 
43-0 
9.0 
58.3 
31.2 
26.7 
level in 1993 (%) 
bv 2020 
32.7 
16.8 
45-7 
32.9 
104-3 
50.8 
44-5 
64.6 
6.5 
124.0 
54.2 
37-5 
Table 5.9. Projected increase in the demand for cereals, 1993 to 2020. 
Demand (millions of tons) 
1993 2010 2020 
Increase over the level in 1993 (%) 
bv 2010 bv 2020 
Asia: 695 938 10430 
China 344 451 490 
India 167 227 251 
Indonesia 43.2 58.2 63.6 
Pakistan 22.9 38.3 49-9 
Bangladesh 20.5 28.3 31.9 
Vietnam 14.0 18.7 20.5 
Thailand 12.2 15.9 17.8 
sub-Saharan Africa 70.4 117 155 
Latin America 129. 174 199 
_ 
Developing world 1022 
35 
31 
36 
35 
67 
38 
34 
30 
66 
_35_ 
50 
42 
50 
47 
118 
56 
46 
46 
120 
54 
1413 1614 38 58 
Source: Revision of IFPRI IMPACT Model. 
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6. The role of domesticated farm animals in the 
human food chain 
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The Netherlands 
6.1. Introduction 
The human population in the world has now reached almost 5.7 billion and is expected to grow 
to about 10 billion in 2050 (Heilig, 1999). About ten thousand years ago, men started to 
domesticate animals, initially sheep and goats, later followed by cattle, swine and fowl (Von 
den Driesch, 1995). At present, there are some 18 billion domesticated farm animals, of which 
14 billion are fowl and 4 billion cattle, buffaloes, sheep, goats and swine. They supply high 
quality food (meat, milk, eggs, fish) and most people find animal products tasty, especially after 
cooking or frying. 
Animal products combine high digestibility with high protein quality. Besides, they are a 
valuable source of B-vitamins and minerals, notably calcium (Ca) and phosphorus (P). Fish 
products are valued because of their high protein content and quality, as well as the presence of 
omega-3 fatty acids in their lipids. From a nutritional as well as health point of view, also some 
negative aspects are known. Examples are the high degree of saturation of animal fats, 
widespread contamination with Salmonella, and a possible relationship between BSE in cattle 
and the Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. Apart from serving as a source of food, animals 
provide many other valuable products such as wool, hides, manure and draught power. On the 
other hand, part of the feed given to animals could also be used as human food. 
This paper discusses some aspects of the role of animals in relation to world food security, 
amongst others by comparing regional data on food production and the distribution of humans 
and animals. For reasons of simplicity the regional distribution is limited to a division in the 
continents Africa, Asia, Europe, North America and Latin America. 
6.2. Size of animal population and rate of production 
In numbers and amount of biomass, the world population of domesticated farm animals far 
exceeds that of the human population (Table 6.1). 
The human population accounts for about 226 million t of biomass. The animal population is 
about twice that size (427 million t), of which nearly 85% is covered by ruminants. The 
estimated annual production of biomass by farm animals exceeds the growth of human 
biomass by a factor 9. 
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Table 6.1. Size and growth of biomass of the 1997 world populations of men and farm animals 
(Calculated from FAO, Internet, 1998). 
Large ruminants 
Small ruminants 
Monogastrics 
Fowl 
Total animal 
Number 
(xio9) 
1.41 
1.57 
1.36 
13.9 
18.2 
Biomass 
(xio61) 
332 
36 
47 
12 
427 
Annual Production 
(xio6 t) 
52.6 
9-9 
87.2 
58.1 
207.9 
Human 5-7 226 22.5 
Table 6.2 shows the number of humans and the total production of meat and fish per (sub-) 
continent. Worldwide, the average amount of meat plus fish available is 53.8 kg person"1 yr"1, 
but this varies from less than 18 kg person'1 yr"1 for Africa to more than 150 kg person"1 yr'1 for 
North America. 
Table 6.2. Availability of animal product/person/year (FAO, Internet, 1998). 
Continent 
Africa 
Asia 
Europe 
North America 
Latin America 
World 
Netherlands 
Human 
Population 
(xio6) 
719 
3438 
728 
297 
477 
5659 
16 
Animal 
Production 
(xio9 ko.) 
8.4 
91-5 
49-9 
37.7 
20.4 
207.9 
2.6 
Aquatic 
Production 
(xio9 ka) 
4-5 
50.6 
12.5 
8.5 
20.6 
96.8 
0.51 
Animal 
Product 
(ka person'1 vr"1) 
17.9 
41.3 
85-7 
155.7 
86.0 
53-8 
194.8 
As can be seen in Table 6.3, there are also large differences between continents with respect to 
the kind of meat eaten. For instance: only 1% of the meat of Monogastrics (mainly pigs) is 
produced in Africa, while in that continent nearly a quarter (22%) of meat of small ruminants is 
produced. The availability of milk (world total 500 million t yr'1) and eggs (50 million t yr"1) 
shows a similar distribution. In 1995, total amounts of animal protein available per person per 
day were 12 and 19 g, respectively, in Africa and Asia, while the amounts available in Europe, 
N-America and L-America were 58, 69 g and 34 g, respectively. 
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Table 6.3. World distribution of animal (meat) production (FAO, Internet, 1998). 
Large Small Mono- Fowl Total 
Ruminants Ruminants pastries 
World (loH) 53 10 87 58 208 
distribution 
Africa 
Asia 
Europe 
N-America 
L-America 
>W 
5 
24 
23 
23 
18 
22 
55 
22 
<1 
<1 
1 
56 
27 
10 
3 
3 
34 
18 
26 
11 
4 
42 
23 
17 
9 
The regional differences in amount and kind of animal products produced are related to cultural 
and religious differences, but also to differences in resources. Thus, about 40% of the meat in 
North America is from poultry, produced in intensive production systems using large amounts 
of nutritionally balanced and cereal based concentrates. On the other hand, many animals in 
Africa and Asia are scavengers, living on offal and whatever they find around the compound of 
the household. 
6.3. Other roles of livestock 
Generally, livestock keepers in the industrialized countries try to maximize the production of 
eggs, milk, meat, and/or wool. Feed spent to maintain the animal is considered as a price that 
has to be paid for this goal. The situation in developing countries is often very different. 
Animals also provide a large part of the tractive power and manure is very important for the 
maintenance of soil fertility. In some areas (e.g. India) manure is also important as fuel for 
cooking. In addition, it is used for construction. In the absence of reliable banking and insurance 
systems for the rural poor, animals are not only (or not even primarily) kept for production 
purposes; they serve also as a savings bank, from which expenses like school fees can be paid, 
and as a reserve for emergencies like illness or crop failure (Udo, 1996). Under such conditions, 
the number of animals that can be kept may be more important than the level of production, 
even to the extent that the total production of all animals is lower than would be possible with 
a smaller number of animals. It is therefore not surprising that the variation in animal biomass 
present per person varies much less between the different areas in the world than does animal 
production. 
6.4. Feed consumption by farm animals 
The feed consumed by farm animals can be divided in a part needed for body maintenance and 
a part available for production. The latter includes the growth from newborn to maturity, and 
the production of offspring and subsequent lactation until the young are weaned 
(reproduction). In intensive animal production, special measures (improved feeding, health 
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control, etc.) are taken to accelerate this process (faster growth from young to maturity, higher 
rate of reproduction, and production of more milk than is required for the young). In this way 
more biomass is produced per unit of biomass present, and a smaller fraction of the feed is lost 
in maintenance. Consequently, the technical efficiency of the production process (amount of 
animal product produced per unit of feed or per unit of animal biomass) is increased. This is 
also a main reason why the ratio (annual production of biomass)/(biomass present) is much 
higher for farm animals than for humans. 
Maintenance requirements are normally expressed as the amount of feed (or feed energy) 
required per unit of Metabolic Body Weight (MBW = W (Liveweight in kg075)). Using 
approximate average weights for each species, the respective biomasses were recalculated as 
MBW. It was assumed that maintenance of one unit MBW requires 0.05 kg concentrates or 0.10 
kg forage of average quality and that forages are used to cover 100% of the maintenance 
requirements of ruminants and 50% of those for pigs. This gives amounts of forage and 
concentrates needed for maintenance as shown in Table 6.4. 
Table 6.4. Amount of feed (MT) required to maintain the world animal population. 
Species MBW* 
(x io 9 ka) 
Cattle 90 
Sheep & Goats 20 
Pigs 25 
Fowl 15 
Total 150 
% Forage 
100 
100 
50 
0 
90 
Feed needed ( l 0 6 t ) 
Foraaes 
3285 
730 
456 
-
4471 
Concentrates 
-
-
228 
274 
502 
* Metabolic Body Weight 
Estimated amounts of feed required for production are given in Table 6.5. Unlike for 
maintenance, where the nutritive value of forage was assumed to be 50% of that of 
concentrates, it was assumed that the feeding value of forage used for production is 0.75 times 
the feeding value of concentrates. It was also assumed that rations used for the production of 
milk and beef contain considerable amounts of concentrates (50 and 30% respectively). These 
are guestimates based on present practices in the intensive production systems (mainly in 
Western Europe and North America). 
The results in Table 6.5 show that about equal amounts of concentrates are needed to maintain 
the entire animal population and for its (net) production (502 and 492 million t yr'1, 
respectively). The data in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 indicate that about 70% of the biomass used as feed 
is covered by forage, and slightly less than 30% by concentrate feeds. For aquatic animals, a 
distinction must be made between fish caught from the sea, rivers or lakes (fisheries), and fish 
produced through aquaculture. When caught from natural waters, no competition for food for 
humans occurs. Of the more than 90 million t of fish landed annually from fisheries, some 30% 
is used for non-food purposes, i.e. mainly as animal feed. About 50% of the world fin-fish and 
crustaceans produced through aquaculture (total about 25 million t yr'*), is based on 
concentrates. This adds about 10 million t to the amount of concentrates used for animal 
production. 
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Table 6.5. Amount (MT) of concentrates needed for world animal production. 
Milk 
Beef 
Mu t ton 
Pork 
Eggs 
Chicken 
Total 
Wor ld 1 ' 
Production 
500 
60 
10 
90 
50 
60 
770 
% Cone.2» 
50 
33 
-
100 
100 
100 
57 
Cone/Gain2 ' 
(ka ka1) 
0.5 
3.0 
2.0 
1.1 
1.2 
Feed d o 6 
Foraae 
167 
160 
40 
-
-
-
367 
t) 
Cone. 
125 
60 
-
180 
55 
72 
492 
11
 FAO Statistics, Internet, 1998;2) Educated guess 
6.5. Competition between humans and animals 
Except dairy cows and beef cattle kept in feedlots (the latter mostly in North America and to a 
limited extent in Europe), cattle compete little with humans for feed resources, because they are 
largely fed with forages. Small ruminants (sheep and goats) are considered even less 
competitive. On the other hand, monogastric farm animals and fowl consume large amounts of 
concentrates. 
Pimentel et al., (1997) estimate that 40% of the world production of cereals is used as animal 
feed, primarily in developed countries. Data of De Haan et al. (1997) suggest a slightly lower 
proportion (35%). It is often stated that this is a wasteful process, because the production of 1 
kg of chicken, pork and beef requires 2,4 and 8 kg of cereals respectively, and is therefore a 
highly inefficient conversion process. However, part of the concentrates used for animal 
production consists of by-products rather than cereals. Farm animals act then as waste 
converters rather than competitors for human food, because such feeds become available as 
offal, notably in the manufacturing of flour (bran, middling, etc.), vegetable oil (cakes, oil 
meals), sugar (beet pulp, molasses), starch (gluten meals, gluten feeds), and in fruit canning 
(citrus pulp), slaughtering (meat, bone meal), fish processing (fish meal), brewing (spent 
brewers grains) and distilling (distiller's grains). The size of this proportion is not exactly known, 
but, also according to De Haan et al. (1997), the total annual amount of concentrates used in 
1990/92 was 982 million t, of which 600 million t was as cereals, 130 million t as roots, 13 million 
t as oilseeds, and 119 million t each as brans and oilmeal (cakes). Thus, according to these 
figures, by-products of the agro-industry accounted for 30-40% of the concentrates, and cereals 
for about 60%. 
6.6. Grain for food and feed 
Table 6.6 summarizes FAO data on the production of cereals, oilseeds, pulses, and roots and 
tubers. The total production (air dry material) is well above 2500 million t per year. When the 
requirements for nutrition of humans are set at 275 kg per person per year, this would be 
enough to feed nearly 10 billion people. With 5-7 billion people, between 1500 and 1600 million 
t would be needed to feed the human population and around 1000 million t is available as 
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animal feed, amply the amount required for maintenance and the present production of the 
world population of farm animals (1000 million t). 
Table 6.6. Primary production of food and feed (FAO, Internet, 1998). 
Africa 
Asia 
Europe 
N-America 
L-America 
World 
Cereals 
109.2 
991.2 
438.5 
427-2 
100.8 
2067 
Oilseedsl) 
14.0 
126.0 
25.5 
96.3 
56.2 
318.0 
Pulses 
7-4 
27-9 
10.3 
5-9 
3-9 
55-4 
Roots & 
Tubers 
135-6 
269.8 
1544 
29.7 
47.1 
636.6 
Total 
per person2' 
248 
360 
726 
1817 
372 
471 
11
 Coconuts, cotton seed, groundnuts, rape seed, soy beans, sunflower seed; Oceania excluded 
2)
 Roots and tubers counted for 35% 
As estimated above, world forage consumption by farm animals must be in the order of 5000 
million t. Most of this forage is produced on marginal land, not very suitable to produce food or 
cash crops. Based on these calculations, it could be concluded that there is at present a 
reasonable balance between the worldwide demand and supply of human food and feed for 
animals. Especially when it is taken into account that concentrated feeds for animals also 
include large amounts of by-products of the food industry, it may also be concluded that at this 
moment animal production does not compete strongly with the supply of human staple food. 
There appears even to be an excess of grain. In addition, in Western Europe and the USA land is 
set aside and farmers are being paid not to produce cereals, while in Eastern Europe the 
potential for arable production is clearly under-exploited at present. 
Two observations should, however, be added. Firstly, that the excess of grain is largely 
concentrated in Europe and America. The amount of grain available in Africa is only just enough 
to meet the requirements for humans. Reserves appear to be higher in Asia, but estimates may 
be too optimistic because FAO production figures refer to hulled rice. Deducting husks and bran 
(accounting for about 20 and 10% respectively), would considerably reduce the estimated excess 
in Asia. Also on a world basis, the present net-balance between production on the one hand, 
and amounts needed for humans and used for animal feeding is 261 million t, or 10% of the 
amount of raw grain produced. Taking not only the hull fraction into account, but also post 
harvest losses of edible grain, would change the estimated balance from positive to negative. 
The second point to keep in mind is, that the demand for food wil l increase due to the 
increasing population and economic growth (Heilig, 1980; Hossain & Sombilla, 1999). This 
would absorb the total amount of grain now produced annually, leaving only by-products for 
animals, even in Europe and America, unless the amount produced is increased. A complicating 
factor is that the largest rise in demand is expected to occur in Asia and Africa. 
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6.7. Can more animal product be produced from the same 
amount of feed? 
Animal productivity can be expressed in various ways. When animals are used as an income 
generator, as is the case in industrialized countries, the primary aim is a positive financial 
return. Animal productivity is then often expressed in terms of efficiency of production i.e. in kg 
of product (meat, milk eggs) per kg of feed. As indicated earlier, large differences exist between 
animal species. In intensive systems, fowl are the most efficient converters but they need also 
the highest quality feeds; therefore they are also the species competing most with humans for 
the same resources. 
An alternative way of expressing animal productivity is the ratio (animal biomass produced 
annually) / (amount of biomass present). This ratio (Table 6.7) differs widely between animal 
species and between regions. Also according to this measure, fowl are the most efficient 
producers of meat. Average values per continent for fowl vary with a factor 3.6, with the lowest 
value (2.68) in Africa and the highest (9.56) in North America. The same picture emerges for the 
other species, except that the variation between continents is even bigger for large ruminants 
(value for N-America more than 6 times the value for Africa). For all species except small 
ruminants, values for the Netherlands are similar to those of N-America and much higher than 
the average for Europe. For fish production (aquaculture), the above ratio was estimated to be 
approximately 1.5, with little variation throughout the world (Verdegem, unpublished). 
Table 6.7. Rate of animal (meat) production: (animal biomass produced annually)/(amount of biomass 
present). 
Africa 
Asia 
Europe 
N-America 
L-America 
Large 
ruminants 
0.08 
0.09 
0.35 
0.49 
0.15 
Small 
ruminants 
0.19 
0.31 
0.36 
0.52 
O.13 
Mono-
aastrics 
0.77 
1.73 
2.36 
2.63 
O.89 
Fowl 
2.64 
3.64 
5.86 
9.56 
6.09 
Total 
0.15 
0.44 
0.93 
1.21 
O.24 
World 0.16 0.27 1.88 5.04 0.49 
Netherlands 0.50 0.36 2.67 9-59 1.52 
Several factors contribute to the large differences between N-America and Europe on the one 
hand and the other continents on the other. The rate of production is, however, strongly related 
to the level of nutrient intake and consequently, feed quality. A large proportion of the animals 
in developing countries is kept as farmyard animals in small holder farming systems rather than 
in intensive commercial units as in industrialized countries. As explained above, animals in 
developing countries are not only kept for the production of meat, milk and eggs, but serve also 
a range of other purposes. The effect of multiple roles of livestock combines often with limited 
feed resources, both in terms of low quantities of concentrates available and low quality of 
roughage. In North America and Europe a considerable area of land is used to produce high 
quality forages such as grass, alfalfa and maize. High levels of fertilization and capital intensive 
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conservation methods are used to assure that high quality feed is available both in the growing 
season and in winter. In developing countries, forage consists largely of much lower quality 
grass f rom natural grassland, roadsides, ere. and low quality crop residues. On the basis of feed 
balance studies it has of ten been suggested that w i th a dif ferent production system more 
animal product could be produced w i th the available feed. Winrock (1978) estimated that in 
most areas of the wor ld only about half of the metabolizable energy in forages is used. Most of 
the feed left unutil ized is, however, of very low quality. The main effect of including more of the 
available straw-like materials in the ration is that energy intake and production per animal 
decrease, to such an extent that the to ta l amount of animal products produced decreases even 
though herd size can be increased. Low quali ty straw-like feeds can be very valuable t o keep 
animals alive during l imited periods of feed scarcity (survival rations), but this serves only a 
useful purpose in as far as better feeds are available t o support actual production in subsequent 
seasons (van Bruchem & Zemmelink, 1995). Studies in East Java, Indonesia, indicate that the 
degree of feed selection performed by farmers is remarkably close to the opt imum giving 
maximum animal product ion (Zemmelink et al., 1992; Ifar, 1996). It has often been suggested 
that uti l ization of low qual i ty roughage could be improved by combining these w i th small 
amounts of nitrogenous products like oilseed cakes or urea. The favorable effects of this have 
been known for several decades, but farmers have hardly adopted this technique, because i t is 
not economical. The suggestion that animal production in developing countries can be based 
on low quality crop residues plus nitrogenous supplements has proven to be too optimistic. 
6.8. World trade in feedstuffs 
Table 6.8 presents an overview of the wor ldwide imports and exports of feedstuffs. The to ta l i m -
or export accounts for only about 8% of the amount of concentrates consumed by farm animals. 
Table 6.8. World imports and exports of feeding stuffs in 1996 (Mt yr"1). 
Imports Exports Import-Export 
Africa 
Asia 
Europe 
N-America 
L-America 
2.568 
21.061 
48.331 
5.585 
1.809 
1.159 
11.486 
22.336 
21.856 
22.732 
1.400 
9.575 
25.995 
-16.271 
-20.923 
Total 79-345 79.569 -O.224 
The vast majority of exported feed comes f rom North and Latin America and Europe (each 22 
mil l ion t per year); African countries export hardly at al l , wh i le Asia holds an intermediate 
position (11 mil l ion ton) . Europe is a big net importer of animal feeds. An important reason is 
that the ratio in which protein rich commodit ies (oilseeds, pulses) and energy rich commodit ies 
(cereals) are produced, is much lower in Europe (0.07) than in North and South America (0.23 
and 0.48 respectively). Of the net impor t of 26 mi l l ion t in to Europe, 18 mil l ion t were o i l seed 
cakes. 
The farmer in Europe has t w o advantages in his compet i t ion for protein rich feeds. Firstly, he 
can combine them w i th high quali ty forages (e.g. maize silage) and high energy concentrates 
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and so get a much better physical return than his colleague in Africa and Asia. In addition: he 
produces for consumers with higher purchasing power, which enables him to pay a higher price 
for his inputs. 
The importance of consumers with a higher purchasing power is also shown by the data for 
Africa and Asia: the positive import-export balance for these continents is due to large imports 
by a limited number of countries with a sizable middle class which can afford to eat higher 
priced animal products (South-Africa, Japan, Algeria, Egypt, China, South-Korea). The amount of 
grain used for feed in China was stable at slightly less than 20 million t between 1965 and 1978, 
tripled in the period 1978-1988 and, after a slow-down in growth in the period 1988-1990, 
increased from 60 to more than 100 million t in 1996. India, which lags behind in economic 
growth as compared to China, is a net exporter of animal feed even though major programs 
were developed in the nineteen-sixties and -seventies to increase animal production. In 1980, 
the amount of animal protein available was the same in India and China (7 g per person per 
day); in 1995 in was 9 in India and 24 in China. 
6.9. Discussion 
The role of domesticated farm animals (animal production) in relation to food security is a very 
complicated one. Farm animals are instrumental in converting huge amounts of crop residues 
and by-products of the food industry, which could otherwise be an environmental burden, into 
high quality food. Also the produce of vast areas of marginal land (natural pastures, roadsides, 
etc.) is so converted. In addition to producing high quality food, farm animals contribute to the 
household income of millions of households practicing mixed farming or are responsible for the 
entire income of specialized farmers. Further, farm animals contribute indirectly to food 
production and the income of farmers (mainly in developing countries) by supplying draught 
power and manure. Lastly, farm animals serve as a living bank account, providing additional 
economic security for millions of poor households. The total of these benefits from livestock is 
huge. Nevertheless, a number of questions may be raised. 
Increasing animal production does not automatically lead to increased food security. The total 
amount of animal protein produced worldwide (about 53 millions t in 1994) is equivalent to 
nearly 26 g person"1 d'1. That is sufficient if compared with a norm of 70 g total protein of which 
one third is recommended to be animal protein. Thus, the main problem is unequal distribution, 
not total production. Based on various sources, Luvten (1995) suggests that 9 g animal protein 
person"1 d"1 is sufficient, if the diet includes not only cereals and potatoes but also legumes, 
fruits and vegetables. Even the average values for Africa and Asia (12 and 19 g person'1 d"1) meet 
these amounts. Nevertheless, the (average) value for some 20 countries, including India and 
Bangladesh (together more than 1 billion people), is even below that. In these and many other 
countries, a large part of the population suffers from under-nutrition. The first priority is then to 
assure that enough dietary energy and total protein is available. Animal production wil l 
contribute to that if it is based on the produce of marginal lands, crop residues and by-products, 
but for the poor the situation wil l only worsen if livestock production is expanded beyond that. 
Differences between national averages of animal protein consumption (FAO statistics) are 
clearly related to similar differences in economic development as measured by the Gross 
Domestic Product per person (UN Statistics). As soon as the economic situation permits, the 
consumption of animal products starts to rise (Born er o/., 1994), with an apparent plateau 
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between 60 and 70 g of animal protein person"1 d 1 (Zemmelink, unpublished). Thus, per capita 
availability of animal protein in richer Hong Kong (72 g d"1) and Japan (52 g d_1) is much higher 
than that in Bangladesh, India and Indonesia (6, 9 and i l g d"1, respectively). It seems certain 
that the demand for animal products in many countries wil l increase when the income of their 
people rises (Steinfeld et o/., 1997). Possibilities to increase production based on crop residues 
and marginal land are limited (see also De Haan étal., 1997). In accordance with this, the 
fourfold increase in the per capita production of animal protein in China between 1978 and 
1995 (from 6 to 24 g d_1), was accompanied by a fivefold increase in the amount of grain used as 
animal feed (from <20 to >100 million t yr"1). Thus, to meet the rising demand for animal 
products, China is in the process of developing intensive systems of production, similar to those 
used in North America and Europe. Per country data on importation of feedstuffs indicate 
similar trends for other countries in Africa and Asia with increasing prosperity. 
Views vary when it comes to the question how provision of staple food might be affected if 
more grain is used for animal production. FAO (quoted by Fresco & Steinfeld, 1998) emphasizes 
the capacity of the livestock sector to draw on different resources and to contract and expand 
with resource availability. According to these authors, reductions in total cereal supply during 
the global food crises in 1974/75 and 1982/83 were almost entirely absorbed by adjustments by 
the livestock sector. On the other hand, Brown (1998a) warns that growth of the world grain 
harvest is slowing down and that stocks have decreased to levels well below those needed to 
cushion one poor harvest. Since 1994, grain prices in China have climbed 60% because demand 
rose faster than production (Brown, 1998b). Estimates of possible increases in grain production 
vary widely, but there is increasing concern about meeting requirements, both in Africa and 
Asia and a shift to diets including more animal products may have very large effects on the 
demand for grain. According to Rabbinge (1999) the required rate of increase in cereal 
production in Asia will be doubled as compared to that required to meet population growth. In 
a situation of scarcity, using more grain for animal production could lead to decreased food 
security for the poor because they cannot afford the higher prices. Brown (1998b) states that 
this has already led to measures designed to avoid political unrest in 1995 in China and 
Vietnam, while the European Union imposed export taxes in 1995/96 on wheat as well as barley, 
to discourage exports. 
At present the role of livestock production in many agricultural systems is under discussion, 
because of a possible negative effect on the environment (Nell, 1998). Animal production can 
prevent environmental problems by preventing by-products to be treated as waste, but it can 
also cause environmental problems when the production system is based on high external 
inputs causing large nutrient surpluses. In many industrialized countries, such problems are 
already apparent and this results in detrimental effects due to the over-loading of the 
environment with excess nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P) and potassium (K), and the release of 
methane (CH4) by ruminants (Tamminga, 1996; Nell 1998). In The Netherlands this has led to 
strict legislation to control and improve manure management and more recently to an enforced 
reduction of the number of pigs. A similar situation exists in many other industrialized countries 
and future legislation wil l probably limit further expansion. 
In developing countries expansion of the livestock industry may easily result into overstocking, 
overgrazing and the depletion of the soils. Steinfeld et al. (1997) point at environmental 
challenges as land degradation, soil mining and over-grazing in semi-arid areas of sub-Saharan 
Africa, deforestation in rain forest frontiers (Brazil), and involution of mixed farming systems in 
densely populated areas. Shortage of water has also been mentioned as a factor most likely 
limiting both future plant and animal production in many parts of the world (Pimentel, 1997). 
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Production could in many areas probably be increased by reducing herd size, so that the 
remaining animals can be fed at a higher level and less feed is spent on maintenance. Farmers 
may, however, be reluctant to increase production this way because it reduces other benefits 
and thereby reduces their food security. It is true that more then half of all people in the world 
consume very low amounts of animal protein and would probably benefit from eating more. 
But it is equally true that amounts of animal protein needed to make a healthy diet, are often 
exaggerated. Certainly, amounts consumed by many in North America and Europe are far 
beyond requirements. 
6.10. Conclusions 
Presently no severe competition for food and feed between humans and animals appears to 
exist. A growing human world population together with an increased wealth will increase the 
demand for food and feed. This growing demand must be met by increasing productivity, by re-
introducing set aside land, possibly by converting pasture into arable land and if necessary by a 
re-distribution between food and feed, leaving forages and by-products as main sources of 
animal feed. 
Lack of purchasing power must presently be considered as the main constraint limiting animal 
production and consumption in many developing countries. In developed countries 
environmental problems associated with animal production may become a limiting factor. In 
addition in many parts of the world the availability water may become a limiting factor. 
Farm animals contribute to the welfare of millions of households through a multiple of 
functions, including the production of high quality food. There is no doubt that they can and 
should continue to play these roles. The role of animals varies between regions. To avoid 
inappropriate allocation of resources and unfavorable side effects, animal production should be 
treated as an integral part of the total complex of agriculture and food production. 
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Abstract 
The impact of air pollution on crop production in developing countries is reviewed with the aim 
to use the information in a broad discussion on food security in these countries. 
During the past decade evidence has become available that air pollution adversely affects crop 
production in developing countries. Yield reductions of up to 40% in major crops such as rice 
and wheat have been observed. In addition, the quality of crops for human and animal 
consumption can be reduced by accumulation of air pollutants in plant tissues. Ozone, sulphur 
dioxide and nitrogen oxides (NOx) are considered to be the most important gaseous air 
pollutants on a global scale. Ozone, probably the most important one in terms of yield 
reduction of crops, is a secondary pollutant that is produced by photochemical reactions in 
which NOx and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) are involved. Sulphur dioxide, NOx and VOCs 
are primary pollutants, emitted by various sources related to industry and urbanization such as 
combustion of fossil fuels by power plants and traffic. Global risk assessment studies show that 
a significant part of the agricultural production area in developing countries is seriously 
affected by ozone and to a lesser extend by sulphur dioxide and NOx, with average crop yield 
reductions greater than 15%. The crop loss due to ozone is expected to increase strongly in the 
coming 2-3 decades, especially in the crop production areas in a radius of 100-200 km around 
megacities in developing countries. 
On a local scale, several other air pollutants may contribute to the air pollution situation in 
developing countries. It is observed that emissions of certain halogens [e.g. F and Cl), heavy 
metals (e.g. Pb and Hg), VOCs, and suspended particulate matter (dust, soot) can reduce crop 
production in terms of quantity and quality. Generally, adverse effects of these pollutants on 
crops are limited to an area of a few km around sources such as industries, mines, waste 
incineration, but some of these local causes of damage are highly persistent {e.g. soil 
degradation by heavy metals or acidification). Biomass burning and deposition of dust along 
unpaved roads are eye catching types of air pollution typical for some developing countries, but 
not a mayor threat for food production on larger scales. 
It is concluded from the reported data that air pollution is a serious and continuous threat to 
crop production in developing countries, and that it should be viewed as a major issue in a 
discussion on food security in developing countries. For the future, it is expected that the air 
pollution situation in developing countries wil l further deteriorate due to rural and industrial 
developments and their associated emissions of air pollutants. Our understanding of the impact 
of air pollution on crop production in developing countries would benefit from a systematic 
monitoring of the air quality situation in the agricultural production areas in these countries, 
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from studies on exposure-effect relationships under local conditions, and from studies on 
economic and social consequences. 
7.1. Introduction 
This paper describes an inventory on effects of air pollution on crop production in developing 
countries, with the aim to use the information in a broad discussion on food security in these 
countries. Adverse effects of air pollution can be observed on humans, livestock, crops, natural 
vegetations, forests, animals, buildings, and soil and water quality. The scope of this paper is 
narrowed down to adverse effects on crops. The following definition is used: an air pollutant is 
a substance in the atmosphere that adversely affects crop production. Four categories of 
adverse effects on crops may conveniently be distinguished (adapted from Marshall et al., 1997): 
1. Direct visible injury. Visible injuries on leaf tissue usually occur after short-time exposure of 
crops to relatively high levels of air pollution. Extensive injury may result in reduction of 
crop yield. Visible injuries can make the crop more sensitive to biotic stresses (see 4) and , 
thus may increase the need of crop protection. Also, visible injuries reduce the economic 
value of crops such as vegetables and flowers. 
2. Direct effects on growth and yields. Productivity of the crop is reduced, generally by a long-
term exposure of plants to moderate levels of air pollution, even in the absence of visible 
injury. 
3. Accumulation of pollutants in crops. Pollutants may accumulate in crops to levels that are 
toxic for humans and animals without affecting crop productivity itself. Accumulation can 
occur by direct uptake from the air as well as by uptake via soil and roots. 
4. Indirect effects. This category represents a diverse group of effects. Low levels of air 
pollution may cause a range of subtle physiological, chemical or anatomical changes that 
wi l l not directly lead to yield reductions. These changes may increase the sensitivity of crops 
to other stresses such as frost (Taylor et ai, 1987), pests and diseases (Manning & 
Tiedemann, 1995) and drought, thereby contributing to yield reductions and reduced crop 
quality. 
Low levels of air pollution can have positive effects on crops as well. For example, deposition of 
low quantities of S02 may increase crop production under conditions that sulphur is limiting. 
The same applies to NH3 and NOx. This fertilizing effect is generally negligible and, dependent of 
the buffer capacity of the soil, is counteracted by the adverse effect of soil acidification by those 
compounds. No attention wil l be paid to positive effects of air pollutants on crop production. 
Other effects that are not addressed in this paper are on: 
• natural vegetation, although loss of biodiversity by air pollution is evident and has serious 
impact on food production and quality of life on the long term, 
• forest, although forest decline results in increased risks of erosion, of damage by weather 
extremes and loss of biomass for timber and combustion, 
• water quality can be adversely influenced by air pollution, resulting in reduced food 
production {e.g. acidic deposition kills fish in lakes with low buffer capacity), 
• livestock, although fodder quality can be reduced (for instance, fluoride deposition can 
cause severe damage to livestock via accumulation in pasture grass and fodder). 
Due to these exclusions the crop loss estimates presented in this paper are underestimations. 
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Heck & Heagle (1985) have presented an air pollution system (Fig. 7-1). The system runs from 
sources and emission of pollutants, through atmospheric transport, to emission of pollutants 
into crop production areas and effects on crops. Monitoring of air quality and effect-assessment 
studies are essential elements in understanding the relationship between air pollution and food 
security. The effect of air pollution on crops is a function of the air pollution components 
present (7.2), exposure concentration and duration, uptake, crop characteristics, and external 
growth conditions. The effect-assessment studies provide input data for evaluation of 
agricultural, economic and social risks associated with air pollution effects on crops. 
regional 
background 
air pollution I 
emission —> dispersion —> air quality 
+ 
transformation i 
t 
deposition 
+ 
uptake 
local sources -i-
effects -» damage 
Figure 7-1. The air pollution system (adapted from Heck & Heagle, 1985). 
7.2. Air pollution components 
Commonly known air pollutants are summarized in Table 7.1, together with some background 
information about these pollutants. 
Air pollutants can be divided into two categories. Primary pollutants are emitted directly into 
the atmosphere. They are generally present in high concentrations in urban areas or near large 
point sources. S02 is probably the most important primary pollutant in terms of impact on 
agricultural production world-wide. It is emitted in large quantities from coal-fired power 
plants, and can be spread over relatively large areas around these sources (this is happening at 
a large scale in China nowadays). Often, the sources that emit S02 compounds are also emitters 
of nitrogen oxides, heavy metals and fluorides. 
In several developing countries dust produced by road traffic, excavation and open cast mining 
is an obvious air pollutant, although generally of a very local and non-phytotoxic nature. 
Another common practice in developing countries is biomass burning for extending or 
improving land for agricultural use. It generally is a local phenomenon, but sometimes it can 
have international dimensions (like in the autumn of 1997 when the fires in Indonesia caused 
smog on Malaysian Peninsula). 
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Table 7.1. List and background information of commonly recognized air pollutants from anthropogenic 
sources. 
Description (common or group name) 
Primary pollutants: 
Sulphur dioxide (S02) 
Nitrogen oxides (NOx) 
Halogens (F, CI) 
Heavy metals (Pb, Zn, Cd, Hg, etc.) 
Organic compounds such as ethylene, PCB's, 
PAC's, etc. 
Suspended particulate matter 
(SPM, e.g. soot, dust) 
Ammonia (NH3) 
Dominant form / important sources (or precursors) 
Gas / power plants, industry 
Gas / traffic, industry, power plants 
Gas / industries esp. brickworks and metal smelters 
Particulates / industries, mining, power plants 
Gas / industries, waste incineration 
Particulates / power plants, traffic, construction 
works 
Gas / agriculture 
Secondary pollutants 
Ozone (03) Gas /secondary pollutant / (NOx, VOCs) 
Peroxyacetyl nitrate Gas / secondary pollutant / (NOx, VOCs) 
Acidifying substances (H2S04, HN03, (NH4)2S04) Aerosol, rain / (NH3, NOx, S02) 
Ultraviolet radiation (UVb) Radiation/ (Halogenated hydrocarbons) 
Secondary pollutants, such as ground level ozone, are formed by subsequent chemical reactions 
in the atmosphere. Ground level ozone often spreads at high concentrations over a distance of 
more than 100 km away f rom sources of its precursors. Ozone is formed through a series of 
chemical reactions in the atmosphere, which involve emissions of ni trogen oxides and 
hydrocarbons, of which traffic is the most important source. Reactions leading to ozone 
format ion are favored by high temperatures and high l ight intensities and by stable 
atmospheric conditions {e.g. condit ions in Mexico City during the summer period). It is 
considered to be the most damaging pol lutant in terms of impact on agricultural product ion 
world-wide (Heck, 1989; Fuhrer et o/., 1997). Other secondary air pollutants are H2S04, HN03 
(NH4)2S04 dissolved in aerosols, mist or cloud and rain droplets. They contr ibute to soil 
degradation via acidification; their direct effect on crop production is probably small. 
The increase in ultraviolet radiation is an other secondary pol lutant. Emissions of halogenated 
hydrocarbons (CFKs) and other compounds can deplete the stratospheric ozone layer, resulting 
in increased ultraviolet radiation (especially UV-b) on the earth surface. Clear indications exist 
for a negative effect of increased UV-b radiation on crop production al though it varies between 
species and cultivars. Quantitative estimates are complicated by the fact that both direct 
(damage of cellular structures), indirect (decomposition processes in the soil) and secondary 
effects (reduced stress tolerance) are involved (Tevini, 1993; Zepp, 1995). 
An impression of the dispersion of the compounds is given in Fig. 7.2. 
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Figure 72. Indication of the scale of dispersion of air pollution. 
7.3. Air quality in crop production areas in developing 
countries 
Several air quality monitoring programs in developing countries have been established during 
the past decades. However, the programs were mainly focused on the impact of air pollution on 
human health and buildings in urban areas of megacities (WHO/UNEP, 1992; Marshall et ai, 
1997)- Observations on 03, S02, N02, Pb and soot concentrations in megacities such as Mexico 
City, Delhi, Beijing and Bangkok reveal a deteriorating situation. Concentrations of pollutants 
are often above WHO human health standards and they are increasing with time, along with 
the growth and development of the cities. 
There are no systematic data available on air pollution concentrations in crop production areas 
in developing countries. In general terms, it is likely that the air quality situation is deteriorating 
because most crop production areas in developing countries are generally situated close to 
urban areas of megacities. They are found in peri-urban areas of megacities, or just outside 
megacities in river deltas and valley's (generally less than 100 km away from megacities). 
Industrial sources of air pollution are generally located close to those megacities as well. 
Moreover, highly urbanized and industrialized regions are often situated in valleys or river 
delta's surrounded by hills or mountains. This geographical situation reduces the atmospheric 
turbulence and dispersion of air pollution, compared to flat areas. Thus, it is obvious that the air 
quality situation in crop production areas in developing countries is affected by emissions from 
megacities nearby. The available data on air pollution concentrations in crop production areas 
in developing countries is presented in 7.4. 
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74. Evidence for yield loss by air pollution in developing 
countries 
Evidence of yield loss due to air pol lut ion in developing countries has become available only 
since the past 10-15 years (e.g. Marshall et al., 1997; Kempenaar et al., 1997)- Experimental 
results of these studies are summarized in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2. Examples of studies showing effects of air pollution on crops in developing countries (after 
Marshall et al., 1997 and Kempenaar et al., 1997). 
Location and reference Crop(s) Dominant pollutant(s) (including Effect 
approximate exposure concentration) 
Indian Punjab (rural) 
Bambawale, 1986 
Southern Peru 
Balvin Diaz (pers.com.) 
Valley of Mexico (rural) 
Laguette-Rey, 1986 
China (rural) 
Hongfa, 1989 
India 
Farmer 1993 
China (rural) 
Li & Wu, 1991 
Nile delta (rural) 
Ali et al., 1992 
Nile delta (rural) 
Hassan et al., 1995 
Pakistan Punjab 
(peri-urban) 
Wahid et ai, 1995 
Potato 0 3 
Several S02 (100-1000 ppbv) 
crops 
Bean 03,100 ppbv (annual, 6 h mean) 
Several S02,40 ppbv, NOx, 25 ppbv, 03 , F 
species 
Corn (a.o. Lime dust >o.5 g m"2 d"1 (other dust types 
crops) higher NOECs) 
Several Pb, Cd, Zn and other heavy metals 
species 
Several Pb, Cd, Zn and other heavy metals 
species 
Radish, 03 , 50-70 ppbv (seasonal 6h mean) 
Turnip 
Wheat, 03 , 30-60 ppbv (seasonal 6h mean), N02, 
rice 20 ppbv 
Visible leaf injury 
Visible injury and 25% 
yield loss 
40% yield loss in 
sensitive cultivar 
5 tot 25% yield loss 
Yield loss 
Accumulation to toxic 
levels 
Accumulation to toxic 
levels 
30 and 17% yield loss, 
respectively 
40 and 42% yield loss, 
respectively 
Experimental studies on effects of ambient air pol lu t ion on crop product ion in developed 
countries show similar or smaller yield reductions than the ones observed in developing 
countries. An example is given of the effect of 0 3 on wheat in Fig. 7.3. The opposite is more 
exceptional. For instance, crop losses in China by S02 + NOx (Table 7.2) are less than expected on 
the basis of exposure/response relationship fo r crops (Van der Eerden et al., 1998). 
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Figure 7-3- Yield of wheat as related to ozone. Results are from Open Top Chamber experiments in 
Switzerland (SW), Sweden (S), Denmark (DK) and Belgium (B) (After Fuhrer, 1993). The dashed 
quadrangle refers to results of Wahid et al. (1995). 
Probably, ozone is the most relevant pollutant in relation to crops, due to its wide distribution, 
its phytotoxicity and the expectations of still increasing concentrations in the future. In the 
developed world several studies to quantify the ozone damage have been carried out. In 
California, yield reductions of up to 23% by ambient ozone have been observed (Olszyk et al., 
1988). In the Mediterranean area of Europe yield reductions of up to 20% by ambient air 
pollution have been demonstrated (Schenone & Lorenzini, 1992). In the Netherlands, ozone-
induced yield reductions of 5-10% may occur in sensitive crops such as legumes, potato and 
fodder crops (Van der Eerden et o/., 1988). Western Europe, yield reductions in wheat of 10% or 
more due to ambient ozone are to be expected (Fuhrer & Achermann, 1993). In Japan, yield 
reductions of 8% in rice by ambient ozone (Kobayashi, 1992)1 have been demonstrated. 
As there is little systematic data from developing countries concerning concentrations of air 
pollutants at which yield loss occurs, any assessment of thresholds for adverse effects of 
pollutants must primarily be based on data from developed countries. For ozone, these data 
suggest that significant effects (defined as yield loss above 10%) may be seen when seasonal 
mean concentrations in the middle of the day exceed 50 ppbv (Ashmore, 1992; Marshall et ai, 
1997). For sulphur dioxide, the threshold concentration for significant effects on crops is 
considered to be around 10 ppbv (Ashmore, 1992), for nitrogen oxides 20 ppbv (Van der Eerden 
et ai, 1998) and for fluorides 0.3 ppbv (Slooff et al., 1988). 
Concentrations of ozone, sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides in crop production areas in 
developing countries (Table 7.2) are regularly above the damage threshold concentrations for 
air pollutants from developed countries. However, systematic data are missing. For ozone, the 
available data suggest that damage is to be expected in large parts of agricultural production 
areas in developing countries (Marshall ef ai, 1997). For sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxides, 
damage is probably limited to areas in the vicinity of urban and industrial sources (Singh et ai, 
1990; Marshall et al., 1997), although these areas can be in the order of magnitude of 104 km in 
1
 Somewhat surprising is the estimated high yield loss in rice by ambient SO^ 35% (Taniyama & Mizuno, 1985). 
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parts of China. In several developing countries dust produced by road traffic, excavation and 
open cast mining is an obvious air pollutant, although generally of a very local and non-
phytotoxic nature. Dust can have adverse effects on crop production both by a physical and 
chemical impact. It can affect photosynthesis, respiration, transpiration and allow penetration 
of gaseous pollutants (Farmer, 1993). Most of the dust from road traffic on unpaved roads is 
deposited within 10-30 meters. Per unit of daily passing traffic unpaved roads produce around 
50 times more dust compared to paved roads. Particulate matter in car exhaust is strongly 
dependent of the fuel used: cars using unleaded fuel produce 77% less particulate emissions (on 
a mass basis) than cars using leaded fuel. Nearly all dust types cause an increased transpiration, 
but reduction in biomass production depends on the chemical properties of the dust. 
Cement/lime dust at concentrations as low as 0.5 g m"2 d"1 can cause adverse effects, like blocked 
stomata, deficiencies in Fe, Mn, P and Bo, reduction in growth and formation reproductive 
structures, but smaller deposition can increase crop production by improving nutrients supply. 
Coal dust contains toxic substances as fluorides, sulphur compounds and heavy metals, but their 
effects on crop production has not been quantified. Even in the case of inert dust the crop 
production can be affected by reducing light interception and increasing leaf temperature (via 
reduction of transpiration, which is a general result of dust deposition). Per unit of dust 
deposited the threat of reduction in crop production is more severe with lower light intensities 
(proportional reduction in period with light saturation is less), with little rain fall (less washing 
off of the dust) and low water availability (less compensation of increased transpiration). 
Without an in depth modeling effort it in not possible to say which climatic zones are most 
threatened; by just by expert judgment we assume dry hot climate to be the most threatening. 
Biomass burning, a common practice in developing countries can have a number of negative 
effects (e.g. Freney, 1997). The burning produces large amounts of compounds that are directly 
toxic (NOx, S02), or involved in climate change (C02, N20) and in photochemical smog formation 
(NOx, VOCs). Moreover, the light interception of the smoke depresses light interception and 
thus photosynthesis and crop growth. A mayor reason for biomass burning is deforestation to 
gain agricultural land, but forest might be needed to protect against weather extremes and soil 
erosion and as a sources of genes. As far as we know, an integral cost/benefits analysis of 
biomass burning has not yet been made. 
There seems to be a tendency that, after correction for the concentration level, the yield losses 
in developing countries are higher compared to those in developed countries. These differences 
may be caused by differences in: 
1. Climatic conditions. Conditions that favor opening of stomata, such as low atmospheric 
vapor pressure deficit, low soil moisture deficit and high light intensity (so called modifying 
factors), increase the damaging effects of air pollutants, 
2. Exposure regimes (concentration * duration) and composition of air pollution. Much 
evidence exists for combined effects, often of a synergistic nature. For China, for instance, 
one may expect that the damaging effect of ozone is probably larger than it would be in 
Europe because of relatively high levels of sulphur dioxide in the atmosphere of China. 
3. Crops and cultivars may differ significantly in sensitivity to air pollution (Maggs, 1996), 
4. Interactions with other factors, such as pests, diseases and production systems. 
Few studies aim to understand, explain and generalize these differences (Maggs, 1996). Up to 
now most estimates of crop loss are based on field observations or chamber studies in which 
crop growth is compared in filtered and non-filtered air. A substantial step forward in 
generalization of observational results would be an approach that explains the impact of air 
pollutants on the basis of physiological mechanisms. In general, mechanistic crop growth 
simulation models can be used to do so. We made an attempt using the data of Whahid et al. 
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(1995) on yield reductions of wheat by ozone. These data were evaluated using a SUCROS model 
for wheat production (Goudriaan & Van Laar, 1994). The data are of interest because the 
observed yield reductions cannot be explained by damage threshold concentrations from 
developed countries: a 40% yield reduction was observed by Whalid et al. (1995), while the air 
pollution concentration was just around the damage threshold level. Wahid et al. (1995) 
showed that the maximum photosynthetic rate in leaves was reduced, and the senescence rate 
during the reproductive phase was increased for wheat plants exposed to ambient 
concentrations of air pollution. Van der Eerden & Grashoff (unpublished) analyzed the data of 
Wahid et ai (1995) with the aim to determine whether altered photosynthetic rates and 
senescence rates could explain observed yield loss. Physiological and phenological parameters 
in the model where set to values comparable to those estimated by Wahid et al. (1995). 
Furthermore, location specific weather data were used to run the model. A sensitivity analysis 
was done in which the maximum photosynthetic rate (AMAX) was reduced twice in steps of 
13%, and the reproductive phase (DVRR) was reduced twice in steps of 30%. Results of the 
analysis (Table 7-3) show that simulated yield reductions were always less than the observed 
yield loss of 40%. It is concluded that the observed yield reduction of 40% in wheat in the 
Punjab cannot be explained by altered maximum photosynthetic rates and senescence rates 
only, and that likely other unrecognized damage mechanisms are occurring simultaneously. 
Table 7-3- Effects of altered maximum photosynthetic rates (AMAX) and senescence rates (DVRR) on yield 
reduction in wheat as simulated by a SUCROS model. 
DVRR 
Unaltered 
-30% 
_ -60% 
Unaltered 
0% 
10% 
20% 
AMAX 
-13% 
7% 
20% 
27% 
-26% 
15% 
25% 
30% 
7.5. Does air pollution affect food security in developing 
countries? 
While the experimental evidence presented in the previous sections does give cause for concern 
that food production in developing countries can be severely affected by air pollution and by 
ozone in particular, it is of interest to clarify how this affects food security. Risk assessment 
studies are a first step in this direction. Secondly, socio-economic impact studies have to be 
performed. However, in doing so one has to bear in mind that systematic data on air pollution 
in crop production areas in the developing countries are missing as well as validated dose-effect 
relationships for the impact of air pollution on crop production. In this section, a few 
informative studies in the fields of risk assessment and socio-economic impacts are presented. 
A. Global risks assessment studies 
The Imperial College Centre for Environmental Technology (ICCET) recently carried out a global 
risk assessment study with the aim to identify crop production areas at high, moderate and low 
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risk of yield reduction from ozone and sulphur dioxide (Ashmore & Marshall, 1997). Global data 
on air pollution emissions were used to indicate potential pollutant concentrations. These 
concentrations were compared with crop yield loss in Europe, in order to estimate areas in 
which crop loss might occur. Fig. 7-4A shows the risk of crop loss due to ozone based on this 
approach. High-risk areas correspond to exposure that is estimated to cause a yield reduction 
above 15%. Intermediate risk areas are estimated to have a yield reduction between 5 and 15%. 
Almost all areas in developing countries that were identified as moderate or high risk 
correspond with agricultural areas. Areas of high risk are found in Northern India, China, Korea 
and Taiwan, with isolated areas elsewhere. Areas of moderate risk are found among others in 
Egypt, Malaysia, Pakistan, Mexico and Venezuela. Risk patterns in Fig. 7-4A are consistent with 
experimental observations (see Table 7.2). In addition, patterns in Fig. 7.4A for Europe and the 
USA are consistent with results of experimental and model studies. Fuhrer et al. (1997) has 
calculated that the ozone exposure corresponding to a 10% yield loss is exceeded over most 
parts of Europe. The NCLAN program (see section C) in the USA has resulted in a mean crop 
yield reduction by ambient ozone of 5%; a figure dominated by effects on cereal crops which 
occupy a large part of the agricultural production areas in the USA, and viewed as relatively 
insensitive to ozone. 
Figure 7.4A.Risk of ozone impacts on crops, based on emissions of nitrogen oxides in 1985 (after Marshall 
et al., 1997). 
Fig. 7.4B shows a projection for ozone effects on crop production for 2025. This predicts how 
yield losses are likely to increase if emissions continue at their current rate. Whilst in Western 
Europe and Northern America the risk level decreases due to reduction in emissions, the risk 
level in the developing countries is generally increasing. In India, China and South Africa most 
production areas fall in the high-risk category in 2025. Also, in Egypt, Malaysia, Bangladesh, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria and Zimbabwe large areas with moderate to high risk 
are to be expected. 
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Figure 7-4B. Risk of ozone impacts on crops, based on projected emissions of nitrogen oxides in 2025. (after 
Marshall et ai, 1997). 
B. National and local risk assessment studies 
Marshall et al. (1997) have presented two informative regional risk assessment studies on ozone 
and sulphur dioxide impacts on crops in India and Pakistan. In the studies, observed air 
pollution concentrations were used to estimate concentrations in zones up to 80 km around 
major cities in these countries. Regional-specific dose-effect relationships were then used to 
estimate yield reduction due to air pollution. For ozone, it was estimated that in 80 km zones 
around the cities of Lahore, Mumbai, Pune, Ahmedabab and Lucknow crop yields of wheat, rice 
and soybean were reduced by 12 to 40%, depending on population density and crops grown in 
the respective zones. For sulphur dioxide, it was estimated that crop yield loss in a zone of 10 
km around a thermal power plant is between 10 and 60%. 
Another type of local risk is caused by deposition of heavy metals. Although the affected area is 
generally located within 1-10 km from the source it can damage the soil quality and via root 
uptake the food production for many decades (Li & Wu, 1991). Most heavy metals have a 
negative impact on soil biology. Some of them are easily taken up by the plant (making the crop 
unsuitable for consumption, e.g. cadmium), while others are phytotoxic, and thus affect plant 
growth {e.g. zinc and nickel). 
Deposition of dust (Farmer, 1993) and fluoride (e.g. Zhang et o/., 1995) can cause crop losses on 
a local problem as well. 
C. Economic and social impact studies 
When considering economic losses the spatial scale is relevant: local emissions can result in 
serious losses for individual farmers, while it has a negligible impact on food production and 
product prices on regional or higher scales. But dependent of the of price elasticity of the crop, 
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a yield reduction caused by a regionally deposited pollutant is increasing the product price for 
the consumer, which means a partial compensation for the producer. 
Quantitative data on the economic impact of air pollution on crop production are available for a 
few situations in developed countries. Two of these studies are described hereafter because 
they are useful in understanding a possible economic impact. 
Economic damage study: Recently, the extent of crop yield reduction and economic loss caused 
by air pollution has been estimated for The Netherlands (Tonneijck et ai, 1998). The principal 
aim of the study was to determine economic benefits of pollution abatement with respect to 
crop production. Ozone is the most important pollutant in terms of crop loss in The Netherlands 
and concentrations of ozone are sufficiently high to adversely affect crop production 
throughout the country. Potato, legumes and wheat are among the ozone-sensitive crops. Crop 
losses and economic consequences have been calculated in response to various ozone exposure 
levels compared to 1992. Crop volume was expected to increase with 2.3 % when the level of 
ozone was reduced to background concentrations (circa 70 % of the level in 1992). If ozone 
decreases to background levels, producers and consumers would experience a net gain of circa 
US$ 225 million. Consumers are the primary beneficiaries from a decrease in the level of ozone. 
Results showed that producers and consumers would experience a net loss of US$ 300 million in 
a high ozone summer (ozone level is 130 % compared to 1992). 
NCLAN study: In 1980, the National Crop Loss Assessment Network (NCLAN) was set up in the 
USA to assess the economic consequences resulting from the exposure of major agricultural 
crops to the main air pollutants. Of the crop loss due to air pollution, observations have 
indicated that ozone is responsible for 90% of the whole, which amounts to 2 to 4% of the total 
crop production (Heck et ai, 1982). Calculations showed that the economic benefits from a 
reduction of ozone levels generally amounted to 1,000-3,000 million US dollars (USEPA, 1996). 
The results of various studies can vary depending on the extent of ozone reduction and the 
number of crop species used in the calculations. As for the Netherlands, all results showed that 
consumers were the primary beneficiaries from a decrease in the level of ozone. 
The social consequences of air pollution effects on crop production have not been quantified 
for developing countries. Some qualitative comments are made. Generally, a significant part of 
the population of developing countries suffers from insufficient food supply. One could say that 
any crop loss is undesirable in situations were food supply is limiting. Apart from the direct 
effect of crop losses, environmental problems are increasingly the cause of social disturbance 
and political conflicts. Currently this is obviously the case in parts of China (Goldstone, 1992; 
Smil, 1992). A better understanding of the social consequences of air pollution effects on crop 
production in developing countries is desired. 
7.6. Conclusions and recommendations 
The following conclusions can be drawn with regard to air pollution impacts on crop production 
in developing countries: 
• An increase in emissions of air pollution from megacities in the developing world is to be 
expected knowing present trends in these cities. 
• Ozone, sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides are likely to be the most important air pollutants 
in terms of crop productivity in developing countries. 
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• A variety of local adverse impacts (heavy metals, fluorides etc.) can be a threat for the 
individual farmers and consumers, and can be the cause of social unrest, but generally it has 
not a major impact on food supply on the regional scale. 
• Serious crop yield reductions due to ambient air pollution in developing countries have been 
reported. Reported reductions are as high as 40%, i.e. higher than expected on the basis of 
existing exposure-effect relationships. 
• Information on the air pollution system (sources, emissions, dispersion and transformation, 
air quality monitoring, deposition and uptake, and exposure-effect) in the developing world 
is scarce. A further assessment of the impact of air pollution on crop productivity in 
developing countries requires more information of the air pollution system. 
• Socio-economic impacts of air pollution on food security in developing countries cannot be 
quantified accurately since information is generally lacking. However, in qualitative terms 
one may conclude that air pollution puts an increasing penalty on food production in 
developing countries which definitely contributes to an uncertain food production situation, 
and possibly to social and political problems. 
To improve our knowledge on the impact of air pollution on crops in developing countries, and 
to be able to direct air pollution control strategies, the following recommendations can be 
made: 
• The use of bio-monitoring and air quality monitoring systems should be stimulated in 
developing countries. Especially biomonitoring is recommended because this technique is a 
very useful tool in assessing air pollution effects on plants, is relatively cheap, and is rather 
convincing towards politicians. It makes people aware of a problem. 
• Exposure-effect relationships should be determined for situations in developing countries. 
The focus should be on (tropical) crops grown in the vicinity of megacities. Such studies 
should also present information on the importance of modifying factors. 
• The relative importance of different air pollutants in the developing world should be 
assessed on basis of information of the developing world. 
• The studies on assessment of crop losses in developing countries should be carried out in 
the scope of other disciplines such as rural/urban planning, economy, and social sciences. 
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8.1. Introduction 
A recent study of the world food outlook (Mitchell et al., 1997) dismisses the idea that the world 
will face a Malthusian crisis in the foreseeable future. The one exception to a broadly optimistic 
picture is Africa. Africa already suffers major problems feeding itself. Africa's poor agricultural 
position reflects war, political failures, and weak performance of African economies, but also 
lack of attention to technological constraints. Mitchell and co-authors conclude that the nub of 
the world food problem wi l l remain in Africa. They arrive at this conclusion without taking the 
epidemic of HIV/AIDS into account. The purpose of this paper is to focus on whether and how 
HIV/AIDS adds significantly to the problems of agriculture and food security in Africa. The paper 
summarizes the present state of the debate about agricultural transformation in Africa and then 
asks what difference does HIV/AIDS make to the way the problem is conceived, and to the 
solutions being proposed. 
8.2. Agricultural transformation in Africa - the debate 
Africa is the world's poorest continent. It also has the fastest rate of population growth, but 
from a relatively low starting point (reflecting the demographic legacy of the slave trade and 
colonialism). As a result, land is still relatively abundant, though often of low quality. 
Historically, Africa has suffered more from labor shortage than lack of land. Agricultural 
technologies and agrarian institutions still reflect this fact (Richards, 1985). 
Science-based agricultural technology generation has by-and-large been shaped by different 
conditions; by the availability of abundant good-quality land in North America, where banks 
have never hesitated to help farmers' acquisition of advanced machinery, or abundant skilled 
family agricultural labor in Asia, where wet rice lands are well suited (as Francesca Bray has 
shown) to the care- and chemical-intensive plant innovations associated with the Green 
Revolution (Bray, 1986). 
In Africa farmers have had neither the time nor inclination to homogenize their land, for 
machines or chemical-intensive plant ideotypes (Richards, 1995). Scrambling to secure timely 
labor African farmers tended to work with the land as they found it. Time and again detailed 
study of African farming systems reveals the great skill of African agriculture as time-dependent 
1
 This paper combines material f mm my oral presentation to the DLO symposium on food security and a paper read at 
the workshop Responding to HIV/AIDS: development needs of African smallholder agriculture (SAFAIDS/ZARC/ISS/LUW 
Regional Conference for East and Southern Africa, Harare, June 8-ioth, 1998). 
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capacity for labor-economizing 'precision agriculture', in which a plethora of local crop and 
animal types are skillfully matched to soil and moisture niches opened and closed by the 
passing seasons (Richards, 1985; Brouwer & Bouma, 1997). 
Until recently, science-based agrotechnology has lacked the language to describe and 
appreciate these kinds of skills.1 The labile diversity met with on the African farm was even at 
times seen as a manifestation of some kind of mental disease - as if the African farmer was 
afflicted with the hyper-active child's inability to concentrate properly on one thing at a time 
(Richards, 1985). 
Agricultural science - based on one-at-a-time isolation of significant variables - has found it hard 
to conceive of ways of working with the huge diversity of crops and land types deployed in even 
the meanest examples of African 'subsistence' agriculture. Instead, efforts have focused on 
transferring innovation programs designed to impact widely on near-monocrop agricultures 
such as SE Asian wetland rice farming (Richards, 1986). The story is one of under-investment in 
locally-innovative agricultural research in favor of 'technology transfer' (Mitchell et al., 1997), 
often in the form of elaborate extension schemes with nothing to extend, or integrated rural 
development initiatives where the benefits go not to farmers but to a small politico-
bureaucratic elite. 
Recently, understanding of the technical issues has begun to change, and there are now 
science-based precision and eco-dynamic approaches to agricultural innovation that hold out 
considerable hope for African agriculture (Brouwer & Bouma, 1997). But meanwhile Africa 
struggles with an inappropriate institutional legacy. This includes an underfunded and 
demoralized scientific research community trained primarily to support adaptive modification of 
Asian-style Green Revolution initiatives, bureaucrats dreaming of the return of McNamara-style 
World Bank Integrated Rural Development schemes, and an action-oriented non-governmental 
sector unsympathetic to the long lead-times associated with true problem-solving research. 
Meanwhile, aware that among poor consumers (where food accounts for 50-70% of household 
expenditure) food and politics are inseparable (Richards, 1996a), the political classes in Africa, 
seek popularity in a democratic age through consumer subsidies that ultimately undermine 
prospects for long-term transformation in their own agricultural sectors. If local-funded food 
subsidies for the urban poor and party faithful are insufficient some countries are not above 
manipulating drought or civil conflict to gain access to international relief. Controversially, de 
Waal (1997) has charged that the 'humanitarian international' is willingly complicit in this 
manifest manipulation of democratic politics in Africa. 
The debate about agricultural transformation in Africa has paid less attention to some 
demographic issues with great bearing on the HIV/AIDS crisis. Current high rates of population 
growth imply very high percentages of dependent young people. Sociologically, one might 
speak of a crisis of youth (or a deficit of parental support). In Europe and North America the 
economically active age cohort (the mainstay of dependent youth) is over 50% of the total 
population, and over 40% in India in China; in Africa the equivalent figure (for the age range 25-
64) drops to 30%. Dependent youth in Africa are further disadvantaged by the 'structurally 
adjusted' state cutting back on education and public-sector employment. More and more 
1
 In an important new comparative historical analysis Scott (1998) puts the point somewhat differently; in his analysis 
science and technology became servants to the political project of high modernity in which a tiny political 'vanguard' 
saw itself as bettering the human race through imposing regularity upon the environment and landscape. 
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children find themselves 'on the street', without education or family support (Richards, 1996a). 
HIV/AIDS only worsens this already difficult situation. 
There are two implications, to be developed below. Social innovation wil l be needed to deal 
with the potential threat of increased alienation and social exclusion of rural youth as the 
HIV/AIDS crisis deepens. Second, ways wil l have to be found to re-focus the current debate 
about appropriate technologies for African agriculture on the needs of these potentially 
excluded young people. 
8.3. HIV/AIDS as a problem in African agriculture 
The link between ill health and under-performance in African agriculture is well established. I 
give two brief examples. 
River Blindness {onchocerciasis) handicaps entire communities in West Africa, and over several 
generations empties otherwise fertile river valleys. The World Bank supported Onchocerciasis 
Control Program, spraying against the Black Fly vector, and parasite control in humans using the 
drug Ivermectin, has successfully opened thousands of square kilometers of River Blindness 
blighted terrain to agricultural resettlement. 
Less dramatically, Richards (1986) shows that even minor health problems - sprains and cuts 
sustained in farming, for example - can have significant 'knock-on' effects if a member of a 
tightly-coordinated household labor group is incapacitated at any of a number of key points in 
the upland rice farming cultivation cycle in central Sierra Leone. If a man misses part of the 
planting ('ploughing') season or a woman is incapacitated during the weeding season 
consequences ramify throughout the rest of the farming cycle. Keeping the annual farm 
performance together despite such vicissitudes is a major preoccupation of upland rice farming 
households. A number of complementary planting, weeding and harvesting strategies 
(including planting topographic sequences with a range of niche-adapted rice types of varying 
durations) are deployed to minimize knock-on effects. Coping through labor sharing 
arrangements is also important. Labor cooperatives provide some degree of insurance against 
accidents and ill health (Richards, 1986).1 
As Barnett et al. (1995) make clear, farming systems vary in their vulnerability to the challenge 
of HIV/AIDS. 
Comparing West African grain systems (Richards, 1986; Hill, 1982; Watts, 1984) with eastern 
African banana/maize/root crop farming systems of the type found in rural regions with high 
levels of HIV seropositivity in NW Tanzania and southern Uganda (Barnett & Blaikie, 1992; 
Barnett et al., 1995; Rugalema, 1998) it is clear that the east African systems are located towards 
the less sensitive end of the spectrum. Rugalema (1998) shows that although much labor that 
would otherwise be devoted to farm work is diverted into nursing an adult household member 
with AIDS-related sickness crop schedules are quite flexible, suggesting that food yield wil l 
remain more or less proportionate to effort invested. 
1
 However, it should be noted that labour cooperation arrangements only provide insurance against sickness where 
hazards are distributed randomly and are followed by full recovery; farmers with above average levels of illness or 
permanent disability are excluded. 
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In highly sequence-dependent West African grain farming systems failure to complete key 
operations within the very narrow time 'window' available risks farm failure, and squandering 
all the labor invested earlier in the cycle. If HIV/AIDS begins to affect the kind of upland rice 
farming systems described by Richards (1986) it is possible that afflicted households wil l 
abandon upland rice production altogether in favor of small survival patches of 'garden' and 
dry-season wetland crops such as sweet potatoes. 
Rugalema (1998) concludes that even in the relatively favorable agronomic conditions of 
Bukoba District (Tanzania) there is no coping with HIV/AIDS. The point about HIV/AIDS is that it 
attacks the mainstays of the household agricultural production system, and that there is no 
recovery. During the typical two years or so of AIDS-related sickness preceding death household 
food production drops sharply as large amounts of labor time are devoted to nursing the 
sufferer and to the search for health. Recovery of the household group from the death of an 
HIV/AIDS victim is hampered by the high levels of asset disposal involved in this ultimately futile 
search for health. There is also the strong possibility that the partner of the AIDS victim wil l also 
fall sick and die, pushing the survivors through a second cycle of labor diversion and asset 
disposal. 
Rugalema (1998) shows that although it is possible at this stage that survivors wil l be absorbed 
into related household groups as widows and orphans definite categories of post-HIV/AIDS 
household are beginning to emerge in Bukoba District (i.e. households comprising children and 
elderly women, say, or outright 'orphan headed' households). The sociology of these 
unprecedented household groups remains to be more fully understood. Rugalema (1998) 
suggests that the normal pattern of absorbing orphans into related households is beginning to 
break down under the impact of so many HIV/AIDS related deaths, but it is also clear, locally, 
that lineage groups see land inheritance advantages in keeping orphans on the land to which 
they are entitled. Some of these orphan-headed households appear to be under some degree of 
supervision by the wider extended family. 
8.4. HIV/AIDS is not like other crises 
De Waal (1989) has argued that outsiders - humanitarian agencies, in particular - have 
misunderstood drought-famine crises in Africa. In local understanding famine is a period of 
hunger to be endured, even at some individual cost, and not an apocalyptic disaster threatening 
to end an entire way of life. That some people wil l die is accepted, and set against the wider 
understanding that the community wi l l recover. Not all regions or households are affected 
equally. Communities with greater wealth differentiation sometimes do better in drought-
famine recovery than more egalitarian communities - since the resources of the strong can be 
tapped to help the weak (cf. Richards, 1986). 
HIV/AIDS is significantly different. The greatest impact is not felt by the weak. HIV/AIDS, in a 
sense, 'selects' for the strong - for the professional classes, for remittance earners and those in 
the best position to act as patrons to the young, for household breadwinners. This is a reflection 
of the strong connection between mobility and wealth generation in African society. HIV/AIDS 
is, in effect, a network disease, especially associated with urban nodes and major transport 
arteries. 
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Differentially attacking the wealthier more mobile stratum in rural society HIV/AIDS more 
rapidly depletes scarce reserves of rural capital. Households may economize on marginal 
members' search for health. But with HIV/AIDS it is often the male household head, with direct 
authority over asset disposal, who is sick. Relatively, no expense is spared to protect central 
breadwinners, even though in the end the search for health proves futile. 
The depleted household must begin the struggle for post-AIDS survival with the cattle and other 
assets gone. Only the land remains. Rugalema (1998) reports that family opposition to land 
sales remains a healthy 'survival instinct' in areas of customary tenure, but it is an issue of 
concern what wi l l happen to land in areas where tenure has been modernized. 
The reduction to poverty of households otherwise among the wealthier segment of rural society 
has a number of agrarian consequences of potential general significance: 
• it adds to the growing pool of free-floating young people without protection and 
sponsorship; 
• it depletes scarce but essential pockets of rural capital formation that might otherwise have 
been directed towards various agro-technical improvements; 
• it undermines the position of 'pillar' households who might otherwise have contributed to 
the kind of spontaneous recovery seen in the case of drought-famine disaster. 
The general impact of HIV/AIDS is more akin to the wealth-corroding impact of war on rural 
society (Richards, 1996a), with the exception that war can be ended. HIV/AIDS seems sure to 
intensify in rural Africa over the foreseeable future. 
8.5. HIV/AIDS and agrarian issues 
This section wil l briefly discuss likely socio-cultural and political responses to the challenge 
posed by HIV/AIDS to African agrarian development. 
The first point is to reiterate that asset disposal may extend to land if land tenure reform is 
pursued aggressively in rural regions at high risk of HIV/AIDS, with the consequence that 
household survivors may join the swelling ranks of a landless class, a phenomenon hitherto 
largely unknown in Africa. This implication deserves very careful precautionary consideration in 
policymaking debate at all levels (local, national and international). 
Second, as the HIV/AIDS crisis matures, and people become more aware that AIDS-related 
sickness is irreversible, we may expect some cultural response directed towards the protection 
of collective, societal interest. 
Anthropologists have long stressed that Western individualism is no natural condition but the 
complex outcome of a long process of cultural and political construction. From the neo-
Durkheimian perspective of, for instance, Mary Douglas and others, there is no inevitable 
evolution of institutional cultures in the direction of individualism (Douglas, 1987). 
From such a theoretical standpoint it is perfectly possible to anticipate that African communities 
wil l respond to the challenge of HIV/AIDS by developing new, or re-emphasizing older, modes 
of collective accountability embedded within local and informal institutions. This possibility is 
already explicit in Rugalema's (1998) findings concerning supervised orphan-headed households 
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and the deep instinct to protect 'traditional' land entitlements from the AIDS-mortality asset 
disposal process. Not only may rural communities in Africa 'resist' ill-thought-out 
modernizations of agrarian institutions, but they may engage in a counter-creativity of their 
own based on elaboration of various 'collective' moralities. 
Some of these may be rather negative in tone {e.g. renewed outbursts of witch-finding frenzy). 
Others, conceivably, may be socially progressive. The extent to which AIDS-sickness asset 
disposal is a wasteful dissipation of hard-won capital resources in expensive journeying back 
and forth for ultimately useless hospital treatment is already recognized in many communities, 
and local therapy enjoys a new lease of life and legitimacy. Some AIDS-afflicted heads of 
household may opt for parsimony of treatment, preferring to keep together the family asset 
base for the benefit of survivors. Whether such action becomes a social trend might depend on 
the degree of local commitment to respect for ancestors and concepts of ancestral blessing, still 
very strong in many parts of rural Africa {cf. Richards, 1996b). 
Some indication of possible developments may be found in the medical anthropological 
literature covering the francophone central equatorial African zone. This is a region of fertility 
crisis and community extinction (Patterson, 1975) brought about by colonial concession 
company labor exploitation and the associated spread of venereal disease, and the literature of 
the region provides the best 'model' for thinking about social responses to HIV/AIDS. Here the 
idea of community involvement in sexual morality and management of disease is well 
established. Disastrous asset disposals may be stemmed by greater collective involvement of the 
extended family in disease management decision making and through the formation of new 
self-help therapeutic communities, perhaps drawing upon a stock of knowledge and experience 
from these earlier crises. 
Now we turn to possible political responses at national level. The HIV/AIDS crisis in rural Africa 
will increase the numbers of dysfunctional, food-insecure, remnant households, and there will 
be a corresponding rise in numbers of young 'orphans', 'street children', 'educational drop-outs' 
and other categories of social excludees associated with family failure (cf. Richards, 1996a). The 
graph rises because of demographic pressure and economic failure, and household dissolution 
as a result of HIV/AIDS can only steepen the trend. It is one of the biggest challenges faced by 
African governments today. 
Two highly problematic political responses to deal with these problems have emerged. The first 
is the tendency for African governments to institutionalize a begging bowl mentality to 
subsidize the feeding of political dependents, including the urban poor. Food aid even in 
famine conditions further undermines local agricultural capacity. De Waal (1997) argues that 
the unholy alliance between humanitarian agencies and neo-patrimonial African regimes is as 
unhealthy for democracy and human rights as it is for agricultural development. But it seems 
entirely likely that the HIV/AIDS crisis wil l be used to put additional pressure on donor 
organizations to 'feed the poor', and that African regimes wil l continue to build political 
legitimacy from their efforts to 'manage' these externally-funded resource flows. 
The second trend is even more worrying. Unruly, foot-loose youth are recognized as a growing 
political 'problem' in many African countries. Increasingly, these alienated youths form their 
own political organizations, well beyond the boundaries of 'constitutional' politics or 
'democratic' parties (Richards, 1998). Increasingly, they are stigmatized as 'drop-outs', 'vermin', 
'drug addicts', 'bandits' and subject to draconian control measures. 
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Klein (1998) analyses the preoccupation of General Abacha in Nigeria with drug control as a way 
of building international support for his regime at the same time as putting down potential 
challenges from dissident youth movements such as the Delta separatist movement (MOSSOP) 
led by the late Ken Saro-Wiwa. The Kabbah regime in Sierra Leone uses similar language and 
tactics (not to mention troops supplied by Abacha) to deal with the threat of the dope-smoking 
jungle dropouts of the Revolutionary United Front (Richards, 1998). 
But the more violent pressure is put on these shadowy movements the more determined they 
become, and a rallying point for increasing numbers of young people without jobs and 
educational prospects (Richards, 1998). There seems some prospect that young people spun off 
from HIV/AIDS-dissolved households might be drawn into such movements as they spread 
across Africa in response to the gathering youth crisis. Escalating violence against wild young 
radicals, sequestered in remote and marginal terrain, provides fertile grounds for the further 
spread of the rural HIV/AIDS epidemic. There is urgent need for far-reaching policy debate about 
this rampant youth crisis and on more constructive ways to respond to it than to copy Latin 
American right-wing vigilante death squads waging 'war' on hordes of street children. 
8.6. HIV/AIDS and agro-technological development 
Not before time, debate about agro-technical change in Africa has turned towards 'smart' 
(knowledge-intensive, labor and capital-economizing) solutions. 
It is not currently economic to import fertilizer far inland for large-scale use on very low-fertility 
readily leached Sahelian soils under variable and marginal rainfall conditions. Perhaps for 
centuries farmers have taken careful note of micro-variations in soil type and elevation at field 
level, carefully matching these with seed types that perform well in drier or wetter conditions, 
and relying on a compensatory spread of results, depending on whether the year is drier or 
wetter than average (Brouwer & Bouma, 1997). Remote sensing and careful mapping with geo-
positioning devices can sometimes expand the scope of these local adaptive measures and 
allow for the most effective precision use of whatever small amounts of fertilizer or manure are 
available for soil improvement. 
In analogously 'smart' manner, participatory plant breeding programs (Eyzaguirre & Iwanaga, 
1996) can overcome plant genetic bottlenecks to further adaptive experimentation by farmers at 
local level (one of the major results of the spread of a limited number of modern varieties into 
African agriculture during the Green Revolution may have been the enhancement of the genetic 
potential of local land races, by outcrossing with introduced varieties, so releasing potential for 
a further round of local adaptation, cf. Dennis, 1987). Some breeders now advocate crossing and 
selection strategies intended deliberately to support such trends. Others screen and select for 
the kinds of labor-management problems met with by poor farmers with uncertain labor supply 
(for durable pest resistance and weed competitiveness, rather than yield potential under ideal 
management conditions). Yet others are prepared to work on the myriad little-known crops that 
farmers in Africa make use of to supplement diet or to provide back-up in emergency. 
A recent documentary project (Vietmeyer, 1996) uncovered evidence of more than 200 African 
food-crop plants little known to science. Africa has more indigenous domesticated grain crops 
than any other region in the world, yet it is normally represented as a 'blank' on maps of food 
crop domestication and biodiversity. The first task is to create a knowledge base and collect 
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genetic resource. Then ways have to be found of applying scientific improvement to some of 
the more important of these potentially useful semi-domesticated or little known species. 
Such a research focus is likely to be of direct potential benefit to HIV/AIDS afflicted households 
struggling to secure a basic basket of food with greatly reduced labor input. In the West African 
rice region, for example, farmers short of labor increasingly plant the little-known but locally-
important grain Digitaria exilis ('hungry rice'), since it yields a crop in sometimes as little as sixty 
days on land too poor and weed-affected to sustain a crop of rice. To minimize weed 
competition on poor land farmers have similarly reverted to using African rice varieties (Oryza 
glaberrima) once thought to be approaching extinction (Richards, 1996b). Farmer selection on 
natural crosses between African and Asian rice have put into circulation a number of new hardy 
but higher-yielding hybrid types. Textbooks used to report that such crosses were impossible 
(Richards & Ruivenkamp, 1997). But art now imitates nature and farmer agency, and the West 
African Rice development Association has recently made available several African x Asian Rice 
crosses of great potential interest to war-affected farmers in Sierra Leone and Liberia because of 
their earliness combined with labor-saving hardiness. 
Developments of this sort are likely to be of potential benefits to households adapting to labor 
losses as a result of HIV/AIDS. In Bukoba District Rugalema (1998) reports 'downshifting' of 
HIV/AIDS households away from banana and cash crops towards sweet potato and cassava, 
because of their greater hardiness and tolerance of some degree of neglect (cf. Fresco, 1986). 
Sweet potato was once something of an 'orphan' crop in international research, but recognizing 
its global importance to poor, food-insecure, households, CIP-supported research by the 
UPWARD participatory research network in SE Asia has made considerable strides in 
understanding and releasing local bottlenecks associated with its cultivation by poor 
households under stressed circumstances (UPWARD, 1997). 
Spreading the UPWARD approach to root and tuber research in HIV/AIDS affected rural districts 
of eastern and central Africa seems an obvious starting point for applied research intended to 
strengthen local food security. 
It seems clear that African food security more generally, and the food security of HIV/AIDS 
afflicted households, in particular, wil l be better enhanced by adoption of the 'smart' emphasis 
in agro-technical research. The biggest obstacle to the further development of the 'smart' 
approach, undoubtedly, wil l be institutional problems resulting from the historical 'bias' of 
African research towards Green Revolution and other kinds of top-down and generalized 
solutions to technical improvement of African agriculture, compounded by the relative neglect 
of research in favor of extension and money-spinning integrated rural development. External 
donor support wil l be needed to revive the research sector and set a new course. But donor 
support for some years has favored NGO assistance at the expense of government-based 
activity, and NGOs have a general bias against long-term agro-technical research. 
But other kinds of initiative are needed as well. Steps must be taken to address the youth crisis. 
If there were attractive options for rural youth some of the problem of urban dropout street 
children and outlaw criminal-political youth militias would be dealt with at source. It seems 
especially important to address the needs of HIV/AIDS orphans. Major reassessment of 
vocational education is needed, with an emphasis on rural income-generation opportunities 
and self-employment. Rugalema (1998) encountered HIV/AIDS orphans trying to develop market 
gardening opportunities. Cash flow for them was as important as food security. Such efforts wi l l 
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need to be supported by specific business skills training, credit supply and agro-technical 
research activity. The training and institutional support steps required may not be dissimilar to 
those proposed for dealing with the rehabilitation and social reintegration of under-age militia 
combatants in Africa's civil wars (Richards ef a/., 1997), many of whom first became fighters 
because family support networks were destroyed by war (Peters & Richards, 1998a, 1998b). 
8.7. Conclusion 
It general, it wil l be noted that the impact of HIV/AIDS on rural households intensifies a number 
of already apparent adverse trends in African agriculture and agrarian development - notably 
shortage of labor and capital, lack of suitable agro-technical research, and the inability of 
African agriculture to attract and retain large numbers of young people with weak networks of 
family support. It follows that addressing these trends - through, for example, an emphasis on 
'smart' innovation, or programs aimed at providing skills and start-up capital for socially 
excluded youth, wil l be good for HIV/AIDS management. HIV/AIDS underlines the need for agro-
technical alternatives to the Green Revolution, for example, and this wil l require major 
institutional reform of agricultural research capacity. Within the framework of programs 
conceived with a broader remit than HIV/AIDS relief alone it is possible to envisage particular 
applications - e.g. research emphasis on food crops with low labor requirements and 
programming constraints, or start-up training for HIV/AIDS orphans - directed at amelioration of 
specific HIV/AIDS difficulties. In terms of agrarian issues it is important to recognize that 
HIV/AIDS is different from other kinds of crisis, where risks are spread more randomly, or where 
the weakest and most marginal members of society are the most likely to be affected, and 
where recovery is spontaneous. There is no recovery from the HIV/AIDS crisis, and it selects 
some of the strongest households. Possibly this wil l provoke a crisis of local community values 
and political self-confidence. Meanwhile, ill-thought-out and top-down modernization of 
agrarian institutions must be resisted in favor of support for long-term 'grass-roots' cultural and 
ethical innovation. Agencies might best assist HIV/AIDS affected rural communities by helping 
hold open suitable spaces for social agents to develop and enlarge their community perspective 
on agrarian aspects of the HIV/AIDS crisis, while carefully monitoring asset disposal, especially if 
and where this involves disposal of household or family land rights. 
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9. Soil degradation: a threat to food security? 
LR. Oldeman 
International Soil Reference and Information Centre (ISRIC), P.O. Box 353, 
NL-6700 AJ Wageningen, The Netherlands 
9.1. Introduction 
The soil is a very complex medium which displays a great diversity in physical appearance, in 
chemical processes, and in the flora and fauna present (bio-diversity). 
The role of the soil is of vital importance to mankind and the maintenance of a healthy natural 
environment. The soil is a natural resource, which is not renewable in the short term and very 
expensive either to reclaim or to improve once it is eroded by water or wind, physically 
degraded or chemically depleted. It is our common duty to maintain this precious resource for 
the future, while at the same time to obtain the best benefit from its use now (Stoops & 
Cheverry, 1992). 
One of the most intensively debated issues in projections on directions that agricultural policies 
should take over the next 25 years is the extent of land degradation and its effect on food 
production. While many argue that land degradation is a potential threat to global food 
production ("Arguments about the severity of global land and soil degradation, and the crises 
which humans are facing as a result of the shrinking productive natural resource base are 
convincing", Hurni, 1996) there are others who indicate that land degradation is over-estimated 
and relatively unimportant to global food production (Crosson, 1994). 
There is a wealth of scientific literature, workshop proceedings and policy statements (e.g. 
Serageldin, 1995; Pinstrup-Andersen, 1995; Saouma, 1994) that link rapidly increasing world 
population, stagnant aggregate cereal output and the extent of soil degradation worldwide. 
These are central themes on the international and national agendas of policy-makers, decision-
makers and agricultural research organizations. 
The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) initiated in 1994 an initiative for "A 2020 
Vision for Food, Agriculture and the Environment". This initiative aimed to develop a shared 
vision and a consensus for action on how to meet future world food needs while reducing 
poverty and protecting the environment. It grew out of a concern that the international 
community is setting priorities for addressing these problems based on incomplete information 
(IFPRI, 1995). 
Each year global population increases by some 80 million people. The world population is 
estimated to rise to a total of 8.2 billion people by the year 2020. Cereal deficits in developing 
countries are projected to increase from 78 million metric tons in 1988 to 244 million tons in 
2020 even under the most optimistic scenario, that food production wil l continue to grow at the 
same pace as it has since 1988 to the present, and that current levels of investment in 
agriculture by governments will be maintained (IFPRI, 1994). 
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In the past the demand for more food by increasing population was partly satisfied by opening 
up new land for agriculture and partly by intensified management of the land to obtain higher 
yields per unit land. Although world cereal production almost doubled between 1966 and 1990, 
the growth in aggregate cereal output started to decline after 1982, mainly as a result of a 
decline in quality and performance of irrigation systems, an inefficient use of fertilizers, a 
negative nutrient balance in most non-irrigated drylands in developing countries, increased 
losses from pests and diseases, and a deterioration of commodity prices, leading to reduced 
incentives to invest. 
In much of Africa and also in most non-irrigated drylands in Asia and Latin America the 
"mining" of soil nutrients, often induced by poor socio-economic conditions, are pushing 
average yields into decline (Paarlberg, 1994). In response, farmers are trying to produce more 
food by extending their traditional low-input practices into forestland, or onto drier and more 
fragile pasturelands, or by shortening fallow-periods. As a consequence, fertile topsoil is 
washed away by the erosive forces of water, or blown away by wind. This so-called first 
generation of environmental problems leads not only to a negative nutrient balance, but also 
causes habitat destruction and loss of bio-diversity. Alternatively, it may also lead to positive off-
site effects in e.g. valleys. 
In OECD countries agricultural policies were guided by advances in sciences and technologies, 
focusing almost exclusively on production and financial efficiency (Dumanski & Smyth, 1993). As 
a result fewer farmers are producing more food on less land. However, excessive use of 
fertilizers and pesticides, and inadequate nutrient and animal waste containment has resulted 
in pollution of soil and water resources. This second generation of environmental problems not 
only caused a health hazard for increasing human and animal populations, but also lead to loss 
of bio-diversity and contamination of surface waters, including coastal waters and lakes. 
In some of the economically more advanced developing countries, poorly managed yet high-
input farming practices have also caused this so-called second generation of environmental 
problems. Excessive use of water in irrigated areas in the semi-arid and arid regions has led to 
waterlogging and secondary salinization. Acidification by atmospheric deposition of sulfide 
from coal mining industries is another form of land degradation, which may trigger a whole 
range of pollution processes. 
9.2. The status of soil degradation 
9.2.1. The GLASOD Project 
Although soil degradation is generally recognized as a serious and widespread problem, its 
geographical distribution and total areas affected was only roughly known. Dregne (1986) 
stated that sweeping statements on the fact that soil erosion is undermining the future 
prosperity of mankind do not help planners who need to know where the problem is serious 
and where it is not. 
Recognizing the need to obtain a better overview of the geographical distribution and the 
seriousness of human-induced soil degradation, the United Nations Environment Program 
(UNEP) commissioned the International Soil Reference and Information Centre (ISRIC), in 1988 to 
coordinate a worldwide program in cooperation with a large number of soil scientists 
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throughout the wor ld to produce, on the basis of incomplete existing knowledge, a scientifically 
credible global assessment of the status of human-induced soil degradation w i th in the shortest 
possible t ime frame. This global study (GLASOD) was published as a wor ld map at an average 
scale of 1:10 mil l ion and was complemented w i th statistics on the global and continental extent 
of the various types of soil degradation — water and wind erosion, chemical degradation and 
physical degradation — t h e i r degree and causative factors. GLASOD aroused wor ldwide interest 
and the results (Oldeman et ai, 1991,1994a, b) have been widely cited in many policy papers 
(Scherr & Yadav, 1996; FAO, 1993,1996) and reviewed in several scientific journals (Thomas, 
1993; Young, 1993). Annex 1 il lustrates some results of the GLASOD study. 
While there is wide-spread evidence that soil losses resulting f rom erosion are far in excess of 
the natural rate of soil format ion, the impact of such losses on crop yields or production has not 
been well-established in physical or economic terms, al though there have been many attempts 
to do so (FAO, 1993). 
Hurni (1996) states that science faces the challenge of assessing the impact of soil erosion by 
water and w ind . To what extent is soil productivity affected? Economic estimates only focusing 
on product ion can be misleading because the underlying problem of soil degradation, its long-
term irreversible consequences on soil productivity and the urgent need for action are under-
estimated. 
Crosson (1996) calculated the on-farm economic costs of soil erosion on a global level. Using 
data derived f rom GLASOD on l ightly, moderately, and strongly degraded land in crops and 
permanent pastures and assuming percentage losses of productivity for each degradation 
category (5%, 18%, 50% respectively) he arrived at an average productivity loss on the tota l area 
of land in crops and permanent pastures of 4.8%. Even if higher loss percentages (15%, 35%, 
75%) were used, the average wor ldw ide productivity loss wou ld not be higher than 8.9%. Using 
Crosson's approach, we separated cropland f rom permanent pastures and calculated these 
losses per continent. For Africa productivity losses on cropland wou ld be 25% and for Central 
America even as high as 36.8% (see Table 9.1). 
Table 9.1. Average percentage cumulative loss of productivity during post-second world war period as a 
result of human-induced soil degradation, worldwide and per continent. Loss is calculated by 
assignment of percentage productivity loss for the three degradation categories and the 
occurrence of degradation. 
Crop land Pasture land Crops and (Crops and 
Pastures Pastures) 
Percentage loss per degradation category 15, 35, 75 5,18, 50 5,18, 50 15, 35,75 
(light, moderate, strong) 
World 12.7 3.8 4.8 8.9 
Africa 25.O 6.6 8.1 14.2 
Asia 12.8 3.6 4.7 8.9 
S. America 13.9 2.2 4.1 6.7 
C. America 36.8 3.3 8.7 14.5 
N.America 8.8 1.8 3.0 5.8 
Europe 7.9 5.6 4.6 9.0 
Oceania 3.2 1.1 1.2 3-2 
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Crosson (1997) concludes that nothing we could feasibly do to deal wi th degradation is going 
to contribute much to meeting future global demands for food! However, one may assume 
that if we do not deal wi th the causes of soil degradation, the areas now slightly degraded 
may become moderately degraded, areas now moderately degraded may become strongly 
degraded, while areas now strongly degraded may go out of production leading to higher, 
yield loss percentages. 
There is an urgent need to better characterise the status of human-induced soil degradation 
and to prepare more detailed regional assessments, based on country-based inventories. The 
World Resources Institute, which assembled many of the GLASOD results in its World 
Resources Report 1992-1993 (WRI, 1992), indicated the critical need for further study to more 
accurately portray soil degradation problems at the national and local level. 
9.2.2. The ASSOD Project 
At FAO's 21st Regional Conference for Asia and the Pacific (New Delhi, 1992) it was 
recommended that FAO should find means to strengthen the collection and analysis on land 
degradation data in the Asian Pacific region. FAO's Asian Network of Problem Soils convened an 
expert consultation in 1993 (RAPA, 1994). This consultation, composed of 15 member countries 
in the region, recommended to prepare an Assessment of the Status of Human-induced Soil 
Degradation in South and Southeast Asia (ASSOD) at a scale of 1:5 million, based on refined and 
modified GLASOD methodology and using as a working template a physiographic map and 
database to be constructed along the lines of the internationally endorsed Soils and Terrain 
Digital Database (SOTER) approach (see also 9.4). UNEP commissioned the responsibility to 
coordinate and implement this study to ISRIC. The study was carried out in close coopération 
with national resources institutions in the region (Van Lynden & Oldeman, 1997)-
In 9.3 we wil l discuss the methodology followed in the Asian soil degradation study to relate in 
a qualitative approach the impact of human-induced soil degradation to the crop productivity, 
taking into account different management levels. 
The qualitative approach used does not however give an indication on the future risks of soil 
degradation under certain management scenarios. In order to establish such a risk assessment 
using existing modeling techniques, it is essential to know the geographically referenced 
attributes of soil and terrain, of climatic parameters and information on land use. This 
information can be stored in a GIS-linked database. In 9-3 we wil l briefly discuss procedures to 
assess the impact of water erosion risk on food productivity using the internationally endorsed 
SOTER methodology (9.4). 
93. The status of soil degradation and its impact on food 
productivity 
Soil degradation was defined in GLASOD and ASSOD as a process that describes human-induced 
phenomena which lower the current and/or future capacity of the soil to support human life 
(Oldeman, 1988). These studies did not intend to indicate and delineate the instantaneous 
present and future rate of degradation processes and the potential hazards that may occur 
under human influence. They describe and delineate situations where the balance between 
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climate aggressivity and the potential resistance of the land has been broken by human 
interventions. 
In the GLASOD approach the degree to which the soil is degraded to its present status was 
related in a qualitative manner to the agricultural suitability of the soil, to its declined 
productivity, to its possibilities for restoration to full productivity and in relation to its original 
biotic functions. A light degree for example indicated that the soil had a somewhat reduced 
agricultural suitability, but was considered suitable in local farming systems. Restoration to full 
productivity was considered possible by slight adjustment of its land management. A moderate 
degree of degradation status was defined as a status of the soil with a greatly reduced 
productivity, but still suitable for use in local farming system. Major improvements were 
required to restore the soil to its original productive potential. A strong degree of degradation 
reflected a status of the soil, which had virtually lost its productive capacity. Major investments 
would be needed to rehabilitate the soil, often beyond the means of national governments in 
most developing countries. An extreme degree of soil degradation indicated that the soil was 
unreclaimable. 
The GLASOD study (Oldeman et o/., 1991) revealed that 38% (or 749 million hectares) of the area 
affected by human-induced soil degradation was lightly degraded, 46% (or 910 million hectares) 
was moderately degraded, 15% (296 million hectares) was strongly degraded, while 93 million 
hectares (less than 1%) was extremely degraded on a world-wide basis. 
Although the definitions used in the GLASOD approach were appropriate for the scale it was 
intended for, the severity of the soil degradation problem was not related to the management 
level. Crosson (1994) pointed out that according to GLASOD most of the mapping units in 6 
states of the U.S.A. are moderately degraded, implying that the land suffered a greatly reduced 
agricultural productivity. However, in that region yields of the principle crops have been rising 
steadily over the last 40 years. Because of this apparent inconsistency with reality and being 
"unable to investigate whether there may be similar anomalies in other regions of the world 
between actual yield experience and severity of soil degradation", he concluded that real land 
degradation problems lie in the strongly or extremely degraded area. 
Although Crosson's conclusions from the U.S.A. may be correct, he fails to recognize that the 
high level of management in the U.S.A. is not generally practiced in many of the developing 
countries. The GLASOD map indicates that worldwide about 45% of the degraded land is 
moderately degraded. If degradation of this non-renewable resource continues unabated for 
the next 25 years or so, these moderately degraded lands may become strongly degraded. The 
map therefore can strengthen the awareness of global policy-makers on the dangers of 
inappropriate land and soil management, which was the prime objective. It should however be 
recognized that GLASOD is indeed based on informed opinion and not on quantitative 
measures. 
In the Assessment of the Status of Human-induced Soil Degradation in South and Southeast Asia 
(ASSOD), more emphasis was placed on the apparent impact of soil degradation on food 
productivity. Changes in soil and terrain properties such as loss of topsoil, development of rills 
and gullies, loss of nutrients, may reflect the occurrence and intensity of the process of soil 
degradation, but not necessarily the seriousness of its impact on food productivity. The removal 
of a 5 cm layer of topsoil may have a severe impact on a shallow soil with thin topsoil, but may 
not directly affect the productivity on a deep fertile soil. It would therefore be much better to 
use as criterion for soil degradation impact the relative changes of soil characteristics: the 
n o FOOD SECURITY AT DIFFERENT SCALES: ISSUES, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
percentage of the total topsoil lost, the percentage of total nutrients and organic matter lost; 
the relative decrease in soil moisture holding capacity, the relative increase of the salinity of the 
soil, etc. It is obvious that this type of information only exists in experimental plots and micro-
catchment study areas, while precise information for a region is lacking. 
A significant complication in assessing productivity losses as a result of soil degradation 
processes is the variety of reasons that may lead to yield decline. Yield decline may be caused by 
a wide range of factors, such as erosion, fertility decline, improper management, drought or 
waterlogging, quality and quantity of inputs (like seeds, fertilizers), pests and diseases, and 
adverse weather conditions. It is therefore important to consider a medium or long-time period 
—10 to 15 years — to level out aberrations resulting from fluctuations in weather patterns or 
pest and disease occurrences. 
The assessment of yield reductions as a result of soil degradation is also complicated by the fact 
that over time farmers may apply increasing amounts of fertilizers both to substitute nutrients 
lost by topsoil erosion and to further enhance the natural fertility of the soil. They may improve 
tillage practices to improve the soil structure when compacted by heavy machinery, and grow 
improved varieties. Despite these ameliorating management practices, studies in the U.S.A. have 
shown a relationship between soil erosion and reduced yields on many soils (Batie, 1983). 
Despite technological innovations to improve the productivity of the soil the average rate of 
change in total productivity increases has declined from 2.2% annually during the 1950-1965 
period to 1.8% annually during the 1965-1979 period in the U.S.A. Since soil degradation can be 
more or less hidden by the effects of various management practices, productivity changes 
should be assessed in relation to the amounts of inputs or level of management. 
In ASSOD, the impact of human-induced soil degradation on productivity is therefore assessed 
in relation to the level of management. Five classes of soil degradation impact were defined 
(negligible, light, moderate, strong and extreme). The changes in productivity, ranging from a 
large increase, small increase, no increase, small decrease, large decrease, unproductive, are 
expressed in relative terms: the current average productivity compared to the average 
productivity in the non-degraded situation, or the inferred change in productivity over the last 
10-15 years. 
In summary, one can say that the degree of degradation reflects the intensity of the degrada-
tion process itself, whereas the impact considers the effect of that process. In areas with deep 
fertile soils the degree of soil erosion may be quite high, but the impact may only be light or 
even negligible. Note that negligible is thus not necessarily synonymous with "stable" land, 
which implies no degradation process. Table 9-2 shows how the impact of soil degradation on 
productivity is related to the changes in productivity and the management level. 
If one indicates a small increase in productivity under a high level of management we may 
conclude that management improvements partly benefited yields and were partly needed to 
compensate the impact of degradation. Therefore the impact is light. If we find a small decrease 
in productivity under a high level of management, we may conclude that the management 
measures could not or only partly compensate the impact of soil degradation. Therefore the 
impact is strong. If a small decrease in productivity occurs under a medium level of 
management, we can say that the degradation impact was insufficiently compensated by 
improvement measures. The impact is moderate. 
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Table 9-2. Impact of human-induced soil degradation on changes in food productivity in relation to 
management level. 
Level of productivity 
Large increase 
Small increase 
No increase 
Small decrease 
Large decrease 
Unproductive 
change 
High 
negligible 
light 
moderate 
strong 
extreme 
extreme 
Level of management 
Medium 
not applicable 
negligible 
light 
moderate 
strong 
extreme 
Low 
not applicable 
not applicable 
negligible 
light 
moderate 
strong/extreme 
This methodology to assess the impact of soil degradation on food productivity in relation to 
management level was used in the ASSOD study. It should be noted that informat ion on 
management level is subjective, and relates only to those areas where soil degradation has 
occurred. It appears that 38% of the land affected by human-induced soil degradation had a 
high level of management, 35% a medium level and 27% a low level. Table 9.3 indicates the 
percentage of areas wi th in each management category in relation to the level of productivity 
changes. 
Table 9-3- Areas affected by soil degradation in relation to changes in food productivity under different 
management levels for South and Southeast Asia 
Level of productivity change Level of management 
High 
18% 
46% 
22% 
11% 
3% 
-
372 Mha 
Medium 
-
23% 
40% 
22% 
15% 
-
338 Mha 
Low 
-
-
12% 
48% 
28% 
12% 
248 Mha 
Large increase 
Small increase 
No increase 
Small decrease 
Large decrease 
Unproductive 
Total (= 100%) 
Source: Van Lynden & Oldeman (1997) 
The to ta l area, affected by human-induced soil degradation in South and Southeast Asia is 
equivalent to 46% of the to ta l land area. From this affected area 18% showed a negligible 
impact on food productivity, 45% had a l ight impact, 13% a moderate impact, 13% a strong 
impact, whi le an extreme impact was observed on 1% of the affected land. Al though this 
assessment is sti l l qualitative and based on informed opin ion, the results indicate that human-
induced soil degradation is a serious problem and has a clear impact of food productivity. More 
details can be found in the technical report (Van Lynden & Oldeman, 1997) (see also 9.2.2). 
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94. Impact of water erosion risk on food productivity: the 
Soter approach 
In 9-3 we have shown that soil degradation affects food productivity and is therefore a threat to 
food security. The GLASOD and ASSOD studies however only reflect the present status of 
human-induced soil degradation and its impact on food productivity related to productivity 
changes observed in the recent past. These studies also revealed that the process of water 
erosion is dominant on all continents (see also Appendix 1). 
As indicated earlier under ASSOD, the impact of soil degradation on the functional properties of 
land and its productive capacity may differ between land units and/or soils. If the seriousness, 
and thus the need for soil conservation measures or for alternative land uses is to be made 
explicit, the initial productivity of a certain land use system must be known as well as the effect 
of soil degradation on this productive capacity (Driessen, 1986). 
In order to assess future risks of soil degradation more precise and quantitative information is 
needed on the various soil and terrain attributes, on climatic variables, on present land use and 
vegetation cover. The International Society of Soil Science, FAO, UNEP and ISRIC have developed 
an internationally endorsed methodology for the systematic storage of detailed information on 
natural resources in such a way that this geographically referenced database — the Soils and 
Terrain Digital Database (SOTER) — can be assessed and combined in order to analyze each 
combination of land, water and land use within a country or region from the point of view of 
potential use, in relation to food requirements, environmental impact or conservation (Van 
Engelen & Wen, 1995). National SOTER databases have now been developed for a number of 
countries in Latin America, Africa, Europe and West Asia. 
In the context of their Global Environmental Outlook (GEO) project, UNEP expressed the need 
for a quantitative assessment of the impact of soil erosion on food production. We wi l l briefly 
indicate how the SOTER database and complementary data files on climate can be used to 
assess the impact of water erosion (in this case, loss of topsoil) on the productive capacity of the 
soil. More details can be found in the ISRIC study by Mantel & Van Engelen (1997). They used a 
so-called mixed qualitative/quantitative land evaluation approach. For the qualitative land 
evaluation an ALES-based model was used — SOTAL, developed by Mantel (1995). The risk of 
water erosion — SWEAP, developed by Van den Berg & Tempel (1995) — and the assessment of 
potential productivity — WOFOST, developed by Van Diepen et al. (1989) — were simulated 
using quantitative models. We will briefly describe the various steps involved in the assessment 
of the impact of water erosion risk on food productivity as used in a case study of Uruguay. 
A qualitative model for physical land evaluation developed in ALES (Automated Land Evaluation 
System) (Rossiter, 1990) was linked to the SOTER database for Uruguay to assess the suitability 
for mechanized, low input wheat in Uruguay. The sufficiency of the land quality "availability of 
water" was determined separately with a water balance model. This resulted in a land 
suitability map for wheat. The non-suitable SOTER mapping units were excluded in further 
quantitative calculations. 
In a simultaneous exercise the erosion risk under mechanized, low input wheat was calculated 
using the SOTER Water Erosion Assessment Program (SWEAP). In SWEAP two erosion risk 
models are defined in the model sub-system. In this study the Universal Soil Loss Equation 
(Wischmeyer & Smith, 1978) modified to handle SOTER data, was selected. Considering the scale 
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of study ( l : l million) and the fact that the parametric model is not calibrated for the range of 
conditions as represented by the climatic and SOTER databases, it is not justifiable to present 
the results on an absolute scale as soil loss in tons per hectare. The results are therefore 
presented in qualitative terms (erosion hazards units). This allows for a comparison between the 
various areas within a country. 
A crop simulation model — WOFOST — was used to calculate the potential yield of wheat under 
the present agro-ecological conditions of soil and climate. The potential yield (or constraint-free 
yield) reflects the 'bio-physical production ceiling' determined by the crop's genetic potential 
under ambient radiation and temperature regime. The water-limited yield calculations reflect 
the influence of limited or excessive water supply. The water supply to the plant is determined 
by the water buffering capacity of the soil and only indirectly by the forcing variable: rainfall. 
Changes in crop yield as a function of water availability due to altered hydraulic characteristics 
as a consequence of erosion are (in this study) a consequence of texture shifts and change in 
rootable depth. The QUEFTS (Quantitative Evaluation of the Fertility of Tropical Soils) 
methodology was used to calculate nutrient-limited yield as a function of the availability of 
macronutrients (Smaling & Jansen, 1993). 
The soil erosion risk as calculated for the mapping units in Uruguay were then used as a basis 
for a simulated soil loss over a period of 20 years. In this study no account is taken of the 
possibility that soil deposition occurs in some units. This simplification is justified when the 
objective is to study the impact of erosion on crop productivity under different agro-ecological 
settings, in this manner topsoil losses ranging from 0 to 50 cm over a 20-year period were 
established for the dominant soils in the mapping units and new WOFOST input files were 
created to calculate water-limited and nutrient-limited yields. 
Comparisons of the water-limited yield now and after 20 years erosion show the modeled 
impact of erosion on crop yields. Not only does this give a possibility to calculate the yield 
decline as a result of water erosion at national level, more importantly perhaps it gives a spatial 
impression where soil erosion shows the highest impact. This information can be useful for 
national land use planning agencies. 
The results of this study can be complemented with some statistical trends. The qualitative land 
suitability evaluation indicates that 53% of Uruguay is not considered suitable for mechanized 
low-input wheat. Further quantitative assessments were therefore based on the remaining 47% 
of the country (12% highly suitable; 32% moderately suitable; 3% marginally suitable). 
Erosion risk under mechanized low input wheat cultivation was low on one percent of the 
remaining area, medium on 15%, high on 57% and very high on 26%. In this study six yield 
classes were defined. For each yield class the areas were calculated under constraint-free 
conditions, nutrient-limited yields before and after erosion and water-limited yields before and 
after 20 years erosion. Table 9.4 shows the results. 
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Table 94- Trends in wheat yield under constraint free, nutrient limited (before and after erosion) and 
water-limited (before and after erosion) conditions expressed as a percentage of the total 
suitable area for mechanised low-input wheat (Uruguay). 
Conditions 
Constraint-free 
Nutr ient- l imited 
Nutr ient- l imited after erosion 
Water- l imi ted 
Water- l imi ted after erosion 
0-0.5 
1 
4 
7 
28 
0.5-I.0 
1 
-
20 
27 
Yield classes ( 
1.0-2.0 
30 
34 
34 
43 
42 
in ton/ha) 
2.0-3.0 
31 
34 
43 
16 
1 
3.O-4.O 
31 
21 
9 
13 
1 
4.O-5.O 
9 
8 
8 
2 
1 
It can be concluded that the nutrient-limited yield potential is not significantly different from 
the constraint-free yield, and that the nutrient-limited yield on the generally fertile and organic 
matter rich soils is little affected by topsoil erosion. The water-limited yield on the other hand is 
significantly different from the constraint-free yield and the water-limited yield is strongly 
affected by topsoil erosion. If we set the total wheat production under constraint-free 
conditions at 100 percent, then the nutrient-limited yield is reduced to 93% before erosion and 
to 86% after 20 years of erosion. The water-limited yield before erosion is 65% of the constraint-
free yield before erosion and is reduced to only 16% after 20 years erosion. 
9.5. Conclusions 
Soil degradation is occurring over vast areas. As a consequence of increased population 
pressure and the scarcity of unreclaimed land, physically and socio-economically suitable for 
cultivation, there wil l be increasing pressure on all sectors of society to utilize the existing 
cultivated areas as efficiently as possible and on a sustainable basis. While it may be true that it 
is economically not interesting to reclaim already strongly degraded land, it appears essential 
that all available mechanisms be set in motion to prevent further degradation of the land and to 
protect the land, which is not yet affected by soil degradation. 
The Science Academies Summit (Madras, July 1996) developed an agenda for future action to be 
adopted by world leaders at the World Food Summit in Rome in November 1996 (IFPRI, 1996). 
They urged world leaders to revert the global trend of disinvestment in agricultural research 
and development, convinced that such shortsighted policy can only have tragic results. 
"Meeting the challenge of increasing food availability now and in the future demands equal 
focus on production systems and on the larger issues of access to food". They stress among 
other that a national natural resources conservation and enhancement strategy wi l l be 
fundamental to a national food security system. "High priority must go to combating 
desertification and deforestation and to restoring degraded land". 
In the preceding sections we have indicated how rapidly our natural resource base has been 
degraded in the last decades. We have attempted to illustrate how soil degradation affects food 
security and what might happen if soil degradation processes continue uninterrupted. It is our 
duty to communicate our concerns on soil degradation and its impact on food production to all 
stakeholders; international and national policy-makers; international and national agricultural 
research organizations; non-government organizations (NGOs); agricultural extension services; 
and last but not least, the farmers who cultivate the soils. There is a great demand for well-
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documented soil information to better understand and quantify the impact of soil conditions 
and human-induced alterations of these soil conditions on biomass production. A 
comprehensive project proposal for the development of an Asian Land Resources Information 
System has been developed in close cooperation with IBSRAM and national agricultural research 
systems in the Asian countries. 
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Appendix 9.1. Global extent of the status of human-
induced soil degradation 
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10. Water availability 
MJ.H.P. Pinkers 
International Institute for Land Reclamation and Improvement (ILRI), 
P.O. Box 45, NL-6700 AA Wageningen, The Netherlands 
10.1. Introduction 
Water has no color, no smell, and no taste. Water is refreshing and revitalizing. Being one of 
the simplest chemical compounds, water plays a critical role in sustaining life on our blue planet 
that is covered for 70% with water. Water is essential to all life, all ecosystems and all human 
activity. Wisely used, water means health, harvests, prosperity and ecological abundance for the 
people and nations on earth. Badly managed, or out of control, water brings poverty, disease, 
floods, erosion, salinization, waterlogging, silting, environmental degradation and human 
conflict (WWC, 1998). At the fundamental level water has only two uses, sustaining the 
ecosystem and serving as a natural resource to mankind. All other uses are part of these. When 
water is not in use to serve human needs, it sustains ecological functions. So there exists 
nothing like 'available water' nor something like 'surplus water'. These are man made concepts. 
All water is already 'in use'. Water can only be reallocated between different species/users. 
10.2. Water on earth 
The total amount of water stored in the global hydrosphere is estimated at approximately 
1.4 billion km3, a quantity beyond the comprehension of most humans. However, about 97.5% is 
seawater or brackish, while three-quarters of the remaining 2.5% is locked in ice caps (Table 
lO.l). Fresh water represents 0.26% of the total water mass on the earth surface and only 
0.007% if we discount the ice at the poles and the groundwater resources. This scarce resource 
must be seen as part of the common heritage of humankind. Only this small fraction of water is 
regularly renewed by rain and snow and is therefore available on a sustainable basis. With an 
availability of 7,300 m3 per person and an average consumption of less than 800 m3 per person 
there seems no reason to discuss water issues or water scarcity. In theory there is enough water 
to support a population many times larger than the present one and water may not be a 
limiting factor to food security. Unfortunately, however, this supply is not distributed evenly as 
illustrated by the large extent of arid and semi- arid regions. 
This world's fresh water resource water is not increasing, and barring some major breakthrough 
such as very low-cost desalinization, is unlikely to increase. Pollution even decreases the usable 
or re-usable portion of the resource. Today desalinization of salt and brackish water is 
technologically mature, but energy intensive and expensive. Desalinization provides just one-
thousandth of present world water use. At a cost between $l-$8 per cubic meter, compared to 
$0.01-$0X>5 per cubic meter paid by farmers in the US and to about $0.30 paid by urban users. 
Desalinization, therefore is a realistic perspective only in water-poor and energy-rich regions, 
such as the Middle East. Unless for high valued domestic and processing uses in urbanized areas 
in coastal zones it is unlikely that oceans wil l become a supplier of fresh water in the decades to 
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come. In other regions, in particular where water is scarce, energy choices will be limited too; 
where energy is expensive, opportunities for improving and expanding water supplies will be 
limited in particular (Gleick, 1997). The greater occurrence of groundwater indicates its potential 
for future water supply but aquifers can be used sustainably only temporarily in excess of 
replenishment rates. The same is true for rivers and lakes. The annual precipitation on the 
world's land areas is the only source of water with long term sustainability to supply for green 
and blue water. 
Table 10.1. World's water resources. 
Oceans 
ice caps 
Groundwater resources (< 4000 m) 
Rivers and lakes 
Runoff (annually) 
Runoff (inhabited areas only) 
1360 
26 
10.5 
106 
106 
106 
0.126106 
47000 
39000 
km3 
km3 
km3 
km3 
km3 
km3 
Source: Cox, 1987. 
10.2.1. Water availability 
Annual precipitation brings about 119,000 km3 to the land area of the earth. Evaporation from 
land bodies is about 72,000 km5, so that some 47,000 km3 yr"1 falls renewed as fresh water to the 
earth land surface. Each year, about 40,000 km3 water runs of the land areas into the sea. The 
amount of water to be allocated economically for human purposes is estimated to be about 
13,500 km3 yr'1, including 2000 km3 of groundwater. Actual abstractions, which cover all 
withdrawals from the source including both surface- and groundwater are estimated to be 4,000 
km3 or 30%. Consumption, which covers all water that is irredeemably consumed in the relevant 
process (crop évapotranspiration, cooling tower évapotranspiration) is about 60% of total 
abstraction or 2,440 km3. 
At global level there seems to be no scarcity of water even if use would double. However, due 
to spatial variation, both in supply and demand, serious shortages may develop at national or 
regional levels (Table 10.2). The per capita water availability differs enormously between 
continents. Africa presents about the world average. Asia's per capita water availability is only 
half and South America about 6 times the world average. Within the same continent differences 
between regions are even greater. With respect to the population increase in Asia and Africa 
the present situation wil l worsen. 
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Table 10.2. Per capita fresh water availability in 1980. 
Continent Water availability (1,000 m? yr"1) 
Europe 4.6 
North and Central America 21.3 
Africa 94 
Asia 51 
South America 48.8 
Australia 64.0 
World 8.6 
10.2.2. Regional water scarcity 
We can distinguish three types of water scarcity: 
• Natural water scarcity: this is the scarcity related to aridity, implying scarcity of soil water 
with restrictions for potential rainfed production; 
• Demographic water scarcity: the available water per capita; 
• Technical water scarcity, the ratio of withdrawal-to-availability as an indicator of the 
difficulty to meet increasing water needs by further water resources development. 
In dry climates the natural water scarcity implies problems for rainfed agriculture which have to 
be eliminated by water conservation, storage or water supplies from rivers or lakes. 
Natural scarcity can be aggravated by demographic and/or technical scarcity. 
Bjorklund and Falkenmark (1997) analyzed data from Shiklomanov on water availability and use. 
The world was regionalized in 26 different internally rather homogeneous regions. The 26 
regions tend to concentrate in five clusters: 
Group A: North Africa, West and South Asia 
High use to resource ratio, high population pressure, moderate withdrawals per 
capita. Dry climates. 
Group B: USA, Central Asia, Kazachstan, and Caucasus 
High use to resource ratio, moderate to low population pressure, high withdrawal 
per person. Temperate climate. 
Group C: Central and Southern Europe, former Soviet Union, South East Asia, and North China 
Moderate levels in all respects, good potentials in terms of unused water. Mixed 
climates. 
Group D: Northern Europe, North America, South America, and Central Africa 
Water rich regions with low water needs; high potentials in terms of unused water. 
Group E: Dry parts of sub-Saharan Africa 
Dry climate, erratic precipitation, moderate population pressure, use to resource 
remains low due to lack of irrigation Theoretical high potential in terms of unused 
water, but water is difficult to mobilize. 
Attempts have been made to correlate the need for active planning for water management and 
the level of water demand. If demand is less than 5% of the total runoff few water problems 
occur and there is little need for water management activities. Water supply commonly will 
become a significant problem when demand is in the range of 10 to 20% of total runoff and 
need arises for water planning. If demands exceed 20% of total runoff, severe water 
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management problems can be expected that require active planning and investments in 
infrastructure. Under these condit ions water may become a l imit ing factor in economic 
development (Bjorklund & Falkenmark, 1997). Where global water consumption (2,440 m3) is 
about 6% of tota l runoff (40,000 m3), abstraction (4,000 m3) is 30% of the potential that can be 
made available economically (Table 10.3). So, at global level, water may already be a l imit ing 
factor i n economic development, i n particular i n arid and semi-ar id regions. 
Table 10.3. Estimated water abstraction and consumption (km3). 
Use/Purpose Abstraction Consumption 
Domestic 350 60 
Industry 800 380 
Agriculture 2,850 2,000 
Total 4,000 2,440 
Source: WWC (1998). 
Total renewable supplies have been estimated to be adequate to meet the needs of f ive to ten 
times the existing populat ion (Postel, 1984). Land use and landcover and their demands for 
water and food are governed by the size of the g lobal populat ion. United Nations projections of 
wor ld populat ion indicate an inevitable further g rowth of wor ld populat ion. Wor ld populat ion 
increases w i l l be by 80 mi l l ion persons per year and w i l l not decline before 2015. Al l fu ture 
wor ld populat ion g rowth w i l l be in developing countr ies. Most of these countries are in arid 
and semi arid regions. By 2050 Africa has to feed 1,300 mi l l ion people i n addi t ion to the 700 
mi l l ion currently. In Asia populat ion increased between 1950 and 1995 w i t h about 2,000 mi l l ion 
persons and has to accommodate an addit ional 2,000 mi l l ion persons by 2050. Nigeria and 
Ethiopia w i l l have the largest populat ion increase in Africa. In Asia populat ion g rowth w i l l 
cont inue to be large in China and Indonesia, but India and Pakistan w i l l out -grow them. As a 
reference, Pakistan's populat ion i n 2050 w i l l have a larger populat ion than all countries of West 
and Southern Europe combined, and Nigeria w i l l have twice the total populat ion of Western 
Europe. 
10.2.3. Land cover and land use 
About 90% of the earth land surface is covered by some sort of vegetat ion (Table 10.4). The 
remaining is covered by snow or ice. Some 55% of the land surface is covered by cultivated 
lands and pastures, and built-up areas. Cultivated land, including irr igated agriculture, is only 
10% where pastures contr ibute 44%. These categories represent action on land use affecting 
land cover. Land cover is constantly changing, as a result not only of seasonal cl imate variations 
but also of human activity. The past centuries have been marked by massive land use 
conversion: the change f rom one category, natural ecosystems, generally forests and savannas, 
to agriculture and pastures (Fresco, 1994). 
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Table 104. Land cover categories. 
Covers Area (106 km2) Area (%) 
Snow/ice 15 10 
Cultivated 15 10 
Pastures 65 44 
Forest, etc. 45 30 
Wetlands 6 4 
Built-up areas 2 1.5 
Source: Fresco, 1994 
As fewer and fewer areas of natural ecosystems are left, and protection and wise use of the 
remaining is strongly advocated, the fu ture w i l l be of one where changes i n land cover have to 
be w i th in the broad category of arable lands. In some regions these may be reconverted to 
'man- made nature areas', when land is taken out of product ion. But by far the most important 
land cover change appears t o be the intensif icat ion of land use through better management of 
product ion factors, inc luding water management. 
Of the 10% of land brought under cult ivation (1,451 mi l l ion hectares), about 83% is under 
rainfed agriculture and 17% under i r r igat ion (Table 10.5). So, i rr igated agriculture is only about 
2% of the earth landcover. Irrigated land however, provides 40% of the world 's food. In the 
developing countries about 60% of rice and wheat is produced on irr igated land. Average yield 
per i r r igated hectare is 2.2 t imes the yield of rainfed agriculture. Between the mid-1960's and 
the mid-1980's, i r r igat ion accounted for more than half of the increase of global food 
product ion. Of all the water taken f rom rivers, lakes, streams and aquifers in developing 
countries almost 80% is used for i r r igated agriculture. 
Table 10.5. Arable and permanently cropped area per (sub)continent (106 ha). 
Continent Total arable area Irrigated % Irrigated 
Africa 186 13 7.0 
Asia 473 159 33-6 
South America 105 10 9.5 
World 1451 249 17.2 
Source: FAO, 1995. 
103. The arid developing world 
There are many types of arid regions that are distinguishable by degree of aridity, human 
history, vegetal cover and other. The degree of ar id i ty depends on the relative importance of 
the supply of water by precipitat ion and the loss of water by evaporation and transpiration 
(Dresch, 1982). The l imit for arid regions is where rainfal l represents half of potent ial 
évapotranspirat ion. The UNESCO map of ar id regions (UNESCO, 1977) ident i f ied four zones: 
hyper-arid, ar id, semi-arid and dry subhumid. The last category permits rainfed agriculture when 
interannual rainfal l variabil i ty is less than 25%. The ar id zones represent 37% of the earth land 
surface or about 48.53 106 km 2 (Table 10.6). 
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The arid wo r l d is a fragi le environment, in which numerous plants and other species are at the 
l imits of thei r distr ibut ion. The natural environment also seems to l imi t human presence. In fact, 
most ar id regions have a l ow populat ion density. Tradit ional rural resources have severe 
l imitat ions. The question of water resources is most vi tal i n arid countries. Rainfed cult ivation is 
irregular, even in areas w i t h adequate rainfall: i r r igated agriculture is strictly dependent upon 
water supplies. The arid wor ld has a low carrying capacity for both pastoralists and cultivators. 
Food product ion and food security are at risk. Yet, in some parts of the ar id wor ld , like in the 
valleys of the Nile and the Indus, human presence is abundant in megacities of the Old Wor ld as 
of today's wo r l d . Moreover, i n many countries in the arid region populat ion g rowth is rapid. 
Table 10.6. Aridity zones by continental region (lO3 km2). 
Hyper-arid Arid Semi-arid Total 
Africa 6720 5035 5138 16893 
Asia 2773 6257 6934 15964 
Australasia 3030 3090 6120 
Europe 110 1052 1162 
North America 31 815 4194 5040 
South America 257 445 2645 3347 
Total 9781 15692 23053 48527 
% of Earth's land area 7-52 12.06 17.72 37-30 
Source: UNEP (1992). 
The Hyper arid zone covers largely the Saharan, Arabian and Gobi deserts w i t h only local 
populat ion concentrations except where water is externally sourced as i n the Nile Delta. The 
Ar id zone covers 12 .1% of the land surface. Asia and Africa have large ar id zones. Here 
pastoralism is dependent on mobi l i ty or the use of groundwater resources. Cultivation is 
dependent upon i r r igat ion. Semi-arid zones occur in al l continents and cover 17-7% of the land 
surface. Pastoralism and cult ivation are both vulnerable but stil l dependent upon water 
supplies. 
Populat ion distr ibut ion and urbanization in arid and, in future also in semi-arid regions, is 
conf ined t o water supplies f r om groundwater or external or ig in. Where the ar id regions cover 
37% of the land surface, they sustain only 15% of the wor ld populat ion or 840 mi l l ion people of 
which 94% live i n developing countries. In arid regions the most extensive fo rm of land use - i f 
any - is livestock raising, nomadic in the tradit ional fo rm f rom Mauri tania to Mongol ia, and 
ranching as the modern fo rm in the arid regions of the United States, Argent ina, South Africa 
and Austral ia. Tradit ional rain-fed agriculture occurs i n the Maghreb, the Sahel, India and 
northeast Brasil. Modern rain-fed agriculture, dry farming is practiced i n Australia, Central Asia 
and the United States. 
Irr igated agriculture is only a f ract ion of the land use i n ar id regions, 2-3%, but sustains a large 
part of the populat ion. High populat ion concentrations in arid regions correspond w i th i r r igated 
zones a long the major rivers Nile, Tigris, Euphrates, Aral Sea basin rivers, Colorado and others. 
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10.3.1. Urbanization and industrialization 
Rapid urbanization and industrialization are placing unprecedented pressures on water supply 
and quality. Between 1950 and 1990, the number of cities with populations of more than 1 
million nearly quadrupled from 78 to 290, adding some 650 million urban people. In the next 
few years, half the world's population will live in cities. By the year 2025, 90% of population 
growth will have taken place in urban areas, increasing the demand for water of suitable quality 
for domestic, municipal and industrial use, and for treatment of waste. Today in the developed 
world, industry uses between 40 and 80% of total water withdrawals. Comparable figures for 
developing countries are 2-5%. This figure can be expected to grow significantly. Greater 
industrial use will also lead to more problems of water quality. 
Income growth will also put pressure on household water use, because the rich use more water 
than the poor. In view of this trends, proactive measures for managing the demand for water 
wil l be as critical as investments in new infrastructure (Serageldin, 1997). 
103.2. World food projections 
Computation of the potential for food production in the world has been the topic of many 
studies. Buringh et al. (1975) estimated the maximum world food production under optimal 
agricultural conditions to be enough to feed at least 30 billion people. Recent studies (Luyten, 
1995) confirmed that potential global food production could be 10 to 20 times the current 
global production of 4 billion ton depending on high or low external inputs to the agricultural 
production system. This potential global self-sufficiency does only imply global food-security if 
worldwide transports of food from surplus to deficit regions wil l occur. Will deficit regions have 
a buying capacity? The potential global production levels will only be attainable if all fresh 
water available will be allocated to irrigated agriculture. The share of irrigated agriculture, now 
17%, has to increase to 50% independent from the type of agricultural production system. This 
wi l l require large investments. 
Differences among regions are very large. South America has a huge potential as soils are 
suitable and water abundant. Northern and Southern Africa and Western Asia have low values 
due to poor soils and limited fresh water resources. The latter regions with highest increase in 
population and food demands will continue to be regions of risks with regard to regional food 
security and dependent on imports. 
While using all fresh water available to irrigated agriculture can be questioned, continued 
pollution of groundwater with nitrate seems to be unavoidable and again raises questions 
about the long term sustainability of the production system with regard to the quantity and 
quality of fresh water as an external input to the production system. 
Last but not least, whether the projections of global or regional self-sufficiency can be realized 
is depending very much on the ability of countries and farming communities to apply in a 
strategic framework the measures to create the enabling environment for the introduction and 
implementation of infrastructure and farming and trade systems. A coping capability is needed 
in terms of economic, technical and knowledge capacity. The most important external input 
would be capacity building through human resources development and institutional 
126 FOOD SECURITY AT DIFFERENT SCALES: ISSUES, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
development. Other constraints such as social and cultural barriers make it doubtful that 
achieving food security will become reality in some regions, perhaps even in the 21st century. 
There have been several attempts to evaluate the status of water resources on a worldwide 
basis. The most recent is the 'Comprehensive Assessment of the Freshwater Resources of the 
World', published in 1997 by WMO. The report gives global projections of water demand for the 
year 2025 at three levels related to different scenarios. In the scenario with the lowest impact on 
global water withdrawals, the total global abstraction has to increase with some 10% to 4,500 
km3 yr"1. In the scenario with most impact on water resources abstraction wil l be in order of 
5,500 km3 yr"1. An increase of some 40%. The abstraction level of 5,500 km3 yr"1 amounts to 40% 
of the 13,500 km3 deemed to be economically available. Table 10.7 gives the breakdown by 
sectors. 
Table 10.7. Projections of global annual water abstraction (km3 yr"1). 
Use/Purpose 1998 2025 
Domestic 350 600 
Industry 800 1400 
Agriculture 2850 3500 
Total 4000 5500 
Source: WWC (1998). 
Projections of water supply and demand for individual countries can only be achieved from 
detailed studies. Most developed countries have carried out studies of this type, but these 
studies are rare in developing countries. 
The Mediterranean 'Blue Plan' assembles the results of a number of separate country studies by 
riparian states into a regional framework. Scenarios were prepared for projections to the 
reference years 1990, 2010, and 2025 (Table 10.8). The total water abstraction for a population 
of about 400 million was in 1990 some 276 billions of m3 yr"1 (bcm). For the year 2025 different 
scenarios show the effect of: 
a. no increase in water abstraction: to meet the growing demands of different sectors water 
wil l be reallocated from agriculture to other users. The water allocated to agriculture wil l 
decrease with 10-20%. 
b. increase of water abstraction to 430 bcm yr'1 (60%). The additional water (154 bcm) will be 
allocated to non-agricultural sectors 60%. The water allocated to agriculture will increase 
with 40%. 
In both scenarios it is unlikely that irrigated production areas will expand. 
Table 10.8. Méditerranée 
1990 276 
2025 high 430 
2025 low 272 
in water consumptie 
Domestic 
13 
14 
15 
3n forecasts by different sectors (billions of m 
Agriculture 
64 
56 
58 
Industry 
10 
12 
13 
5
 yr"1, bcm). 
Energy 
13 
14 
14 
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10.4. Food security 
Food security is defined as a state of affairs where all people at all times have access to safe and 
nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life. Food insecurity at the household level is 
most often associated with food shortages as a result of crop failure due to failing rainfall or 
agricultural pests. However, for those who live in urban areas, and in future the majority of 
world population will live in urban areas, food shortages are associated with unemployment 
and lack of income. Therefore, food security at household level should be seen as the necessary 
resources to buy food. Only in the case of the self-sustaining farmer food security can be seen as 
the necessity to produce the household food according to the household needs. Therefore food 
insecurity is dominantly linked to lack of income rather than lack of water. 
Food self-reliance at country or region level is ensured trough a combination of food production 
and food import. However, countries with low incomes and a weak trading position may be 
unable to buy in the international market the food needed to ensure every citizen is adequately 
fed. Here again food security is predominantly linked to income rather than the ability to 
produce the food or the lack of water. 
In countries where water for agricultural production is becoming a scarce resource one should 
decide to allocate water to other uses than irrigated agriculture, uses that provide a higher 
valued domestic or industrial product and more benefits to the majority of the (urbanized) 
population in the long run by improving employment, household income and the countries 
ability to import food from the world market. 
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Abstract 
Climate change wil l have important impacts on agricultural production. It is widely recognized 
that these impacts depend on a variety of factors, such as temperature change, precipitation, 
weather extremes and direct physical impacts such as hurricanes and floods. In addition, the 
C02 fertilization effect plays an important role. As a result of sea level rise, much land may be 
lost in coastal areas, reducing the area of arable land. This paper summarizes some of the 
impacts of climate change on the agricultural sector and pays attention to adaptation strategies 
in the agricultural sector. 
l i . l . Introduction 
The results of research on the impact of the enhanced greenhouse effect on agriculture are 
ambiguous, despite large research efforts in the past decade. All impacts strongly depend on 
the adaptability of the farmers, and on the reaction of markets and politics (Toi et al., 1995). 
Together with the costs of sea level rise the effects on agriculture are probably the most studied 
aspects of the enhanced greenhouse effect. Much of this research concentrates on productivity 
or output aspects and does not include the impact of changing prices. Price effects are crucial, 
however, for the economic valuation of agricultural damage (Fankhauser, 1995). Elevated C02 
may lead to more carbon stored in the vegetation. Through an increased root growth it may 
lead to an elevated carbon pool in the soil, too. This clearly illustrates that mutual relations exist 
between climate change and the agricultural sector. The consequences for the total carbon 
balance may be considerable. 
11.2. Impacts of climate change on agriculture 
The estimates of the costs to agriculture in Table l l . l are based on a study by Kane ef al. (1992) 
which includes price effects, but neglects managerial responses as well as the effect of C02-
fertilization. Working with two scenarios, Kane et al. analyzed the impact of climate change on 
crop yields, data which are then fed into a 'world food model' to analyze the effects on world 
agricultural markets. Welfare changes (measured as changes in producer and consumer surplus) 
can occur in two ways: firstly by a change in a region's agricultural output due to different 
climate conditions, and secondly by a change in world prices. The welfare effects (as percentage 
of GDP) for the two scenarios considered in the study are reproduced in Table 11.1. Absolute 
values for the year 1988 are based on average figures from the two scenarios. 
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Table 11.1. Costs to Agriculture (2xC02 -109 US $ 1988). 
Range of welfare Average welfare 
change (% GDP") change (lQ9$b) 
EU -0.400 .. -0.019 -0.9666 
USA -0.310 .. +0.005 -0.7392 
Former-USSR -0.520 .. +0.032 -0.6185 
CHINA -5.480 .. +1.280 -0.7812 
OECD -O.316 .. -0.018e -2.3130 
WORLD -0.470 .. +0.010 -3.9141 
a
 Range from the two scenarios of Kane et ai, 1992. 
b
 For former-USSR the result is based on GNP rather than GDP. 
c
 Average over several subregions. 
Source: Fankhauser, 1995-
The results are significantly negative for all regions, but the discrepancies between the two 
scenarios are considerable. This is particularly the case for China, where impacts range from a 
loss of more than 5% to benefits of over 1% of GDP, and to a lesser extent for the former USSR. 
It should be emphasized, however, that particularly the 'upper bound' case is quite optimistic, 
compared to e.g. Rosenzweig & Parry (1994). It assumes non-negative yield effects in most 
regions. The first scenario assumes negative yield effects even for northern regions such as 
Canada and the former USSR, and is more within the Rosenzweig & Parry range. 
Rosenzweig and Parry (1994) base their results on three of the older equilibrium General 
Circulation Model (GCM) experiments. Impact on yields for wheat, rice, maize and soybeans is 
calculated for some sixty sites in 18 countries, for three modes of adaptation, i.e. no adaptation 
(l), minor shifts (2) and major shifts (3) in behavior. For the rest of the world, yield changes are 
interpolated in an unreported fashion. Table 11.2 contains the nine world regions of Tol (1995) 
in the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution called FUND. Based on 
this, yield changes are then assessed per country, and these are also fed into a 'world food 
model' called the Basic Linked System, leading to impact on production levels, prices, and the 
number of people at risk from hunger. The Basic Linked System does not provide feedback to 
the yield models. In real life, the crop choice depends on market considerations. Change in crop 
is a powerful form of adaptation, but, as any other form of adaptation, little is known of the 
driving processes. How fast farmers wil l adapt, and under which circumstance adaptation will 
be successful is a crucial but largely unknown determinant of the damage costs. Cropping 
practices including crop rotation, tillage practices and nutrient management are quite effective 
in combating or reversing deleterious effects (IPCC, 1996, Chapter 13, p. 1). Scientific studies wi l l 
tend to overestimate the damage if no adaptation is assumed (see Table 11.3). This bias is 
sometimes called the 'dumb-farmer scenario' to suggest that it omits a variety of the 
adaptations that farmers customarily make in response to changing economic and 
environmental conditions. Omitted variables are the effect of extremes and ranges in climatic 
variables as well as the effect of changes in irrigation. Another bias arises in the production-
function approach, because it fails to allow for economic substitution as conditions change 
(Mendelsohn et al., 1995). Newer studies increasingly emphasize also other (non-climate 
change) stress factors, and the need for integrated assessment of damages. The rate of change 
may be equally important, as are the speed of adaptation and restoration. 
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Table 11.2. Agricultural Yield Changes (2xC02 - % of Gross Agricultural Product)a-9h. 
model b 
Scenario0 
region: 
OECD-A 
OECD-E 
OECD-P 
CEE&SU 
M-E 
L-A 
S&SEA 
CPA 
AFR 
UKMO 
1 2 
-20.0 
+5.0 
+7-5 
-7.5 
-22.5 
-22.5 
-20.0 
-7-5 
-20.0 
-5.0 
+5.0 
+7-5 
-7-5 
-22.5 
-22.5 
-20.0 
+7-5 
-20.0 
3 
-5.0 
+5.0 
+7-5 
-7-5 
-7-5 
-8.5 
-10.0 
+7.5 
-20.0 
1 
-5.0 
+10.0 
+7.5 
+22.5 
-7.5 
-15.0 
-10.0 
+7.5 
-7.5 
GISS 
2 
+10.0 
+10.0 
+7.5 
+22.5 
-7.5 
-15.0 
-10.0 
+22.5 
-7.5 
3 
+10.0 
+10.0 
+7.5 
+22.5 
+7.5 
-1.0 
0.0 
+22.5 
+7.5 
1 
-5.0 
-5.0 
+7.5 
+7.5 
-7.5 
-10.0 
-10.0 
+7.5 
-15.0 
GFDL 
2 
+10.0 
-5.0 
+7.5 
+7.5 
-7.5 
-10.0 
-10.0 
+22.5 
-15.0 
3 
+10.0 
-5.0 
+7.5 
+7.5 
+7.5 
+4.0 
0.0 
+22.5 
0.0 
avg. 
2+3d 
+500 
+333 
+7.50 
+7.50 
-5.00 
-8.83 
-8.83 
+17.5 
-6.67 
avg. 
I e 
-10.0 
+3-33 
+7.50 
+7.50 
-12.50 
-15.83 
-13.33 
+2.50 
-14.17 
diff. 
ava. f 
-15.0 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-7.50 
-7.00 
-4.50 
-15.00 
-7.50 
• After Rosenzweig et al. (1993); cf. also Fischer et al. (1993); Rosenzweig & Parry (1994); Reilly (1994). 
b
 The climate change scenarios used are the equilibrium 2xC02 experiments according to the General 
Circulation Models of the United Kingdom Meteorological Office (UKMO), the Goddard Institute for 
Space Studies (GISS) and Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL). 
c
 The scenarios concern no adaptation ( l) , minor shifts (2) and major shifts (3) in behavior. 
d
 The average of adaptation scenarios 1 and 2 over the three models. 
e
 The average of no adaptation scenario over the three models. 
' The difference between the averages described under notes d and e. 
9
 The costs due to a changed climate correspond to the yield losses associated with the average over the 
three models and the two adaptation strategies. The costs due to a changing climate correspond to the 
difference between this average and the average over the three models without adaptation. 
h
 The source can be criticized for two reasons: (i) the climate sensitivity of all three models is above the 
IPCC consensus best guess, and (ii) the carbon fertilization effect is based on too high assumptions for 
the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide (Cline, personal communication). As the effects of this 
are unclear to Toi, but of opposite sign, they are supposed to cancel out. 
Source: Tol, 1995. 
Moreover, changes in socio-economic vulnerabil i ty are as important as the actual shape of the 
damage funct ion. In addit ion to adaptat ion, vulnerabil i ty w i l l change exogenously to cl imate 
change (Fankhauser & T o l , 1995). In Rosenzweig & Parry (1994) physical production potent ial is 
the driving force for agricultural product ion. Land use change is excluded f rom adaptat ion. 
Climate change scenarios near the high end of the IPCC range of doubled-C02 warming exerted 
(in most cases) a slight-to-moderate negative effect on simulated wor ld cereal product ion, even 
when the beneficial direct effects of C02, farm-level adaptations and future technological yield 
improvements were taken into account. The only scenario that increased global cereal 
production was one involving major, and possible costly, changes in agricultural systems, for 
example, installation of i r r igat ion. Climate change was found to increase the disparities in 
cereal production between developed and developing countries (Table 11.3). Whereas 
production in the developed wor ld benefited f rom climate change, production in developing 
nations declined. Adaptat ion at the farm-level d id l itt le to reduce the disparities w i t h the 
developing wor ld suffering the losses. Cereal prices and thus the populat ion at risk f r om 
hunger, increased despite adaptat ion. The number of people at risk of hunger is estimated at 
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640 mi l l ion or 6% of the total populat ion in 2060 (compared to 530 mi l l ion in 1990,10% of to ta l 
current populat ion). The largest negative changes in cereal production occur in developing 
regions, though the extent of decreased production varies greatly by country depending on the 
projected cl imate. Price increases resulting f rom climate-induced decreases in yield are 
estimated t o range between 24-145%. These increases in price affect the number of people at 
risk of hunger. Their estimated number increases 1 % for each 2-2.5% increase in prices 
(depending on climate change scenario). People at risk of hunger increase by 10% to almost 
60% in the scenarios tested, resulting in an estimated increase of between 60 mi l l ion and 350 
mil l ion people in this condit ion (above the reference scenario projection of 640 mil l ion) by 2060. 
Even a high level of farm-level adaptation in the agricul tural sector did not entirely prevent such 
negative effects (Rosenzweig & Parry, 1994). 
Table 11.3. Economic effects of 3 GCM equilibrium scenarios (106 US $ 1989). 
With CO, & Adaptation 
Reqion\GCMa GISS GFDL UKMO 
With CCy No Adaptation 
GISS GFDL UKMO 
No CO,. No Adaptation 
GISS GFDl UKMO 
Developing 
<$500/cap. -210 -2573 -14588 
$500-$2000/cap.-429 -2927 -10669 
>$2ooo/cap -603 -534 -1021 
-2070 -5322 -19827 
-1797 -5135 -15010 
-818 -878 -328 
-56692 -66110 -121083 
-26171 -27839 -48095 
-6661 -4351 -3870 
Eastern Europe 2423 -125 -4875 1885 -2048 -10959 -12494 -28854 -57471 
OECD 5822 25 -6470 2674 -3644 -15101 -13453 -21485 -17606 
TOTAL 7003 -6135 -37623 -126 -17028 -61225 -115471 -148640 -248124 
" GISS = Goddard Institute for Space Studies; GFDL = Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory; 
UKMO = General Circulation Models of the United Kingdom Meteorological Office. 
Source: IPCC, 1996, Chapter 13, p. 27. 
Several studies (Nordhaus, 1991; Titus, 1992; Nordhaus, 1994; Fankhauser, 1995) have estimated 
the damage costs of agriculture in the US due to cl imate change. These scientists have 
respectively damage costs of l .o, 1.0 and 0.6 bi l l ion dollars. The latest estimates of Tol (1996) 
are 10.6 bi l l ion dollars in OECD-A and w i th the 15.2 bi l l ion dollars of Cline (1992) this scientist 
has the highest damage costs for agriculture in OECD-A. Table 11.4 summarizes the regional 
impact assessment of Tol (1996). For the OECD-E, OECD-P, CEE&fSU and S&SEA there are some 
benefits to gain for agriculture. A recent study by Mendelsohn et al. (1995) shows a significantly 
lower estimated impact of global warming on U.S. agriculture than the t radi t ional product ion-
funct ion approach and, in one case, suggests that , even w i thou t C02 fert i l izat ion, g lobal 
warming may have economic benefits for agriculture. 
Some general implications for the US agricultural sector can be drawn. First, because of possible 
changes in domestic and foreign production under a GFDL (see Table 11.3) cl imate, the role of 
the United States in agricultural export markets may change. Second, patterns of agriculture in 
the United States are likely to shift as a result of changes in regional crop yields and in crop 
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i rr igation requirements. Third, concern for fu ture agricultural impacts on important natural 
resources, especially land and water, seems to be just i f ied (Adams etal., 1990). In the European 
Union various climate change scenarios appear to yield considerable different changes in yield 
both for each location and for the EU as a who le (Wolf & Van Diepen, 1995).1 Other recent 
studies on this topic are: Bumb (1995), Darwin et al. (1995), Oram & Hojjati (1995), Rotter et al. 
(1995), Mendelsohn (1996), Mendelsohn et al. (1996), Reilly (1996). 
Table 11.4. Costs to Agriculture (2xC02 -109 US $ 1988)". 
OECD-A 
OECD-E 
OECD-P 
CEE&fSU 
ME 
LA 
S&SEA 
10.6 
-6.0 
-6.1 
-23-2 
7.6 
13.I 
23.9 
CPA 
AFR 
OECD 
nOECD 
North 
South 
World 
-3-2 
11.4 
-1.5 
29.7 
-24-7 
52.9 
28.2 
a
 The impact of a 2.5 °C warming at a pace of 0.04 °C, accompanied with a sea level rise of 50 cm, an 
increase of 25% in hurricane activity, a 10% increase in winter precipitation, and a 6% increase in storm 
intensity in the extratropics. 
Source: Tol, 1996. 
11.3. Forestry 
Many of the world's forests are amongst the last ecosystems on Earth that remain relatively 
undisturbed by human influences. Especially in the tropics, they harbor the majority of the 
world's biodiversity. As such, they are indispensable, self-maintaining repositories of genetic 
resources. Forests are of great socio-economic importance as a source of t imber, f iber for pulp 
for paper making, fue l and for many non-wood forest products. Forests are also of special 
economic and spiritual importance to many indigenous people. As components of climatic 
system forests play a major role in the present and projected future global carbon budget. They 
also influence ground temperatures, évapotranspirat ion, surface roughness, cloud fo rmat ion , 
and precipitation (IPCC, 1996, Chapter 1 , p. 2). Roughly one-third of the world's land surface is 
covered by forests or woodlands (IPCC, 1990). The extent to which this area w i l l be affected by 
climate change depends on various factors like, for example, the species and age of trees, 
possibilities for forests to migrate and the quali ty of forest management. The impact of g lobal 
warming on wood production is therefore ambiguous. The IPCC (1996) assumes that al though 
net primary productivity may increase, the standing biomass may not increase. Regional impacts 
w i l l be strongly influenced by the extent to which forest zones can shift northwards. Sedjo & 
Solomon (1989) used the Holdridge Life Zone classification t o estimate that as a consequence of 
2xC02 the wor ldwide forest area could reduce by about 6%. Temperate and boreal forests 
would decline more, by about 16%, whereas tropical forest areas would expand by some 9%. 
These figures fo rm the basis of the estimates in Table 11.5. Adjusted to 2.5 °C warming they 
1
 Toi et al. (1995) make the following observation: In abstracto the damage costs of climate change are based on 
limited, parly outdated information, inconsistent combination of models, uncontrolled up- and downscaling, gross 
inter- and extrapolation, and non-expert interpretation 
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correspond to changes of -3.5, -9.6 and 5.2%, respectively. Further underlying assumptions are 
as follows. Forest and woodland area statistics can be found in FAO (1991). Based on Sedjo & 
Solomon and World Resources Institute (1992) it was assumed that 40% (42% according to IPCC, 
1996, Chapter 13, p. 14) of all forest areas are tropical, and that no tropical forests can be found 
in the OECD, the ex-USSR, and China. That is, in the five regions EU, US, China, ex-USSR and 
OECD forest areas uniformly decrease by 9.6%. Studies by Fankhauser, Cline & Titus estimate 
damage cost on forests in the United States due to climate change on respectively 1.0, 2.9 and 
38.O billion dollars (Toi et al., 1995). For the world as a whole the picture is mixed. 40% of all 
forest areas (those in the tropics) are growing; the remaining 60% are decreasing. 
Table 11.5. Damage to the forestry sector (100 km2 and 106 US $, 1988). 
Loss in forest area Forestry loss 
(100 km2) do6 US S) 
104 
564 
363 
24 
1,801 
2,005 
2,284 
-279 
Source: Fankhauser, 1995. 
Internationally, the shift toward tropical, and away from boreal and temperate, forests suggests 
that most developing countries would experience relatively less forest loss than would the mid-
to high-latitude countries (Cline, 1992). Table 11.5 shows the reduction in forest areas implied 
by these assumptions. More recent estimates can be found in IPCC (1996, Chapter 15, p. 7). The 
forest area of ecosystems projected by BIOME (IPCC, 1996, Chapter 15, p. 7) for present and for 
the year at which climate reflects a doubling of greenhouse gases is shown in Table 11.6. Note 
that estimated present forested areas and modeled present forested areas are similar except for 
a serious discrepancy in the tropics. There, the differences are in both definition and in model 
capability. The major pattern to emerge from comparison of all four climate scenarios with 
modeled present area is a moderate increase in area occupied by tropical forests, a strong 
increase in area occupied by mid-latitude temperate forests, and a similarly severe decline in 
area occupied by boreal forests. Table 11.7 presents forested areas in tropical, temperate and 
boreal zones, projected by IMAGE (IPCC, 1996, Chapter 15, p. 7) at 1990, 2000, 2020 and 2050. 
EU 
USA 
Ex-USSR 
CHINA 
OECD 
WORLD 
temperate 
tropical 
52 
282 
908 
121 
901 
1,235 
2,169 
-934 
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Table 11.6. Global, tropical, temperate and boreal-forested areas in 106 km2 under different future climate 
scenarios, projected by BIOME 1.0 Model. 
Tropical Forests 
Temperate Forests 
Boreal forests 
Present Area 
Est.* Modeled 
17.6 36.8 
10.4 10.6 
13.7 16.7 
GFDL 
40.6 
15.7 
8.4 
Area 
GISS 
42.9 
15.7 
11.5 
OSU 
41.3 
13.3 
13-5 
UKMO 
41.4 
16.1 
9.1 
GFDL 
11 
48 
-50 
Difference (%) 
GISS 
16 
49 
-31 
OSU 
13 
25 
-20 
KMO 
13 
52 
-46 
Al l Global Forests 41.7 64.1 64.7 70.1 68.1 66.6 
* From Dixon et al., 1994; 
- From Solomon et ai, 1993-
Source: IPCC, 1996, Chapter 15, p. 7-
Table 11.7. Tropical, temperate, boreal and total global forested areas in 106 km2 under a single, future 
climate and land use scenario generated by IPCC and projected by IMAGE 2.0 Model. 
Tropical Forests 
Temperate Forests 
Boreal Forests 
1990 
27.6 
5.4 
13.8 
Area of Forest 
2000 
25.0 
4.1 
14.3 
2020 
21.0 
4-9 
15.2 
20SO 
14.4 
5-3 
15.3 
2000 
-9 
-24 
4 
)ifference in Area 
2020 20S0 
-24 -48 
-9 -2 
10 11 
All Global forests 46.8 43-4 41-1 35-0 -7 -12 -25 
Source: IPCC, 1996, Chapter 15, p. 7-
The areas of tropical, temperate and boreal forests estimated for the present by the t w o models 
differ substantially. The differences appear to arise f rom a much larger agricultural area 
calculated in IMAGE than in BIOME. BIOME indicates a tota l g lobal increase in forested area 
f rom 1 to 9%, IMAGE calculates a decline of 25%. The value of forests in the US was estimated 
by Titus (1992) as $l l ,000-$37,000 km"2, based on observed differences in land values before and 
after logging. This f igure is roughly in line w i th the ratio of income f r om the forest sector 
relative t o forest area in countries w i th comparatively small forest areas like Germany or France. 
It is, however, more than an order of magnitude too large for a country w i th wide forest areas, 
such as Canada. A very small number of countries report forestry income in their nat ional 
income statistics. Yet, f rom there Fankhauser (1995) deduced an average forest value of about 
$2,000 km'2. The value in the middle income countries is assumed to be $400 km'2 and in low-
income countries $200 km'2. The resulting forestry loss is also reported in Table 11.5. In the short 
te rm, t imber supplies f rom all zones can be readily assured in intensively managed forests. 
Unfortunately, past intensive management, especially f ire suppression and tree selection at 
species and intra-specific levels, has created forests that may now be more vulnerable to f i re, 
pests and pathogens (Schowalter & Filip, 1993). Other scientists dispute this conclusion. Given 
the current degree of uncertainty over fu ture climates and the subsequent response of forests 
ecosystems, adaptation strategies (those enacted to minimize forest damage f rom changing 
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environment) entail greater degrees of risk than do mitigation measures (those enacted to 
reduce the rate or magnitude of the environmental changes) (IPCC, 1996, Chapter 15, p. 19). The 
figures are inexact in several ways. First, they are based on an equilibrium assessment of 2xC02 
damage, i.e. after enough time has passed for forests to migrate or adjust. It has been pointed 
out by Cline (1992) that the slow adjustment speed of forest systems may cause a temporary 
decline in forested area over 200-300 years, before a new equilibrium is reached. The estimates 
would in this respect be too optimistic. On the other hand they neglect the managerial response 
from the forestry industry, which may help to ease both transitional and equilibrium losses. On 
a conceptual level it should be noted that the approach used here is only an approximation of 
the exact welfare changes to producers and consumers. A more accurate analysis would have to 
be based on a general equilibrium assessment, which allows for price changes as well as trade 
effects. 
11.4. Discussion 
The agricultural sector is facing many challenges in the coming decades. Soil erosion and 
declining soil fertility as a result of overexploitaiton are manifest in many areas of the world. At 
the same time, the growing world population needs larger quantities of agricultural products 
and rapid growth of the demand for animal protein in developing countries wil l increase the 
need for arable land to produce animal fodder. In this context the additional impacts of climate 
change on the agricultural sector definitely pose challenges, either because of the potential 
threats or the new opportunities. Detailed analysis of the impacts of climate change on the 
agricultural sector requires detailed and regionalized climate scenarios, based on down scaling 
of the results of Global Circulation Models. 
To what extent the agricultural sector wi l l adapt to climate change depends on the flexibility 
and the quality of agricultural management in the various regions in the world. In most 
developed countries we can expect that technologies and crops wil l rapidly be adjusted to the 
changing circumstances, offering scope for higher productivity on the basis of higher 
temperatures, more precipitation and C02 fertilization for the relevant crops. 
The dispersion of pests wil l also change as a result of climate change, affecting yields and the 
need for additional plant protection. Finally, the agricultural sector may not only be influenced 
by the effects of climate change, but also by the policy measures to mitigate climate change. 
Energy taxes, or increased production of biomass may have an important impact on land use 
and prices of land, thus affecting the agricultural sector. Although model calculations shed 
some light on the aggregated impacts of climate change and climate change policies on the 
agricultural sector, it wi l l be extremely difficult to assess the final outcome of so many 
counteracting forces. This explains that a large variety of estimates of the impacts of climate 
change on the agricultural sector exists and the final outcome wil l only be known in a number 
of decades, when the actual impacts become evident. 
11.5. Conclusions 
The impacts of climate change on the agricultural sector wi l l be the result of a number of 
counteracting forces. Positive impacts may result from higher temperatures, more precipitation 
and C02 fertilization. Negative impacts are the result of weather extremes, land losses because 
of sea level rise, desertification, serious droughts and flooding. Global circulation models have 
so far not yet provided detailed regionalized information on temperature and precipitation that 
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allows scientifically justified detailed estimates of the impact of climate change on agriculture. 
However, a large number of studies exist that try to provide an impression of what can be 
expected as a result of doubling C02 concentrations. 
The impacts that are reported in this paper depend highly on the assumptions of adaptive 
behavior in the agricultural sector. If technologies and crops are selected according to the newly 
prevailing climatic circumstances, the negative impacts can be largely reduced and positive 
impacts can be reinforced. Some areas where agriculture at present is not successful wil l have 
new opportunities. Other areas may suffer from drought, desertification and or flooding. 
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Summary 
This paper deals with food security of poor rural households in vulnerable regions. The resource 
base that provides their food entitlements is weak: they face unfavorable agro-climatic 
conditions, scarcity of fertile soils and a lack of viable economic opportunities. Consequently, 
survival is usually a major element in their livelihood strategies. We wil l focus on two issues: 
food security strategies and characteristics of the food and related (agricultural inputs, labor, 
land, capital) markets. We stress the complex nature of food security problems in the semi-arid 
regions in West Africa. Food security policies, which do not take into account this complexity, 
are bound to fail. These policies can consist of strategies of the government and non-
governmental organizations. Such policies may improve transport services; help to set up 
insurance and other market institutions; support initiatives of the rural population to introduce, 
for instance, agricultural methods of low external inputs and improved methods of water and 
soil management; strengthen cooperative farmers' associations; create credit facilities to 
farmers and traders. 
12.1. Introduction 
This paper discusses some constraints and opportunities for the rural poor in semi-arid West 
Africa to achieve food security1. Poverty at household level is a major problem in the rural areas 
of this region. Food entitlements are scarce and fluctuate heavily from one year to another. In 
bad years most rural households are 'deficit producers' and their failure to earn sufficient off-
farm income makes them to live below the poverty line2. They are food insecure, i.e. they run a 
high risk of not having access to enough food for a healthy life. For example, the FAO estimated 
that 37% of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa were chronically undernourished in the period 
1
 In accordance with Sanders et al. (1996) we define the semi-arid region as the area with mean annual rainfall between 
500 and 1000 mm (which corresponds approximately to an average growing period of 90 to 179 days). Limited annual 
and highly variable rainfall severely limits agricultural production in these regions, together with low soil fertility 
levels. Cropping systems are dominated by millet and sorghum cultivation. 
2
 Country assessments of poverty have been undertaken during the last decade, with technical and financial assistance 
of the World Bank. Sijm (1997) discusses some results of these studies for Ghana, Tanzania, Mali and Malawi. 
Respectively 36%, 55%, 47% and 51% of the population in these countries live below the poverty line. It is also shown 
that the rural population is relatively over-represented in this group. In a recent critical review of 23 poverty 
assessment reports of Sub Sahara countries (Hanmer et ai, 1996) it has been concluded that more than 75 per cent of 
the poor live in rural areas in all but two of the countries. 
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1988-19901. Their vulnerability is the result of unfavorable agro-climatic conditions, scarcity of 
fertile soils, lack of viable economic opportunities and incidentally major social and political 
disruptions. Livelihood strategies are therefore mainly characterized by survival. 
Assessment of food (in)security and of perspectives to improve food entitlements requires a 
multidisciplinary approach as it depends on biophysical, socio-economic and political systems in 
a large sense. Production and exchange of food depend not only on food requirements and on 
the quality and quantity of production factors at the disposal of households or rural 
communities, but also on cultural values, political stability and economic opportunities. It is not 
our intention to provide a complete list of factors that determine food security. This paper 
focuses on two issues related to production and exchange decisions of the rural poor: their food 
security strategies and some characteristics of the food, agricultural inputs, land, labor and 
capital markets. We want to stress the complex nature of food security problems in the semi-
arid regions of West Africa. No blueprint exists to provide a solution for these problems. On the 
contrary, food security policies should be based on careful assessments of the constraints and 
the perspectives of rural development, taking into account the spatial and temporal dimensions 
of local food systems and inter-household differences with respect to food entitlements. This 
paper does not plead to postpone action, but to defer from ineffective top-down approaches. It 
emphasizes the different levels of policy-making, and the need to involve stakeholders (farmers, 
traders, project officials, extension agents, etc.). Finally, it nuances the regularly acclaimed 
recipe of 'market liberalization' to improve food security in these regions. To which extent the 
private market can indeed contribute to food security is one of the crucial questions for the next 
decade. 
In 12.2 of this paper the concept of food security is discussed (food security, food entitlements, 
chronic and transitory food insecurity). Section 12.3 focuses on strategies of the rural poor to 
earn a livelihood from the resource base at their disposal (production for self-sufficiency, non-
farm income and transfers). Section 12.4 presents the rural market as an allocation mechanism 
(arbitrage, imperfect information, incomplete markets, thin markets, markets and famines). 
Subsequently some local initiatives to improve the food situation are discussed. In 12.6 we 
discuss briefly the perspectives of sustainable agricultural intensification. Finally some 
conclusions for food security policy are drawn. 
12.2. Food security; some notions introduced 
Food Security is defined in the World Bank report on Poverty and Hunger as follows: 'Access by 
all people at all times to enough food for an active and healthy life' (World Bank, 1986). Enough 
food is defined on the basis of a minimum consumption norm: a standard for the minimum 
average daily per capita energy intake2. This nowadays widely accepted definition of food 
security contains at least two crucial elements: 
• the availability of food on the household level, through own production and marketing 
channels [e.g. buying on the local market); 
1
 FAO has defined chronically undernourished people as "those people with food energy consumption averaged over a 
year inadequate to support more than light activity and maintain body weight". This definition excludes productive 
manual labour (see FAO/WHO, 1992 and Sijm, 1997, p. 67, for further discussion of this standard). 
2
 FAO uses the 1.54 Basic Metabolic Rate (BMR) as a minimum standard (see FAO/WHO 1992). The factor 1.54 allows 
only for light activity. It is the energy expenditure of an individual while in a fasting state and lying at complete rest. 
The standard used by the World Bank (1986) is a minimum energy intake of 2070 or 1840 calories per capita per day 
(respectively 90% and 80% of FAO/WHO minimum requirements). 
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• the accessibility of food for individual households, resulting from exchange entitlements. 
Food Security and Food Entitlement 
During the 1970s, when serious concern arose with regard to cereal imbalances in Sahel 
countries, the term food security was hardly used at all. It certainly did not have the connotation 
of food shortages at the household or individual level, which it has today. Food security had a 
supply-oriented meaning. Its assessment was usually based on a comparison between national 
food needs over the season (year) based on the standard developed by FAO/WHO (see footnote 
4) for minimal food requirements per adult, and a national estimate of net food availability. 
Efforts of food donors and governments focused on the national food supply and in particular 
on the establishment of security stocks. 
Evaluations of food policies have shown that aggregated food-availability statistics are quite 
uninformative about the causes of hunger. Except for civil wars and during years of extreme 
drought, availability of food (on the national level) is not the constraining factor for household 
food security. However, a large part of the rural households in the vulnerable regions of semi-
arid West Africa is chronically food insecure (FAO/WHO, 1992). Sen (1981) stressed the 
importance of accessibility to food for consumers, not at an aggregated level but at the 
household or individual level. A household has several 'entitlements' at its disposal, which can 
be used to produce or buy goods and services. The bundle of entitlements consists of various 
components and varies among households: income from employment; the assets owned; the 
food produced for home consumption. If a farmer loses his crop due to some calamity like a 
drought, he loses entitlements. The same loss of entitlements occurs when he loses his job. 
Although good harvests attenuate the threat of food insecurity for many of the poor, it does not 
necessarily provide all of them with the required food entitlements. 
Chronic and transitory food insecurity 
The World Bank (1986) introduced a distinction between chronic and transitory food insecurity. 
Chronic food insecurity refers to a persistent inadequate diet caused by the inability to acquire 
food; transitory food insecurity refers to a temporary decline in a household's access to enough 
food. It results from a major shock in food production or household income - and in its worst 
form it produces hunger: famines. Although both types of food insecurity are linked and not 
always easy to distinguish, this classification has important consequences for the policy 
instruments to be developed (Drèze & Sen, 1989). In the context of famine prevention the 
crucial need for timely intervention often calls for a calculated reliance on relief agencies to 
supplement existing distributional mechanisms. Combating chronic hunger requires quite 
different and more permanent actions at the household level as we wil l see later. 
12.3. Food security strategies of the rural poor 
The food entitlements of the rural poor differ among individual households and from one zone 
to another. Rainfall, population density and infrastructure vary considerably within the semi-
arid region of West Africa, and determine both major constraints and options for rural 
development. Food entitlements differ also between households of the same sub-region. 
Kinship relations, and the domestic development cycle of farm-households were - and still are -
important factors which explain differences. Processes of individualization further increase the 
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differences in food entitlements between households1. The following two examples serve to 
illustrate the wide variety of situations. 
• In the northern areas of the semi-arid region of West Africa (sahelo-sudanian zone), food 
entitlements of households are largely based on livestock, and millet-cultivation. Millet is 
cultivated on small plots, which receive relatively large doses of organic manure. Average 
levels of food crop production of the (semi-)nomadic population in these regions are well 
below subsistence requirements. Livestock production depends on the fluctuating 
availabilities of fodder and water resources in the dry season (especially after a bad rainfall 
year). In bad years, animal densities are reduced through strategies of destocking (sales of 
animals) and by increased movements of herds to the southern regions. Besides, income 
from petty trade, non-livestock trade, artisanal (weaving, making of baskets, etc.) and other 
local non-farming activities and seasonal migration is used to buy additional food crops. 
Many households have developed important networks to diversify their sources of income 
(cf. Reardon & Matlon, 1989). The resulting set of food entitlements makes them food 
secure. However, the mobility of the pastoralists and their herds becomes increasingly 
constrained, as both human and animal densities rise in the southern areas2. 
• In the densely populated areas of the sudanian zone (700-900 mm), as for instance on the 
Central Plateau in Burkina Faso, food entitlements are predominantly based on food crop 
production (millet, sorghum, maize). In normal years, food production is generally sufficient 
to meet subsistence requirements. However, in the most vulnerable areas or in bad years, 
poverty is widespread and household food security is seriously threatened. Revenues from 
cash-crop production, livestock sales and local non-farm activities (e.g. processing) are 
generally insufficient to provide the required food entitlements. Agricultural productivity is 
very low in these regions. Present yield levels are obtained largely at the expense of the 
fertility of land. Fallow periods are shortened or have disappeared, and agriculture is 
extended into marginal areas (rangelands) without sufficient measures to restore soil 
nutrient levels. Animal husbandry is very much constrained by the limited availability of 
fodder resources (decrease of rangeland area, limited availability and competitive use of 
crop residues) and labor. 
Food security strategies depend on the local situation farmers are facing. They also differ from 
one year to another. Strategies are characterized by rationing and destocking of animal herds in 
'bad' years; in better years, farmers invest in food security stocks, livestock and other activities 
(e.g. Toulmin, 1995, Gué, 1996). Overtime, food security strategies have changed, among others 
as a consequence of increasing population pressure on land. In the densely populated zones of 
the Central Plateau of Burkina Faso over the years several distinct phases can be distinguished: 
Shifting cultivation: the traditional agricultural system of shifting cultivation, based on the 
natural regeneration and maintenance of the original vegetation (fallow periods of 10 to 15 
years, after 3 to 5 years of cultivation). 
• Expansion of cultivated areas: the growth of the rural population causes an extension of 
cultivated areas in "virgin" areas and, more and more, a decrease of fallow periods, thus 
creating an agricultural system based on (semi-)permanent cultivation with relatively short 
periods of fallow, next to some permanently cultivated fields. The increased cultivation of 
1
 The process of individualisation refers both to a weakening of the socio-economic ties between households of the 
same extended family (clan, hamshed), as to the weakening of customary family authorities (see e.g. Kohier, 1971, 
Marchai, 1983). Migration, increased market-integration, and the persistence of a 'survival'-economy are often claimed 
to be the dominant forces behind these processes of individualisation. 
2 Another f actor is the development of horticulture on the low-lying soils around dams and water reservoirs (carried out 
immediately after the rainy season). 
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cash crops (cotton in colonial times, groundnuts thereafter) also induced an increase in area 
cultivated per active member (see Hart, 1982). 
• Extensification of cropping practices: as the fertilization measures (fallow, organic 
manure) and intercropping and rotation patterns are not sufficient to compensate for the 
extraction of nutrients from the cultivated soils, soil fertility declines. In order to cope with 
the decrease of soil fertility levels, more land (in terms of ha/active member of the 
household) is cultivated, often at the expense of more intensive methods of land 
preparation, sowing and weeding. This extensification of cropping systems (cf. Marchai, 
1983) is only aggravating the phenomena of soil degradation, and contributes also to an 
increased competition between cropping and livestock systems, and in particular between 
sedentary farmers and (semi-)nomadic pastoralists. 
• Marginalization, migration and farmers' initiatives: the decrease of labor productivity (as 
a consequence of soil degradation, and the scarcity of new arable lands) stimulates farmers 
to look for other opportunities to invest their own labor: livestock, non-farming activities1 
and migration. The diversification of revenues is an important strategy to balance crop 
production deficits. However, since the local possibilities to diversify are very limited, a large 
and growing number of households becomes increasingly dependent on revenues from 
seasonal migration and income transfers from migrated parents. A large number of 
households finds itself in such a situation, having less and less access to sufficient food. 
Some of them, in particular the younger heads of a farm-household, take the decision to 
emigrate to higher potential zones in the sub-humid regions; others try, often with the help 
of extension services or rural development projects, to increase agricultural production and 
to restore soil fertility through the adoption of soil and water conservation methods. 
Not all these changes in food security strategies were directly related to just rural population 
density. Some other important factors are: the progress of Islamic religion, climatic cycles 
('good' rainfall years in the '60s, droughts in the early '70s and '80s) and the influences of 
colonial and post-colonial policies. Moreover, changing food security strategies themselves 
affect rural society, the organization of labor, the intra-household division of relationships and 
the inter-household economic relationships, and tend to induce further changes. Seasonal 
migration, which is part of the food security strategies of a large number of households in the 
semi-arid region, is a good example of this. Its effects go far beyond the short-term food 
security situation of these farm-households, as it strongly influences 'traditional' relationships in 
the rural areas from which they migrated (Mabogunje, 1990). 
Gender relations are of particular interest here. It is difficult to generalize about the evolution of 
gender relations, as there are large differences from one region, class or ethnic group to 
another. However, in almost all regions of semi-arid West-Africa, women have - often 
successfully - tried to diversify their incomes, through animal husbandry, horticulture, trade 
(vegetables, etc.), with only one major exception: seasonal migration. These new sources of 
income are needed to counterbalance the decrease of crop production from their small 
individual fields2. These individual plots are often the less fertile fields of the farm, and yield-
levels have dropped dramatically on these plots. In some regions the crops cultivated on the 
1
 Non<ropping activities have been important in every different phase described here. However, livestock-production 
and other important income-earning activities (such as trade) were in the first phases only allowed on a limited scale. 
Capital accumulation through these kind of activities was often restricted to some households with substantial status. 
Nowadays, a growing number of households and individuals are practising livestock and trade to counterbalance 
decreasing and variable crop harvests. 
2
 Peulh-women are the major exception here. Generally they do not cultivate, not even on the 'common' fields of their 
husbands. 
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individual plots have changed too, from cash-crops (groundnuts) and sauce-plants, to cereals; 
different reasons may explain for this change: a decreasing ratio of the producer-prices for cash-
crops and the consumer-prices for cereals and/or an increase of women's responsibilities to 
provide food for the family from their own individual granaries. 
12.4. Food allocation by the market 
Many policy-makers and researchers tend to view sedentary rural households in the semi-arid 
tropics as almost exclusively dependent on their own cereal production to ensure household 
food security. Rural markets are seen as primary markets that drain surpluses to urban deficit 
markets. Various recent research results have undermined this view and show that many farm 
households are net buyers of substantial food quantities (see Reardon et ai, 1989 and 1992)-
Revenues from livestock and non-farm activities provide an important part of the necessary 
food entitlements for the rural population. Despite the growing importance of markets for the 
distribution of food, a major limitation should be stressed. The market is only operational if 
consumers have sufficient purchasing power. Implicitly, market advocates presuppose that 
consumers have the food entitlements at their disposal, which ignores the problem that many 
households lack these assets. 
The rural economies are increasingly monetized and nowadays food markets play a crucial role 
in food distribution. Petty trade and processing activities are an important income source for 
many women. Remuneration is often low, but it is attractive when no other opportunities exist. 
Properly functioning markets wi l l serve both the producers at the one end of the marketing 
chain and the consumers at the other end; market failures or missing markets wil l affect 
opportunities for producers, as well as food availability for consumers. Opinions on the 
functioning of food markets have shifted over the years. During the 1960s the debate stressed 
"market failures", in line with the desire of newly independent states to plan economic 
development. Subsequently, interventionist policies were developed to correct for these 
failures. However, the 1970s have shown that many of the so-called "market failures" were only 
replaced by "government failures". In line with these experiences, structural adjustment policies 
in the 1980s and 1990s advocated market liberalization, which put to an end the interventionist 
policies of many governments. However, several market imperfections persist. 
Seasonal and spatial arbitrage with imperfect information 
Food production is not synchrone with food consumption. In the semi-arid areas of West Africa, 
producers have only one harvest a year, while consumption is continuous. Moreover, harvests 
are regularly threatened by climatic hazards. This seasonal aspect may cause substantial price 
fluctuations, as storage costs (due to storage losses and to capital needed to finance the stock) 
are important and information on local supply and demand conditions is imperfect. Efficient 
temporal arbitrage is important for food security. However, most traders operate with very 
small funds while most farmers have little withholding capacity (Saul, 1987)- Imperfect credit 
and insurance markets and imperfect information hamper the functioning of seasonal arbitrage. 
In the same vein, we observe that the place of food production often does not correspond to 
the place of food consumption. Moreover, after a bad year production in neighboring regions 
wil l be affected as well (Snijders et ai, 1988) and arbitrage over long distances may be necessary 
to provision consumers. Consequently, efficient spatial arbitrage is crucial for the food system. 
As described above, the food chain is complex as many food producers are constrained by 
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variable seasonal agro-ecological conditions and appear to be net food buyers. This implies that 
local supply and demand conditions vary between years and within years. Adequate 
information on local market conditions is a prerequisite for successful traders, but difficult to 
obtain in most of these countries as the telecommunication infrastructure is imperfect and 
information depends on personal networks of individual traders. 
On a perfect market, "(....) prices convey information from households to firms concerning what 
consumers want, and from firms to households about the resource costs associated with 
consuming each commodity" (Stiglitz, 1994). However, one of the major constraints which 
hampers the functioning of the rural markets is imperfect information on the potential market 
opportunities. Traders are reluctant to share their information with competitors. Due to the 
seasonality in production, the cereal trade is a volatile business. Some information simply does 
not exist due to uncertainty in the production process. Other sources of information may exist 
but are not always accessible for all traders and farmers. Moreover, official regulations are not 
transparent and their implementation arbitrary. The existence of oligopolistic markets often 
seems to be based on the possibility for certain wholesalers to detain specific information. In 
practice we observe that traders stick to their individual marketing networks which are nested 
in particular geographical regions. 
Thin markets 
The thinness of the food market is another feature that explains the high costs related to 
market transactions. Most producers are peasants who are to a high degree self-sufficient with 
regard to cereals and are incidentally buying/selling their deficit/surplus in the market. The 
grain stock is perceived as a liquid source that may be used for urgently needed household 
necessities. The problem for the market is that most of these transactions concern small and 
highly variable quantities, scattered all over the country's territory. This fragmented structure 
inflates transaction costs: the assembly of cereals becomes a labor-intensive activity. The 
average retailers' turnover, per market day, is often less than 100 kg, while the major group of 
small-scale wholesalers may collect at most 1000 kg. The development of a personal network of 
trade agents and farmers may provide traders the necessary information on potential suppliers. 
However, the elaboration of such a network presupposes the availability of sufficient working 
capital and takes time, which constitutes an entry barrier for potential competitors. 
In order to evade the high transaction costs, farmers may increase the number of non-market 
transactions and consequently aggravate the thinness of the market. Cereals can be exchanged 
within the family and some services and goods can be paid in kind. Matthews (1986) formulated 
this problem as follows: "Family production tends to make for high production costs because it 
restricts exploitation of scale economies and may create mismatches between talents and 
occupation. On the other hand it tends to reduce transaction costs, because if instead you have 
a lot of dealing with strangers you have to devote more resources to checking up on their 
personal characteristics and safeguarding yourself against opportunism". If transaction costs 
are high, it wil l decrease the competitiveness of farmers and, consequently, they may decide to 
withdraw from the market (see de Janvry et ai, 1991). The food security of farmers that do not 
have other food entitlements wil l be at stake if production falls short. This situation is quite 
common for the farmers in densely populated areas of the sudanian zone as mentioned in 12.3-
Markets and Famines 
Various authors, who have studied food insecurity and hunger situations, have particularly 
discussed the relationship between famines and markets (Ravallion, 1987; Drèze & Sen, 1989). 
They have documented situations where market failures, thin markets and missing food 
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markets have made hunger and famines more severe. Markets work badly during famines when 
scarcities are exacerbated by panic buying and excess hoarding. The food insecurity is 
aggravated by the seasonality of food production, which makes that food demand is highest 
during the hungry season, whereas the availability of food stocks is at its lowest level. 
Consequently, governments should be alert and in drought prone areas policies are necessary 
to attenuate the problem of transitory food-insecurity. 
Missing or Incomplete markets 
In all countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the set of commodity markets is highly incomplete. 
Imperfections in three related commodity markets, providing essential services for cereal trade, 
hamper the functioning of the food market and increase the transaction costs: 
• Transport services are only limitedly available. A small group of large-scale wholesalers have 
their own transport facilities, but the majority of small-scale traders depend on public 
transport facilities, which are mainly oriented toward the urban centers. During rainy 
seasons large rural areas may even become inaccessible. Consequently, the transport of 
commodities is less flexible than required for optimal trade flows. 
• Credit facilities constrain the commercial activities of traders and farmers, in particular the 
storage function. The formal financial sector does not provide credit for trade activities and 
even if credit facilities do exist, most traders and farmers lack the necessary collateral (see 
Zeiler et al., 1997). 
• Finally, an insurance and futures market accessible to individual traders and farmers almost 
does not exist. Hedging against price fluctuations is impossible. Only recently some 
experiences can be observed (see below). However, the institutional structure necessary to 
guarantee the enforcement of contracts between individuals is weak, often resulting in the 
non-existence of this market. 
12.5. Alternative local initiatives to improve the food 
situation 
During the last 20 years a growing number of farmers have taken new and promising initiatives 
to master the situation again. These activities include among others: 
• activities on the farm-household level: improvement of strategies to reduce risks of low 
yields by careful choice of different varieties and of intercropping and rotation patterns, and 
by timely land-preparation and sowing; adoption of low external input methods to restore 
soil fertility and water management methods to improve hydrological capacities of soils; use 
of animal draught power for land preparation and weeding; agroforestry and the 
integration of animal husbandry and crop production; investments in non-farming activities 
(trade, processing); 
• 'collective activities' by farmers' groups: village cooperatives working together on the 
construction of small water-reservoirs, anti-erosive measures and horticulture; exchange of 
information between farmer groups; education and information activities; establishment of 
cereal banks with the aim of building up reserve stocks to strengthen food security in the 
village and to improve the local distribution and marketing system. 
They have taken up the twofold challenge: survival in the "hungry season" and the 
transformation towards a more sustainable agrarian system. Some of these initiatives are 
almost entirely based on strategies of 'self-reliance'. However, others do rely directly or 
indirectly on market-exchanges. These initiatives can be individual or collective; the latter, often 
structured by 'new' forms of agrarian institutions, aim to improve access to product- and factor-
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markets (in particular food, finance and inputs) for some group of relatively 'isolated' farmers. 
Cereal banks are a good example of the latter. They substitute to a certain extent for market-
exchanges, but at the same time they play a key-role in improving access of farmers to rural 
markets. 
Cereal Banks 
Cereal banks are a type of organization that may challenge the existing market structure (Saul, 
1987; Yonli, 1997). They concern a communal village organization that coordinates the 
marketing and storage of cereals. In general, cereals are bought in harvest time and sold during 
the lean season to members of the community. The idea behind this structure is that farmers in 
the rural areas are obliged to sell a part of their production just after the harvest in order to 
settle debts and other financial obligations. The same farmers have to buy during the lean 
season to supplement the cereal deficit. Put differently, they sell low and buy high. The 
difference between these prices may be important when farmers in the dry regions are 
concerned. In these regions cereals have to be imported over large distances. Rural population 
density is low, meaning that the market is thin. Large-scale traders are not interested in 
provisioning these regions, and supply may even be lacking. Under these circumstances a 
farmers' organization (cereal bank) may be useful; there are opportunities to beat the market. 
However, it should be noted that many cereal banks, established during the last decade, failed. 
Often, the objectives were too ambitious and organizational problems were frequent. 
Cereal auction market (futures market) 
A more recent initiative in Burkina Faso is interesting in this respect: the development of a 
cereal auction market. In 1991 the auction started as an experiment, with the aim to facilitate 
the exchange between farmers' organizations, in particular cereal banks. Nowadays also private 
traders are participating in this market. Yonli (1997) indicates that the auction facilitates the 
functioning of cereal banks as it may provide the structure to link directly surplus and deficit 
cereal banks and, consequently, limit transaction costs. Moreover, the auction may introduce a 
futures cereal market as contracts can be concluded for delivery at a certain time, which may 
result in an effective instrument to protect farmers against price changes. 
12.6. Perspectives of sustainable agricultural intensification 
The initiatives of the rural populations in the semi-arid regions of West Africa to increase 
agricultural productivity are almost exclusively based on new or improved methods of low-
external-input agriculture. The importance of these methods is not contested here, often they 
succeed to increase applications of organic manure, and to fine-tune low-cost technologies to 
fight erosion, to improve the use of crop residues, efc. (Prudencio, 1983; Dugué, 1989; Rochette, 
1989). However, the margins to increase agricultural productivity in the longer run without the 
increased use of 'external' inputs are small (Maatman et al., 1996,1998). Agricultural production 
systems based on an efficient combination of low-cost water conservation methods and modest 
applications of chemical fertilizers (rock phosphate, imported complex fertilizers) seem to be 
the only realistic option to increase agricultural productivity substantially, and to maintain -or 
even to restore - soil fertility (e.g. Sanders, 1996). The adoption of 'external' inputs, and in 
particular of chemical fertilizers, gives rise to considerable financial risks. These financial risks 
are determined by: 
• the prices farmers have to pay for the 'external' inputs; 
• the availability of credits to buy 'external' inputs; 
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• the agricultural technology - and knowledge about technological options; 
• the prices farmers receive for their agricultural produces. 
Most farmers in the semi-arid regions are unwilling to buy 'external' inputs, as a consequence of 
uncertain supply, the absence of local credit systems and -last but not least - unfavorable and 
fluctuating price/value ratios. We recall that non-market exchange of labor, land, capital and 
agricultural produces by means of socio-familial networks are predominant characteristics of 
these farm-households, as is their dependence on low cost agricultural methods and the 
production for self-sufficiency. Some actions that may decrease the financial risks are: 
• fine-tuning of technological options (optimal choices of chemical fertilization according to 
climatic zone, soil type, and crops cultivated, complementary measures of soil fertility 
management and of water harvesting) through research and extension; 
• improving the accessibility, both geographically and financially, of 'external' inputs, for 
example through the development of infrastructure (roads, facilitation of storage, transport 
and marketing of inputs) and of appropriate credit systems; 
• development of market outlets for agricultural commodities and the reduction of 
transaction costs. 
Decisions about the adoption of chemical fertilizers ultimately depend on the comparison of 
costs and benefits with other economic opportunities of the farm-household. These alternative 
options include investments in other local non-cropping sectors, (seasonal) migration and 
'insurance' strategies to cope with crop production risks and to decrease food insecurity 
(security stocks of cereals, animal stocks, social relations). 
Land use rights and the importance of farmers' organizations 
The adoption of alternative methods of soil fertility management depend to a large extent on 
the degree of control individual farm-households exercise on the lands they cultivate, i.e. on the 
system of land-use rights. Land-use rights can differ much between households, and even 
between different fields of the same farm-household. When land-use rights are very insecure, 
this may prevent the farmer to invest in soil fertility improvement (for example the plantation of 
trees, application of chemical fertilization). Such investments may be forbidden, or they may not 
be profitable in the very short term. Land-use rights are in particular insecure for young farm-
households, for 'immigrated' farmers, for pastoralists who have settled down at the border of a 
village, and for women within the farm-household. Systems of land-use rights are sometimes 
very complex, especially in the densely populated areas. Moreover, processes of 
individualization have decreased the authority of the traditional land-chiefs ("chefs de terre"). 
The development of 'alternative' social structures of land-use management, reinforcing the 
responsabilisation of rural populations to manage their own natural resources (also with 
respect to the rangelands, the use of forest lands, and of water resources) are important 
conditions for every sustainable rural development. The question of farmer organization is also 
of particular importance in the context of imperfect markets. Cooperation between farmers may 
improve their accessibility to marketing networks as we have already discussed in 12.5. 
12.7. Consequences for food security policy 
Experiences with food policies in the last decades provide ample evidence that market failures 
and government failures persist. The policy challenge with regard to the food market is to 
develop a, structure that minimizes the transaction costs and maximizes food security at the 
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household level. The government remains to be an important actor in the market. It regulates 
markets and reinforces the rules. Nevertheless, food security cannot be "planned", even if 
policies are decentralized and executed by regional and (sub)regional government agencies. 
The market proved to be an important instrument to regulate food distribution and in particular 
the individual strategies of farmers and traders. However, we also stressed that market 
incentives can fail. We conclude that civil organizations at the intermediate level may provide a 
solution for some of the mentioned food distribution problems (e.g. farmers' organizations for 
cereal banks and rural credit, the distribution of land rights and the implementation of soil 
conservation techniques) 
In our view, there is a strong need for flexible 'learning' and decentralized approaches to rural 
development. Such approaches imply that decisions can be fine-tuned to the specific 
circumstances of the region, and - more important -that these can be negotiated thoroughly 
with all different stakeholders: farmers, traders, project officials, extension agents, etc. Several 
lessons can be drawn from this paper with regard to food security policies: 
• The constraints and options for the rural populations are very diverse. Food security policies 
should take this heterogeneity of situations into account. One way of dealing with this kind 
of heterogeneity is to opt for a "multipurpose enabling approach" (de Janvry & Sadoulet, 
1993). Such an enabling approach should include "education, training, health, 
infrastructure, the promotion of grass-roots organizations, responsive research institutions 
and increasing options for women, youth, ethnic groups and low castes" (ibid., 43-44). 
However, some choices have to be made and should be based on a careful assessment of 
the constraints and potential of different (sub-)regions, and of different types of farm-
households (ethnic groups, sedentary farmers/ pastoralists, "immigrant" and local 
inhabitants, etc.). For example, in the most northern zones of the semi-arid regions 
agricultural intensification seems not to be the best option, investments should focus on 
livestock development, rangeland management, non-farming incomes and should support 
migration. In the more southern areas, intensification of agriculture could be an option. 
However, in terms of labor and financing some investments seem necessary here - at least in 
the most densely populated areas - to restore soil fertility levels in order to decrease 
production risks, and by that also the financial risks of applying 'external inputs'. 
• Perfect markets do not exist - not in the semi-arid regions of West Africa, nor elsewhere. 
They are a theoretical construction. Transaction costs are particularly high in the semi-arid 
regions of West Africa. There are good reasons why markets 'fail' in semi-arid West Africa. 
Farming systems striving for self-sufficiency (based on family labor, non-market exchange 
and management of land and other natural resources through kinship relations) can be 
more efficient than, or supplement, market institutions. The challenge therefore is to deal 
with both market and non-market exchange in food security policies: 1) to improve the 
market-structure where possible and adequate (in particular with respect to food and other 
agricultural commodities, inputs and credits); 2) to stimulate the development of grass-roots 
organizations, in order to improve the functioning of 'agrarian institutions' (village 
platforms to manage the natural resources, farmer groups to increase knowledge of 
agricultural techniques, cereal banks to improve distribution of food, solidarity groups to 
increase the accessibility of credits, etc.) 
• Processes of social and economic change seldomly have only winners. Some specific policies 
are needed to target those groups who may become marginalized (pastoralists who have 
recently settled at the border of a village, without proper land-use rights; other 
"immigrated" households with insecure land-use rights, (young) households with not 
enough land, etc.). 
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Finally we conclude that the perspectives remain bleak, even when government policies 
intervene in the best possible way. Households in the semi-arid regions of West Africa already 
face considerable risk of food shortages and environmental degradation severely threatens the 
prospects in the longer run. Demographic growth is another puzzling factor, it may aggravate 
environmental degradation, but it might also increase the perspectives for market development, 
and open up new economic opportunities. One thing is clear, there is no easy way out. The 
perspectives depend on the creativeness and perseverance of the rural populations. Food 
security policies, which improve market infrastructure and facilitate the development of 
efficient agrarian institutions in these regions, play an important role, but should not be 
overrated. More could and should be done to help farmers in these regions to break through 
the vicious circle of poverty, overexploitation of natural resources and environmental 
degradation: 
First, as we have stated above, sustainable rural development in these regions requires 
considerable investments - at least in the short term - to stop the degradation of natural 
resources and to restore degraded soils (at least when we accept that mass-migration to the 
sub-humid guinean zones is not a realistic option1). Public investments seem necessary to help 
farmers improving their soils. 
Second, food security and rural development in the semi-arid regions crucially depend on 
economic progress on a larger (geographic) scale, and in particular on industrial development 
and agricultural intensification in the 'higher-potential' sub-humid regions. Both industrial 
development and agricultural intensification in the better-endowed sub-humid regions create 
additional (non-local) income-earning opportunities. This could stimulate seasonal and 
permanent migration from the semi-arid regions, and hence lead to higher non-cropping 
incomes and to less environmental pressure. Moreover, industrial development could stimulate 
farmers to intensify agricultural- and non-agricultural production, to increase the marketing of 
food crops and/or other commodities and to buy inputs ("growth-linkages"). 
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13. The role of Asia in world food security 
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CT. de Wit Graduate School for Production Ecology, Bomsesteeg 47, NL-6708 PD Wageningen, 
The Netherlands 
13.1. Introduction 
The World food situation in the coming decades depends to a large extent on the changes in 
Asia. When food security cannot be guaranteed in that continent world food security is in 
jeopardy. It is forthat reason that I wi l l concentrate in this contribution on food production, 
food supply and food security in Asia. I refrain from a description of the development of food 
production in a historical context. It is well known that during the last millennium food 
production in all places of the world has increased considerably. In the last centennial 
worldwide the food production increased six fold, whereas the world population increased five 
fold. Changes in diet, mainly the enormous increase in consumption of animal proteins, have 
caused a larger increase in demand than when the elementary food requirements were just 
fulfilled with a vegetarian diet. 
On a world scale food production can meet the increasing demand (FAO, 1993; WRR, 1994). 
There are sufficient possibilities to increase food production at various places through increased 
land productivity. The differences between various regions is dramatic (WRR, 1994)- In Latin 
America a self-sufficiency ratio of more than 26 is possible, whereas East and South Asia are just 
beyond a self-sufficiency ration of one. This self-sufficiency ratio is based on an analysis of the 
potentials of food production in agro-ecological terms in various places of the world, in relation 
to the demographic development in these parts of the world projected for the year 2040. The 
potentials are determined by the prevailing climate, the conditions of the soil and the 
characteristics of the crops. The demand for food is dictated by the demographic development 
and the prevailing diet. The calculations of potentials are based on simulation studies with crop 
growth models and geographic information concerning soil, climate and water availability. The 
figure is theoretical but it demonstrates the wide variation in self-sufficiency ration in various 
part of the world. It is due to the ratio between number of people per km2 and the amount of 
(potential) arable land that the big variation in self-sufficiency ration is so wide. 
In fact the situation at present is a very mixed one. On the one hand Europe (including 
Northwest, South and East Europe) has ample opportunity to feed its population. There is a 
surplus of land, in North and South America the surplus of land is even larger. All types of 
government policy (set aside change of land use) in North America and to a much lesser extent 
in Europe, are oriented to a decrease of cultivated land. In Africa and East and South Asia that 
situation is considerably different. In Africa the spiral of unsustainability (Rabbinge, 1994) has to 
be broken. Land security is there in theory not a problem, but lack of inputs causes very low 
land productivity. Assuming optimum conditions that are considered for potential calculations, 
the possibilities of self-sufficiency of all African nations, even when population increase takes 
place according to the highest population growth scenario of the United Nations, is possible, 
but it requires an enormous change in land use and agriculture. Several proposals to stimulate 
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agricultural development in Africa have been developed (FAO, 1995). They basically have all in 
common that agrotechnological changes using external inputs to upgrade and restore the many 
outmined soils and extensive land use change are needed to reach the envisaged development. 
At some places in Africa such changes occur but it is very modest in relation to the enormous 
change that is needed. Nevertheless, the world food situation does not depend so much on 
those changes in Africa. Within the continent the lack of improvements wil l have dramatic 
effects, but on a world scale Africa is in principle not the key problem. That seems to conflict 
with observations of IFPRI (1995) and FAO (Alexandratos, 1995), but as the absolute size of the 
population and the relative small room for maneuvering in Asia is so very important, it is 
especially in this continent that food security should be achieved. The world food situation in 
the 21st century wil l be dominated by the changes that occur in Asia. 
13.2. The food situation in Asia 
About two third of the world population is living in Asia and the demand for food is enormous. 
This is the first reason for Asia's major effect on the world's food situation. The demographic 
development in absolute terms, and in relative terms the increasing contribution to the world's 
population, wil l have major consequences for the food security in that part of the world. The 
growth rate in South and East Asia was decreasing from 1.9 to 1.3% during the last decade, but 
in absolute numbers that means still an increase at least 300 up to 800 million people in that 
part of the world by 2025. 
More impressive than the absolute population numbers is the population density expressed in 
numbers per km2 cultivated arable land. The density in many provinces of China is 10 to 20 fold 
the density in various member states of the European Union. This means that the population 
density in the majority of the provinces and states of Asia is such that the availability of arable 
land per capita is less than 500 m2. The increase in total productivity is only possible through a 
higher production per ha. During the last decade there was a considerable economic growth in 
nearly all countries of Asia. The present economic crisis has reduced the growth figures but the 
big trend is still one of a considerable increase. The higher income per capita is affecting the 
consumption pattern. These diet changes, characterized by a much higher consumption of 
animal proteins such as eggs, wheat, cheese and especially meat does affect the need for 
increased plant production considerably. Per kg of beef some 8 kg of grains are necessary. The 
diet changes are in these areas of the world more demanding for the primary production than 
the present changes in population numbers (Penning de Vries et ai, 1995). 
Most good agricultural land in Asia is situated in coastal zones or close to rivers and very often 
places where megacities develop. As a result the area of agricultural land is decreasing 
especially at those places. Industrial development and urbanization require extensive land areas 
and these are normally found in the close neighborhood where agriculture is removed. 
Substantial expansion of agricultural land to meet the increasing demand for food is therefore 
not possible. The amount of land use for industry, urbanization or infrastructure is still relatively 
limited but the places where this well endowed land is situated makes the impact of this 
decrease in agricultural land in terms of total production more than proportional. That is 
another reason for a threatening shortage in regional or local food production in Asia. 
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To feed the Asians the surplus of land in Europe and America could play an important role. 
However, that will be limited in relative, although big in absolute terms. It wil l be limited for 
three reasons: 
1. A structural food production and export from USA and Europe to Asia presumes sufficient 
money to pay for it. That is a sweeping assumption. 
2. The distribution of the food and its allocation requires an enormous transport and 
distribution system. The logistics of a substantial part of the food supply from abroad is even 
in physical terms nearly impossible. When 10% of the rice demand of China is covered by 
imports this is more than 50% of the world rice market and it requires a train of the length 
from Amsterdam to New Delhi. 
3. The structural dependence on food imports may create political imbalance and cause 
geopolitical instabilities. 
These reasons once more underline the importance of aiming at self sufficiency at regional 
level. That is of course not always possible and an open world market may help to adjust and 
compensate for shortages that may occur due to disasters, reduced yields due to apparent 
exogenous effects, such as a year of very bad weather. 
The reasons mentioned above all lead to one conclusion. The food production in Asia has to 
increase considerably during the coming decades and is crucial for the world food situation. 
With less land, less water and optimal balanced production systems that make ample use of 
preventive and biological control methods, an increasing number of mouths with more 
demanding diets have to be fed. To guarantee good natural resource management at field, 
cropping system, farm and ecoregional level, dramatic shifts in agriculture are needed. 
13-3. Possibilities for food production in Asia 
When China imported in 1995 and 1996 substantial amounts of rice and wheat from various 
places in the world, some observers saw this as a symptom of structural shortages in the years 
to come. The response of the Chinese authorities was such that the increase of food production 
has been regained. Imports are less than before, but the question remains whether various 
Asian countries wil l have the possibilities to produce sufficient food for their growing 
population. Studies on the availability of good agricultural land and best agricultural practice 
demonstrate that this is possible (Luyten et o/., 1997). However, at some places that requires 
dramatic shifts from present to other land use and considerable change in agricultural 
technologies. There is in Asia no room for an agriculture that does not make optimal use of the 
land and external inputs and resources. Good environmental practice and agricultural practice 
requires an intensive and higher productive agriculture. 
It is for that reason that a movement away from productivity, technology and adverse to inputs 
and use of external resources is so dangerous. The possibilities to feed the Asian population 
numbers with an organic farming system are absent. Bans on artificial nitrogen fertilizers wil l 
especially in this part of the world cause immediate structural shortages of food. A reduction of 
the number of mouths to be fed with some two billion is then necessary whereas the trend is of 
course still an increase. The adagium 'think globally act locally' does not imply that external 
inputs should be banned but used in a rational, intelligent and diligent way. That way leads to 
high effectivity and efficiency and the best use of all resources. 
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This type of agriculture with innovations at systems level is currently developed at many places 
around the world. It makes use of the best knowledge and insight at process level that helps to 
improve agrotechnological practices and it stimulates better land use. It is a combination of 
Integrated Pest Management, Integrated Water and Nutrient Management and Precision 
agriculture. That advanced high technological agriculture is productive, efficient in use of 
natural resources and stimulates ecological continuity at all levels, field, farm and region. 
The tendency to neglect agriculture (World Bank studies) in part of Asia is a very dangerous 
one. The fragility of food self-sufficiency is demonstrated through the recent experiences in 
China, Indonesia and the Philippines. Investment in agricultural innovations and research, 
guidance of markets and amplification of public-private partnerships in this sector are needed 
to achieve the increase of food production in general and more specifically rice with some 50% 
before 2025. That seems a mission impossible, but it is not so when the right attitude and 
dynamics are promoted. 
Steps to be taken involve a revolution of agricultural systems. The decrease of labor in 
agriculture due to expected considerable changes in labor and land productivity and the related 
changes in the society wi l l have to be guided by a combined public/private investment program. 
The need for democratic institutions is increasing. The change in the attitude towards market 
requires a reengineering of the rural society and this is probably the most important change in 
Asia in the coming decade. 
13.4. Conclusions 
1. The role of Asia in world food security is vital and cannot be underestimated. 
2. The only way to ensure food production in the future is increase of production per hectare. 
Expansion of agricultural area is only very limited possible and the changes of diet that take 
place cannot be stopped. Population control is needed and wil l help but requires much 
effort. In fact, the increase in income and elementary conditions of welfare are the best 
factors to affect population control. 
3. The room for locally oriented agriculture that makes only very limited use of external inputs 
and that is based on organic farming principles is very limited. It would be very dangerous 
for Asia to go in that direction. Increased productivity requires external inputs, sophisticated 
technological and maximum use of ecological principles but bans on inputs or particular 
technologies will be counter productive. 
4. All principles of high technology agriculture have to be implemented. That includes the best 
of precision agriculture, ecoregional approaches, integrated nutrient, water and pest 
management. A true production ecological approach wil l be the best guarantee for 
achieving the multiple goals of food security, protection of the environment and having 
room/space for other activities. 
5. The role of America and Europe to feed the Asians is and wil l be limited in the future. It 
would be unwise and physically impossible to rely on major structural food transports from 
these continents to Asia. 
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14. Investing in the proper functioning of markets 
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Abstract 
For developing countries that surfer from a food security problem, the slogan "trade no aid" is 
now more relevant than ever. First, aid flows have been stagnating, and there are many 
competitors for aid funds: countries from the former Eastern block, South East Asia bail-outs 
and there is much pressure to use the funds for peace-keeping operations and commercial 
investments. In fact, developing countries have increasingly recognized the importance of 
private foreign investment, though many of them have by now experienced the disadvantages 
of accepting footloose foreign capital. Secondly, the alternative of autarky has become less 
viable than ever, as virtually no country can develop without imports of oil, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, or computer software on the global market. Finally, there is general 
recognition that it is impossible to address the hunger problem exclusively by means of 
targeted aid to the poor, not only because of the vast sums of money this would require, but 
also because of the problems created by aid-dependence itself. In short, as emphasized in the 
Rome Declaration of '96, food security policy is primarily a matter of eliminating existing 
barriers to private initiative on domestic and international markets, while both national 
governments and international institutions are primarily seen as providers of an "enabling 
environment" for the proper functioning of these markets. The paper argues that past shifts in 
development paradigms in general and food security polices in particular, reflect the trend in 
ongoing debates in economics (macro/micro) and philosophy (positivism/postmodernism). It 
reviews some of these shifts, and sketches broad areas of consensus around the theme 
indicated in the title. 
14.1. Introduction 
The organizers of this seminar series were thinking truly big when they asked the speakers of the 
present session to answer the question "How to achieve food security?", no more, no less. It can 
safely be presumed that at this stage of the seminar series, after thirteen lectures on the subject, 
this audience has no need for any further clarification of the concept of food security itself. This 
enables us to postulate that achieving food security largely means achieving absence of food 
insecurity which in turn has become synonymous to eliminating poverty, and thus to successful 
development. Food security is a useful concept, because it maintains a clear focus on poverty and 
vulnerable groups, as well as on the various threats to human welfare in general, be it 
environmental degradation or political disorders, thus pointing to existing and potential 
problems. However, the concept gives no indication whatsoever about the ways to resolve these 
problems and i t is the other part of the question, "How to achieve ...?" that makes it so immense, 
as it raises three underlying issues: "Food security for whom?", "Food security by whom?" and 
1
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finally "How?". With respect to the first, let us agree that we mean food security for all, now and 
in the future. The second and third questions are far more difficult to answer. In other words who 
are the actors that should see to it that poverty is eliminated and how should they proceed? 
This paper starts with some remarks about past shifts in the prevailing development paradigms 
that are in the general perspectives on answering to these two questions. Next, it describes a 
perspective on policies at the national and the international level, and concludes with a brief 
discussion of possible implications of these policies for food security related research. 
14.2. Past shifts in the development paradigm 
Over the past decades, development paradigms have undergone many changes. Table 14.1 shows 
some of the poles in between which they have been drifting. One might argue that tensions 
existed mainly between overall approaches that aim at strengthening the economic performance 
of the whole population on the one hand, and targeted approaches that try to help the individual 
in need on the other (see also Keyzer, 1998a). 
Table 14.1. The dialectics of development paradigms. 
Coordination Participation 
Discipline Democracy 
Conditionality Ownership 
Innovation Respect of traditions 
Shocks Gradualism 
Growth Equity 
Infrastructure Micro-credit 
Trade Aid 
To the outsider, these shifts might convey an impression of lacking orientation and effectiveness, 
as if the field was more driven by its failures than by its successes. 
Adjustment to failures 
Indeed, one might argue that the agenda of priorities both in research and in practical policies is 
largely controlled by donor agencies, which need to be convinced, time and again, of the positive 
and significant returns from their contributions. These agencies tend to focus on situations where 
the needs are great and the crisis is deep. Those are often situations where accepted paradigms 
have failed and where radical change is called for, and in fact the issue of food insecurity itself 
tends to be raised in this context of crisis and famine. In addition, the returns from aid should be 
visible, and this is more easily achieved in micro-approaches through a video of a happy fisherman 
who just received a new boat, than through a modest participation in a major multilaterally 
financed project, that might put local vegetation at risk. 
Macro - micro debate 
Yet there is a growing understanding that development assistance cannot help the whole 
population in an equitable way if it is fully oriented to the individual. At the same time economists 
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have, in the context of the macro-micro debate, come to recognize that macro-economic growth 
should be such that it also benefits the poor and reduces their food insecurity, even if the rich 
gain more. 
From positivism to postmodernism 
There is, however, another aspect that deserves mentioning, which the research community in the 
field of food security and development might not sufficiently be aware of. It relates to the strong 
impact of past and ongoing philosophical debates on what is generally perceived as common 
wisdom. These debates have themselves been strongly affected by real world events, such as the 
collapse of communism and other great ideologies, but they were also influenced by deeper and 
long-term undercurrentsin science. In a nutshell, one might argue that mainstream positivism, 
with its attempt at describing the world in full so as to control it better, has over the past decade 
or two lost much ground to the post-modernism of writers such as Rorty (1991) who emphasize 
community and consensus building. The post-modernists think that the description wil l always be 
so imperfect that control is unreliable, and, furthermore, that this illusion of controllability has 
proven dangerous as it was often misused to justify despotism and terror. Post-modernist like to 
search for consensus and this naturally leads to dialectic processes, and to a relativistic attitude 
with respect to ideologies. 
14.3. Policies at national level: three lessons learned 
Yet this variability in policy stance does not mean that it is impossible to learn any lesson from 
past experiences. At this point and at the risk of oversimplification, let us try to summarize these 
lessons. There wil l be four. The first, highly post-modernist one is the following. 
Lesson 1: The worst food security crises are due less to wrong choice of economic paradigm 
than to failures of political system. 
Oppression, chaos and wars disrupt the food security and human well being more than any 
misguided policy can ever do with a government that maintains law and order. Cambodia, China 
in 70's, Guatemala, Haiti, Soviet-Union prior to '89 and present-day Russia and Sudan are only 
some of the many examples. In positive terms, a national government can make a fundamental 
contribution to food security by fulfilling its minimal task of providing law and order. We only 
mention law and order, since the evidence unfortunately does not warrant the direct conclusion 
that grassroot democracy and respect of human rights, are closely correlated with successful 
development (Srinivasan, 1997). 
Lesson 2: No country can solve its food security problem by foreign aid or domestic 
redistribution alone. Successful countries tend to have a long-term government 
commitment to development, with a pluriform and shifting policy emphasis. 
Usually, in successful countries the policy has been inward looking and hardware-oriented at the 
start of the development process and has gradually shifted its emphasis to human development, 
democracy and export orientation. Successful governments assume an active role in economic 
planning, where they provide more central guidance than the adepts of the free market economy 
might wish, but where they maintain a pluriform and economy-wide perspective that is not kept 
hostage by sectoral interests, and leaves ample room for private initiative. Prominent examples 
are, in random order, and in spite of current financial crises in some of these countries, Chile, 
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present-day China, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, the state of Punjab in India and, finally, 
Taiwan. 
Lesson 3- Employment is the key factor. 
Notwithstanding the gains than can be achieved through improved food habits and hygiene, 
there is virtually a general consensus that malnutrition is primarily due to poverty, and that 
poverty alleviation is intimately linked to unemployment, since redistribution of assets or aid 
cannot solve the problem. Indeed, successful countries tend to concentrate their efforts on 
achieving steady growth in remunerative employment. They maintain social safety nets of some 
sort, often in the form of ration card systems, in the explicit understanding that this does more 
than avoiding hardship and maintaining social stability, since it also contributes to labor 
productivity. Malnutrition is both cause and consequence of poverty, as higher food consumption 
enables the worker to become more active. 
As a corollary to this lesson, one may notice that agriculturalgrowth is, by itself, not the solution, 
since agriculture generally offers little growth in income and even less in employment. Clearly, 
this is not to argue that agriculturalgrowth is irrelevant. Most food insecure people in developing 
countries currently live in rural areas, and lack the skills for securing remunerative non-
agricultural employment. Consequently, it is important to improve their opportunities to work in 
agriculture. Nonetheless, it is very difficult to achieve sustained growth in yields of more than 
three per cent, and even more difficultto combine this with a growth in employment. Therefore, 
unless there is ample unused land available for cultivation, elementary arithmetic already 
indicates that countries with a population growth in excess of two per cent per annum, can hardly 
rely on agriculture in their attempts to reach food security through adequate employment. In 
addition, the expansion of agricultural production is only feasible if the up- and downstream 
sectors develop in parallel, and this necessitates substantialinvestments outside agriculture. 
Clearly, in the long run a developing country cannot afford to solve its poverty problems solely by 
creation of artificial jobs in the public sector. Employment policies should be sustainable, which 
means that it should primarily be obtained in the private sector, and naturally leads to the final 
and central lesson: 
Lesson 4- Invest in proper functioning of markets. 
For developing countries that suffer from a food security problem, the slogan "trade no aid" is 
now more relevant than ever. First, aid flows have been stagnating, and there are many 
competitors for aid funds: countries from the former Eastern block, South East Asia bail-outs and 
there is much pressure to use the funds for peace-keeping operations and commercial 
investments. In fact, developing countries have increasingly recognized the importance of private 
foreign investment, though many of them have by now experienced the disadvantages of 
accepting footloose foreign capital. Secondly, the alternative of autarky has never been less viable 
than at present, as virtually no country can develop without imports of oil, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, or computer software on the global market. Finally, there is general recognition 
that it is impossible to address the hunger problem exclusively by means of targeted aid to the 
poor, not only because of the vast sums of money this would require, but also because of the 
problems created by aid-dependence itself. In short, as emphasized in the Rome Declaration of 
'96, food security policy is primarily a matter of eliminating existing barriers to private initiative on 
domestic and international markets, while both national governments, internationalinstitutions 
and the world community at large are primarily seen as providers of an "enabling environment" 
for the proper functioning of these markets. 
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The practical implications of these principles were already touched upon. A food security policy 
cannot rely on markets unless these exist. If there are no means of transporting goods from one 
place to the other, local markets can be flourishing, but supply shocks due to, say, crop failures in 
specific regions, cannot be cushioned by commodity trade between these markets, there is no 
scope for specialization, and the local supply is constrained by local demand, and vice versa. Thus, 
infrastructuraldevelopment is essentialif market integration is to be achieved. A discussion of this 
and the many other requirements for the proper functioning of markets obviously falls beyond 
the scope of this paper. These requirements include protection of property rights, through a well 
functioning police and judiciary system. They also include good access to information about 
prevailing market conditions, and hence assured freedom and sufficient reach of news media. The 
system for grading of commodities should be reliable and its inspectors should know chalk from 
cheese. In addition, state and other monopolies should be avoided to the extent possible. Finally, 
government should be providing guidance to the process of technologicalinnovation and of 
expansion of physical and social infrastructure. 
In short, for markets to function, the national government should invest significant resources in 
their creation and upkeeping and maintain a very active presence. Clearly, many developing 
countries are far from reaching this ideal but their resolve to achieve it should be clear and 
outspoken. Incidentally, these policies do not imply that internationaltrade should be liberalized 
overnight, and even less that all controls on capital flows should be lifted. As long as market 
imperfections persist, government should fight them and at the same time take corrective actions. 
All this is well known by now and well accepted in international circles. However, it raises the 
question as to the role that is left for development assistance beyond the provision of funds that 
should help well-intentioned national governments fulfil l their mandate. This is the question to 
which we now turn. 
14.4. Enabling global environment: an agenda 
Being a friend 
It is not possible to considerthe future of development assistance, without touching upon the 
basic question as to why people in developed countries are willing to provide any assistance at all. 
Over the years, many non-altruistic motives have been suggested, ranging from the promotion of 
commercial interests through subsidized export credits, to the absolution of past guilt. Be this as it 
may, a development assistance policy that purely bases itself on non-altruistic motives has no long 
term future as public expenditure category, for the simple reason that the tax-payer would 
eventually become unwilling to keep on subsidizing exports in this way. Moreover, the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) would start denouncing these exports as unfair trading practices. As to 
the guilt argument, it also requires credibility to be effective. In short, developing assistance has at 
the very least to look altruistic to be sustainable from the donor side. 
In fact, opinion polls tend to indicate that most people in Europe are not indifferentto the hunger 
and poverty in the world but, in the era of individualism and competition, they care more about 
themselves and next of kin. Moreover, the past record convincingly shows that aid and self-
sacrifice would not solve the problem. Consequently, one should not count on significant 
increases in aid disbursement in the near future, except in dramatic emergency situations. 
Here again the shift to a postmodernist worldview should be recognized as a long-term and 
lasting trend. For development assistance, it means abandoning the "control" approach to the 
hunger problem. Such an approach builds on the morality of paternalism, which means "Being 
like a father", or "Do what a father would do" and sometimes also "Do what The Father would 
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like us to do". In contrast, the postmodernist view calls for a more secular approach, characterized 
by a sense of community (Rorty, 1991), where "being a good friend" is what counts. 
This good friend is critical, fair, respectful of mutual differences and of privacy. He or she helps out 
occasionally, gives advice when asked, and mediates in international conflicts and negotiations. In 
international relations, a good friend is there for the people, not for the president of a country in 
need. He is not a Big Brother, neither is he a Rich Uncle. He does not engage in strategic games 
where the enemy of his enemy becomes a friend. He does not discriminate, and keeps his 
distances, he is not the old pall, the very very best friend. Finally, he may expect a sign of 
appreciation once in a while. 
The friend's agenda 
Now let us try to make this notion of friendship somewhat more operational. The basic message 
so far has been that, since food security cannot be achieved by financial aid and redistribution 
alone, to address the problem, it becomes necessary to use the energies of the market 
mechanism. National governments should therefore invest in the proper functioning of markets, 
while keeping the other three lessons at the forefront of their policy agenda: maintain law and 
order in a civil society, maintain a coherent development perspective and ensure sustained 
growth in employment. 
However, when it comes to achieving fair international relations, there is not much that 
disbursement of official development aid can achieve. Here the best and most friendly help a 
donor country can give is to create a level playing field. This part of the argument has several 
ramifications that were discussed elsewhere (Keyzer, 1997, LNV-BZ, 1996) and wil l only be 
summarized briefly. 
First, it is clearthat developing countries should have access to the markets of developed 
countries, to enable them to sell their produce, and buy the necessary imports from the proceeds. 
The current policies of the EU, which only grants preferential access to a selected group of 
countries is highly deficient in this respect (Küster, 1998). The upcoming round of WTO 
negotiations should emphasize the point that free trade means more than a reduction of export 
subsidies. The key element in free trade is free access for imports. Export subsidies wil l then adjust 
automatically. The current proposals for agricultural reform of the EU presented in the context of 
Agenda 2000 and the views of the EU for a new Lomé Convention do not augur well in this 
respect. 
Secondly, there should be free competition. The poorest developing countries wil l not gain from 
GATT/WTO rounds of trade liberalization if the reductions in tariffs are gradually being replaced 
by increases in monopoly margins. As recognized in the conclusions of an Inter-governmental 
forum on food security that was organized by the European Commission in December last year, it 
is very important that competition be safeguarded in areas such a seeds, pharmaceuticals, 
equipment for electricity plants, computer software and airplanes. While most developed 
countries currently pursue an active anti-trust policy on their own markets, there is so far no 
organization that fulfills this task at the international level (Keyzer, 1998b, CEC-Solagral, 1998, 
Keyzer & Merbis, 1997) 
Thirdly, it should be recognized that constraints on labor migration amount to protecting the 
trade in services. While developed countries currently stress the importance of liberalization of 
this type of trade within the WTO, they only open their borders to political refugees and refuse 
economic migrants. This is an anomaly that deserves serious attention. It seems unlikely that a 
densely populated country, such as Bangladesh, wi l l ever, within the confines of its national 
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borders, be able to secure remunerative employment to everyone. It is admittedly utopie to expect 
a return to the conditions of relatively free migration that prevailed in the past, when for instance 
major segments of the Irish population had the opportunity of moving to the United States. Yet 
the issue needs to be tabled time and again, if only to highlight the current inequality in 
opportunities, and enforce concessions on other subjects. 
One of these subjects might be the implementation of international environmental policies, the 
fourth subject to be mentioned. Few will dispute the basic principle that the atmosphere is the 
common property of all and that polluters should pay every owner for the resources they use. Yet 
the current practice in implementing global warming policies is a different one. Polluters in 
developed countries receive quota in proportion to their emissions in a given base year and are 
only required to compensate others to the extent that they exceed these quota. Moreover, the 
individual in a developing country wi l l in general not see much of these payments. 
This leads us to our fifth and final point, which starts from the observation that international 
markets function on the basis of private initiative, as opposed to inter-state trade. At the same 
time, all negotiations and dispute settlements on the above mentioned subjects are between 
nations. The individual trader has no way of denouncing inappropriate implementation of rules, 
other than through the long and tortuous channels of the bureaucracy of his own country, which 
might, if they so wish, eventually issue a formal complaint. This usually is a hopeless path to 
follow, especiallyfor a small trader. The channels are too long and often the own government will 
prefer to maintain good diplomatic relations with the foreign countries concerned. These 
difficulties could to some extent be circumvented if foreign individuals were granted access to civil 
courts in developed countries where they could file complaints against states or companies that 
violate existing regulations. Clearly, many traders wil l lack the financial means for starting such 
proceedings, but recognition of the principle is by itself important, as it reflects the sincere wil l to 
create a level playing field (LNV-BZ,1996). 
14.5. Implications for food security related research 
To the specialized agronomist, the discussion so far might seem rather abstract. Therefore, let us 
conclude with a few remarks on the implications for food security related research, starting with 
the general observation that changes in research priorities over time seem to reflect shifts in 
paradigm of the type listed earlier (Table 14.1). This seems unavoidable as these priorities are to a 
large extent governed by the prevailing concerns of the funding agencies. 
We argue that applied researchers, while showing willingness to meet the challenges of the day, 
should not follow too closely the fluctuating concerns of the political arena, as this could lead to 
an erratic type of research that addresses topical issues but shows no real progress. The dilemma 
can be resolved if research methods rely on theoreticalframeworks that are sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate shifts in emphasis without requiring major re-orientations. Moreover, the 
researcher should know where the own contribution fits within the overall picture and be aware 
of paradigm shifts in the past, as this wil l allow him to anticipate the necessary modifications and 
extensions of his tools and knowledge base. 
This suggests an organizational structure that partitions the subject into thematic fields. 
Table 14.2 gives an impression of how these fields are defined at SOW-VU. Within each field, 
researchers can develop specialized expertise but applied projects often require inputs from more 
than one thematic field. 
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Table 14.2. Thematic fields at SOW-VU. 
Thematic field 
International: 
WTO, CAP, Kyoto, 
the friend's agenda 
National: 
public investment allocations 
taxation, trade policies,... 
Household: 
human development 
institutional constraints 
vulnerable groups 
Spatial: 
land development 
infrastructural projects 
diffusion of pollutants 
Agronomy 
resource base 
extension 
yield functions 
land, water 
hydrology 
The main challenge is to seek integrat ion across themes whi le respecting the integri ty of the 
disciplines concerned, and maintaining the social and spatial diversity in higher levels of analysis. 
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15. Closing presentation 
P.S. Bindraban 
Research Institute for Agrobiology and Soil Fertility (AB-DLO), P.O. Box 14, 
NL-6700 AA Wageningen, The Netherlands 
This is the end of the seminar series on Food Security at different scales: issues, challenges and 
opportunities. When I invited speakers to this series, I got a lot of comments and suggestions to 
improve the set-up. Socio-economists thought that the series were too technical, while the more 
technical scientists wondered why it had to be so broad. Now, I think that we know that 
solutions to the problem of food security can neither be too broad, nor too technical. Even in 
this series with 15 presentations, we have not exhaustively discussed the issues, challenges and 
opportunities on food security. This however, was a good start to shape the discussion and to 
identify researchable issues. 
Briefly, a couple of major issues that were identified I would like to mention. Food security 
concerns the production, distribution, access and quality of food. The geographical and 
temporal scales, and both participatory bottom-up and top-down analyses turned out to be 
important. 
It need not argued anymore that enough food can be produced in the world at the global level, 
but this does not mean that it wil l happen just like that. An increasing amount of food wil l have 
to be produced on the same agricultural area, which will result in increased pressure on the 
natural resource base. Much attention will be needed therefore on sustainable agricultural 
production systems, considering variability and risk in production. 
Regions, countries and individuals need not be self-sufficient in food, as long as they can be 
self-reliant. That means that enough income should be generated either in- or outside 
agriculture. The loss of labor from agriculture should for instance not be seen as a threat, but 
more as a way to make agricultural more productive in terms of labor and inputs. 
Access to food should be improved at all scales, but probably most at the micro level. That is, 
good extension and information is needed to create awareness on how to prevent malnutrition, 
by choosing nutritious food, once income allows it, and by balanced proportional distribution 
of food among family members. 
Developments should be studied at different scales in a comprehensive integrated manner. 
Related to the geographical scale, the interactions between developments at the global and 
local scale are very important to understand. Local effort to increase, say the meat production in 
West Africa, wil l not be successful if global developments, like the dumping of meat on the 
world market, cut down the required conditions of good prices. While participatory bottom-up 
approaches are needed, top-down approaches to reveal broader and general developments, 
opportunities and limitations at higher levels should not be rejected. This aspect has also been 
emphasized in the declaration of the World Food Summit. 
Another scale concerns the temporal aspects of development. Poverty driven decisions at lower 
levels to assure food supply at the short term may jeopardize long-term sustainable 
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developments. Both situations need attention, and creative solutions may be needed to realize 
a phase of transition. 
Some major international developments are currently taking place, which wil l have strong 
impact on food security in developing nations. 
Liberalization is expected to be beneficial for food consumers around the world and ultimately 
put an end to subsidized over-production in the North, reducing dumping of food. But then, the 
formation of monopolies may become a real problem. During this series, a number of other 
shortcomings of liberalization have been identified. A liberal market is not expected to reach 
the poorest of the poor, those who are most severely under-nourished. Also, a liberal market 
system may not protect our natural resource base, as long as these resources are not well 
priced or privately owned. Many poor live in so-called marginal regions. These are not exactly 
the regions that are likely to benefit from liberalized markets. If these regions are not 
developed, instability and disintegration of societies may be the result. Another issue that needs 
attention is unequal conditions of departure in negotiations on liberalization, generally 
unfavorable for poorer countries. Also, market forces may not trigger investment at the right 
time. Prices increase when demand has exceeded supply. The problem of shortage has then 
already occurred. 
Although direct impact of global climate change on agricultural production may be still under 
discussion and investigation, political measures to reduce emission of gasses at world level, like 
suggested on the climate conference in Kyoto, also wil l have strong impact on developments in 
relation to food security. What gains can be obtained from measures like joint implementation, 
emission trade, clean development mechanism, technology transfer, etc.1 Will an additional 
f low of capital towards the developing countries improve food security? Are the measures a 
crowbar to create access of multinationals and western companies into developing nations? 
These are some of the major issues that have come up. If you have missed any, and I am sure 
that this list is far from complete, please submit that in writing. This overview indicates that 
answers to these questions can only be found by comprehensive analyses, requiring joint forces 
from the various disciplines involved. Collaborative efforts are needed among sdentists within 
the Wageningen University and Research Centre, but also with other scientists of universities 
and institutes in and outside the Netherlands, in interaction with stakeholders, be it politicians, 
extension service, farmers, NGO's , private organizations, etc. 
This series has set the stage for further discussion and should be followed up. The presentations 
wil l be published and we will work on a Wageningen platform on food security. All this should 
accelerate and streamline collaborative efforts on the desire to realize food security for at least 
one billion people. 
I would like to thank all the speakers, chairpersons, and participants for their contribution in 
these series. Also on behalf of the research schools Production Ecology, Wageningen Institute 
for Animal Science and the Mansholt Institute, the institute for Agrobiology and Soil Fertility, 
the Program "North-South" of DLO and DGIS. I have assured that the liquid intake of the 
speakers and of all of us is secured; just outside there are some drinks, to stimulate an informal 
get-together and to get the discussion and collaborations going. Please keep actively 
participating in these initiatives. 
Thank you for your interest. 
